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Abstract 
This is a study of the identities and political mobilisation of the Lebanese 
Shiʿa throughout the modern history of Lebanon. Currently, the dominant 
paradigms for such studies focus on the question of sectarianism in 
Lebanon and the corresponding Shiʿi political movements, Amal and 
Hizbullah. This thesis presents an alternative approach. It argues that 
secular identities have also been an important component of the Shiʿi 
community’s political mobilisation. This is explored through an analysis of 
the relationship between the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) and the 
communist Shiʿa.  
 
Drawing on interviews with senior LCP officials, current and former Shiʿi 
communists, party documents and additional interview evidence from the 
documentary film, We Were Communists, this thesis examines the origins, 
evolution and transformation of the relationship between the LCP and the 
Shiʿa after Lebanese independence in 1943, until the end of the Lebanese 
Civil War in 1990. Utilising the concepts of identity and political 
mobilisation, this thesis develops a hybridised approach to the study of 
political identity that combines primordial with constructionist readings of 
identity. This acknowledges the presence of a repertoire of multiple and 
varied identities among any individual or group, and their potential for 
mobilisation. Rather than assuming the domineering influence of 
primordial sentiments, such as sectarian identity, the hybridised approach 
requires an analysis of the conditions under which a particular identity 
becomes the basis for political mobilisation.  
 
In the aftermath of Lebanese independence in 1943, the Shiʿi community’s 
political mobilisation was characterised by a politics of resistance. This was 
a product of the legacy of the Shiʿi community’s experience of the French 
Mandate (1920-1943), as well as the newly reformulated confessional 
political system that was established by the National Pact (1943). The net 
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effect of these processes was the marginalisation of the Shiʿa. The LCP, as a 
prominent anti-system opposition movement in Lebanon at this time, 
became the Shiʿi community’s main vehicle for the mobilisation and 
development of their resistance identity.  
 
During the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) the relationship between 
communism and the Shiʿa transformed as the LCP went into decline and 
new Shiʿi political actors emerged. The mantle of the Shiʿi community’s 
resistance identity became subject to the tensions between communism and 
communalism within the community. In the end, the Shiʿi community’s 
resistance identity was adopted and repackaged by Hizbullah, under 
whose auspices it remains today.   
 
The Shiʿi-communist relationship constitutes the Shiʿi community’s first 
engagement with formal, party-based and ideologically driven political 
mobilisation in Lebanon. The impact and legacy of the LCP’s influence on 
the Shiʿa in these terms encompasses not just the communist Shiʿa, but 
every other political actor in the community. Concern over the growing 
influence of communism led directly to the political mobilisation of the 
previously quietist Shiʿi religious clerics. This outcome is represented by 
the arrival of Imam Musa al-Sadr to Lebanon in 1959 and his stated goal of 
combatting the influence of communism among the Shiʿa. This thesis is an 
important addendum to the current understanding of the origins of Shiʿi 
political mobilisation, which erroneously place Musa al-Sadr at the 
beginning of that process.  
 
This study’s emphasis on alternative, non-sectarian forms of political 
identity is also a reminder of the Shiʿi community’s political diversity at a 
time when critical voices, resentful of Hizbullah’s and Amal’s monopoly, 
are currently emerging from within the ShiʿI community. 
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Introduction 
Traditionally, the origins of the Shiʿi community’s political mobilisation in 
Lebanon have been associated with the emergence of distinctly Shiʿi 
sectarian and religious political identities. This is evidenced by the 
abundance of studies available on Hizbullah and, to a lesser extent, Amal. 
Departing from these paradigms, this thesis argues that secular political 
identities have played a crucial role in the political mobilisation of the 
Lebanese Shiʿa. In fact, this study shows that the first example of the Shiʿi 
community’s engagement with formal, ideologically driven and party-
based political activity occurred under the auspices of the Lebanese 
Communist Party (LCP), in the aftermath of Lebanon’s independence in 
1943. This is an important corrective to most conventional accounts of the 
Shiʿi community’s political mobilisation, which associate the origins of this 
process with the activities of the Shiʿi Imam, Musa al-Sadr. 
In order to explore the role played by secular identities in the political 
mobilisation of the Lebanese Shiʿa, this thesis analyses the origins, 
evolution and transformation of the relationship between the LCP and the 
Shiʿa after Lebanese independence in 1943, until the end of the Lebanese 
Civil War in 1990. The analysis utilises theories of identity and political 
mobilisation to construct a conceptual framework for the study of how 
political identities become mobilised. This framework is then applied to the 
analysis of the primary sources for this study, which include interviews 
with senior LCP officials, current and former Shiʿi communists, party 
documents and additional interview evidence from a recent Lebanese 
documentary film entitled Shiyuʿiyyin Kunna (We Were Communists). The 
analysis finds that not only did secular political identities constitute the 
initial basis of Shiʿi political mobilisation in Lebanon, but that the 
relationship between the communist Shiʿa and the LCP led directly to the 
mobilisation of other, previously quietist, political actors among the Shiʿa. 
In this sense Musa al-Sadr’s political project did not constitute the 
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beginning of the Shiʿi community’s political mobilisation, but a clerical 
challenge to the growing influence of communism among the Shiʿa.  
The Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) and the Taif Accord (1989) which 
ended the conflict, created a climate in which sectarian identities became 
reaffirmed and newly legitimised in Lebanon. This occurred to the 
detriment of most secular political movements in the country, not least the 
LCP. The decline of the LCP directly facilitated the emergence of the new 
Shiʿi sectarian players, Amal and Hizbullah, who capitalised on the LCP’s 
loss of territorial influence in the Shiʿi locales of Lebanon during the war. 
However, the legacy of political learning imparted by the Shiʿi 
community’s association with the LCP was visible in the political 
programmes and strategies of mobilisation adopted by the new Shiʿi 
players. The resistance identity upon which the relationship with the LCP 
was initially forged, also left a lasting imprint on the Shiʿi community’s 
political mobilisation. In the wake of the LCP’s decline, this resistance 
identity has been adopted, reformulated and ultimately monopolised by 
Hizbullah. The concept of resistance, although subject to transformation, 
remains a central tenet of the Shiʿi community’s political identity today. Its 
making, however, originates with the communist Shiʿi.  
In this introductory chapter the discussion begins with a background of the 
Shiʿi community’s political development throughout the modern history 
Lebanon. The discussion then moves on to establish the research rationale 
for this thesis. This includes a critique of current trajectories in the 
historiography of the Lebanese Shiʿa. The secondary literature is analysed, 
suggesting reasons why the relationship between communism and the 
Shiʿa has been largely overlooked by scholars, and highlighting the key 
areas of this relationship that are addressed by this study. The research 
hypothesis, main research questions and methodology are then outlined, 
before providing an overview of the key terms that are deployed 
throughout this study. The introduction ends with a summary of the main 
chapters of the thesis. 
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Background 
The Shiʿi community’s struggle against marginalisation and the pursuit of 
rights, recognition and inclusion as equal citizens in the burgeoning 
Lebanese state pre-dates Lebanon’s acquisition of independence in 1943. 
During the Ottoman Empire (1516-1920), the Ottoman state officially 
designated the Shiʿa as heretics. Nevertheless, the political families who 
represented the Shiʿa at this time (the zuʿamaʾ) managed to strike a delicate 
balance between the experience of Ottoman subjugation and repression, the 
pursuit of political inclusion in the Ottoman state, and the maintenance of 
administrative autonomy in the Shiʿi locales of the Bekaa Valley and Jabal 
ʿAmil. That autonomy however, was lost with the imposition of the French 
Mandate (1920-1943). 
 
The borders established by France incorporated the territory of the Bekaa 
and Jabal ʿAmil into the new Lebanon. French rule facilitated, at the behest 
of the Muslim majority, the political, social, cultural and economic 
dominance of the Maronite Christian minority community in Lebanon. This 
led to fissures and competing narratives between the Christian and Muslim 
communities over Lebanon’s national identity. Officially, the Shiʿa were 
subsumed within the Sunni Muslim position. In reality, the Shiʿi 
community found itself pushed and pulled between French attempts to 
court Shiʿi loyalties to their European modelled Lebanese state, and the 
Arab nationalists, who looked eastward toward the Arab world, rejected 
the French idea of Greater Lebanon and sought the restoration of Greater 
Syria. The Shiʿa did not develop a unified position on these questions 
during the French Mandate. In fact, the political expediency of the Shiʿi 
zuʿamaʾ, whose loyalties to the French and Arab nationalist positions 
frequently alternated, became a source of resentment among others in the 
Shiʿi community. This produced new sites of political mobilisation among 
the Shiʿi literati, peasantry and workers.  
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During the French Mandate, the political mobilisation of the Shiʿa consisted 
initially of a politics of demand - agitation for greater recognition of Shiʿi 
rights, increased state investment in Shiʿi regions and demands for political 
inclusion in the Maronite Christian and Sunni Muslim dominated Lebanese 
polity. As the Shiʿa grew frustrated over their continued marginalisation by 
the French authorities, their political strategy shifted to a politics of protest 
involving strike action and demonstrations. Thus, on the eve of Lebanese 
independence, the Shiʿa were already politically restive, with a developing 
diversity of political identities and commensurately broadened sites of 
political mobilisation. 
 
Lebanon achieved independence from French colonial rule in 1943 on the 
basis of a verbal and unwritten agreement known as the National Pact. The 
agreement was the product of exclusive negotiations between Bishara al-
Khoury (a Maronite Christian) and Riad al-Solh (a Sunni Muslim), 
respectively the first President and Prime Minister of Lebanon. The Shiʿa, 
along with Lebanon’s many other confessional communities were not 
included in these informal negotiations. The pact institutionalised the 
confessional distribution of political office in Lebanon on the basis of the 
1932 population census. This apportioned political power according to a 6:5 
ratio that favoured the Maronite Christians over the Muslim population.  
The Shiʿa objected to the use of a census they regarded as flawed due to its 
exclusion of large Shiʿi areas. The National Pact permanently allocated to 
the Shiʿa the Speakership of the Lebanese parliament, while the Maronite 
Christians were assured the Presidency and Sunni Muslims the office of 
Prime Minister.  
 
The Shiʿi community was disappointed with the circumstances in which 
Lebanon’s confessional political system was institutionalised under the 
terms of the National Pact. This disappointment was compounded by the 
continued deterioration of the political, social and economic position of the 
Shiʿa in the aftermath of Lebanon’s independence. In this environment, 
some Shiʿa came to regard the National Pact as a tool for the maintenance 
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of the privileged few who held power in Lebanon. They began to view the 
provisions of the pact as intertwined with the corrupt and personalist 
political dominance of the political families. This state of affairs guaranteed 
the perpetuation of the political status quo and privileges of Lebanon’s 
sectarian elites. It was for these reasons that Shiʿi political mobilisation 
developed a rejectionist element in the aftermath of Lebanon’s 
independence. The pursuit of political inclusion, and the politics of 
demand and protest that had accompanied that agenda, gave way to a new 




Until the 1980s, the Lebanese Shiʿa did not constitute a genre of its own in 
the field of Lebanese studies. The Shiʿa were subsumed within general 
histories of Lebanon, and they were more likely to be found in the indexes 
rather than the contents pages of these volumes.1 Scholarship of modern 
Lebanese history has focused predominantly on debates about 
sectarianism, often in relation to the question of national identity in 
Lebanon and the origins of the confessional political system.2  Reflecting 
their lived experience in Lebanon at this time, the Shiʿa were relegated to 
the margins of these analyses, which focussed on the mainstream Maronite 
Christian and Druze Muslim narratives of Lebanon’s origins. This implied 
that the Shiʿa community’s absence from the national deliberations that 
paved the way to Lebanese independence in 1943 was because the Shiʿa 
                                                
1 Although they have since been revised and updated, some examples of these first 
histories of Lebanon include, William Harris, Lebanon: A History, 600-2011, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2012  Kemal Salibi, A House of Many Mansions: The History of 
Lebanon Reconsidered, London: I.B Tauris, 1988; Philip K. Hitti, Lebanon in History: From the 
Earliest Times to the Present, London: Macmillan, 1957; David Gilmour, Lebanon: The 
Fractured Country, London: Sphere, 1987; Meir Zamir, Lebanon’s Quest: The Road to 
Statehood, 1926-1939, London: I.B Tauris, 1997; Raghid el-Solh, Lebanon and Arabism: 
National Identity and State Formation, London I.B. Tauris, 2004;  Engin Akarli, The Long 
Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920, University of California Press, 1993, Nadim Shehadi 
and Dana Haffar Mills, Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus, London: The Centre for 
Lebanese Studies & I.B. Tauris, 1988. 
2 For numerous examples and analysis of the nature of this body of work, see Max Weiss, 
‘The Historiography of Sectarianism in Lebanon’, History Compass, 7:1, 2009 pp. 141–151. 
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were a passive, quietist and disengaged community. The Shiʿi community’s 
marginalisation was thus equated with their political alienation.  
 
In the 1980s and 1990s a new subfield of Lebanese Shiʿi studies emerged 
that focussed on Hizbullah as a radical, militant Shiʿi organisation.3 This 
was a direct result of the international interest Hizbullah had accrued from 
its attacks on Israeli and American forces in the context of the Lebanese 
Civil War. Studies of Amal and its founder Musa al-Sadr also emerged 
during this period. Theses analyses developed under the thematic rubric of 
a ‘Shiʿi awakening’, but they were rooted in events largely external to 
Lebanon.4 Amal’s ascendence was attributed to the disappearance of its 
founder, Musa al-Sadr on a trip to Libya in 1978 (Sadr was never seen or 
heard from again, and his whereabouts remains subject to intense 
speculation today). Israel’s invasion of South Lebanon (a Shiʿi region) the 
same year, and again in 1982 were also strongly correlated with Amal’s and 
Hizbullah’s rise as military actors. The significance of the Iranian 
Revolution for these movements was additionally touted by scholars as 
part of a broader ‘Shiʿi awakening’ in the region. Suddenly, the previously 
quietist, passive Shiʿi community emerged as religious, sectarian and 
violent. These were ahistorical assumptions, for now the Shiʿi community’s 
experience of repression and marginalisation was no longer equated with 
alienation per se, but their radicalisation and mobilisation.  
 
                                                
3 These texts have also since been revised and updated but include Hala Jaber, Hezbollah: 
Born with a Vengeance, London: The Fourth Estate, 1997; Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: 
The Changing Face of Terrorism, London: I.B Tauris, 2005; Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu’llah: 
Politics and Religion, London: Pluto Press, 2002; Naim Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from 
Within, London: Saqi Books, 2005; Augustus Richard Norton, Hizbollah: A Short History, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007. 
4 Thom Sicking and Shereen Khairallah, ‘The Shiʿi Awakening in Lebanon: A Search for 
Radical Change in a Traditional Way,’, Vision and Revision in Arab Society, CEMAN Reports 
2, 1974, pp. 97–130; Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the Shia: Struggle for the Soul of 
Lebanon, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987; Fouad Ajami, The Vanished Imam: Musa 
Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon, London: I.B Tauris, 1986; Majed Halawi, A Lebanon Defied: 
Musa Sadr and the Shii community, Boulder: Westview Press, 1992;  Peter Theroux, The 
Strange Disappearance of Imam Moussa Sadr, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987. 
  21 
In the 2000s, scholarship of the Lebanese Shiʿa shifted slightly from its 
preoccupation with recent Shiʿi political actors, and travelled back in time 
in to search for the origins of Shiʿi political mobilisation. These new studies 
explored the Shiʿi community’s political development under the Ottoman 
Empire (1516-1920) as well as the French Mandate (1920-1943).5 Stefan 
Winter’s study of the Shiʿa under Ottoman rule challenges the view, 
frequently made in the Shiʿi community’s own historiography, that the 
Shiʿa were systematically persecuted by the Ottoman state. Winter argues 
that the Ottomans did not always view the Shiʿa in sectarian terms, despite 
the community’s official status as heretics. On the contrary, the Ottomans 
frequently coopted the powerful Shiʿi political families into the 
administrative apparatus of the Empire. Thus, Winter demonstrated that 
the Shiʿa were far from passive actors but politically active and engaged 
from as early as the 16th and 17th centuries.  
 
Moving into the French Mandate, Tamara Chalabi, Kais M. Firro and Max 
Weiss argue that the Shiʿa were actively seeking their rights and 
recognition in communal terms, ’as Shiʿa’ during this period through the 
enactment of matlabiyya, the politics of demand. Weiss claims that this was 
a two-way process of ‘sectarianization’ from above and below. In his view, 
the French sought to encourage Shiʿi particularism and the Shiʿa actively 
lobbied the French for legal rights and recognition as a distinct religious 
sect. Thus, the French granted the Shiʿa jurisdiction over matters of 
personal status, recognising the authority of the Jafari courts, and their 
adjudication of the community’s affairs according to Twelver (Shiʿa) 
religious rulings.6 Firro also discusses the interaction between the French 
                                                
5  Stefan Winter, The Shiites of Lebanon under Ottoman Rule, 1516-1788, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010; Tamara Chalabi, The Shiʿis of Jabal Amil and the New 
Lebanon, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006; Kais M. Firro, ‘Ethnicizing the Shiis in 
Mandatory Lebanon’ Middle Eastern Studies, 42:5, 2007, pp. 741–759 and also ’The Shiis in 
Lebanon: Between Communal ‘Asabiyya and Arab Nationalism 1908-1921’, Middle Eastern 
Studies, 42:4, 2006, pp. 535–550; Max Weiss, In the Shadow of Sectarianism: Law, Shiism, and 
the Making of Modern Lebanon, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003. 
6 Weiss, In the Shadow of Sectarianism, 15. 
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Mandate and Shiʿa as a process through which the French sought to 
promote Shiʿi particularism. 7  These contributions challenge the earlier 
assumptions made by scholars, which overstated the extent of the Shiʿi 
community’s marginalisation, while assuming that this equated initially 
with a passivity before transforming into a radical awakening. The newer 
studies of the Shiʿi community’s early political development suggest that 
the Shiʿa were already active political players by the time Lebanon 
acquired its independence in 1943, while also comprising a highly diverse 
body politic with multiple and changeable political identities. This thesis is 
situated here, but this point is also where this analysis stakes its claims for 
a new approach to the study of the Shiʿa, after 1943.  
 
Although the historical remit of Lebanese Shiʿi studies has necessarily 
expanded over the last fifteen years, the field’s paradigmatic approaches 
have remained largely the same. Studies of the Lebanese Shiʿa are spread 
across three main themes: the theory and practice of Twelver Shiʿism, 
political Shiʿism, and sectarianism. 
 
The theory and practice of Shiʿism in the community of believers is a 
prominent theme in studies of the Lebanese Shiʿa. These studies focus on 
the theological practices of the Lebanese Shiʿa in the public and private 
spheres. Included here are issues concerning faith, doctrine, ritual and 
performance e.g. the commemorative festivals and practices associated 
with Muharram and ‘Ashura’.8 One of the most interesting findings to 
emerge from this body of work is the diversity of interpretation that exists 
within the community in the fulfilment and enactment of religious rites. 
                                                
7 Firro, ‘Ethnicizing the Shiis in Mandatory Lebanon’, 743. 
8 See for examples, Lara Deeb, An Enchanted Modern: Gender and Public Piety in Shii Lebanon, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006; Augustus Richard Norton, ‘Ritual. Blood, 
and Shiite Identity: Ashura in Nabatiyya, Lebanon’, The Drama Review: Special Issue on 
Ta’ziyeh, 49:4. 2005, pp. 140–144; Lara Deeb, ‘Living Ashura in Lebanon: Mourning 
Transformed to Sacrifice’, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 25:1, 
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Whereas some Shiʿi clerics forbade the practice of flagellation during the 
Muharram marches, in Nabatiyya, the local community continued the 
practice.9 This also serves as an example of the potential for deviation from 
the theory of Shiʿism, usually the purview of the Imam, and how Shiʿism is 
practiced by the community of believers. While the theory and practice of 
Shiʿism is not the core concern of this study, it was sometimes found to be 
relevant to the interaction between communism and the Shiʿa. For example, 
Shiʿi communists sought to transform the lamentation rituals associated 
with the Muharram processions into a strategy for mobilising the Shiʿa 
who observed this ritual, transforming the occasion into a source of 
motivation for resistive forms of political mobilisation. 
 
Another paradigm applied to studies of the Lebanese Shiʿa is that of 
political Shiʿism i.e the role played by religion in the political mobilisation 
of the Shiʿa.10 Scholarly interest in the broader term, political Islam, peaked 
across the field of Middle Eastern studies in the aftermath of the Iranian 
Revolution.11  In Lebanon this became problematic because it exacerbated 
the tendency to assume a link between the Shiʿi community’s political 
mobilisation and its clerical elites. The appearance of Musa al-Sadr within 
almost all studies of the Shiʿa at this time illustrates this trend. The late 
Ayatollah Muhammad Fadlallah was also frequently erroneously described 
as the leader of Hizbullah, (which is in fact sayyid Hasan Nasrallah) or 
otherwise the source of the organisation’s ‘spiritual guidance.’ 12   But 
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although Fadlallah’s ideas influenced Hizbullah, he was never a member or 
affiliate of any political party in Lebanon. 13  Newman criticises this 
tendency to drag Shiʿism into the political arena by assuming the centrality 
of the Imam’s leadership over the community.14  
 
The precise relationship between Shiʿism and politics remains subject to 
scholarly disagreement. Whilst some have bemoaned Shiʿism’s inherent 
opposition to political authority, inherent expansionism and its anti-
Western agenda, others have emphasised Shiʿism’s apparently apolitical, 
otherworldly nature.15 Implicit in these debates however, is an essentialist 
idea that the political attitudes of the Shiʿa are shaped by their religious 
identity. This study finds that these assumptions have obscured the role 
played by secular identities in the political mobilisation of the Shiʿa. 
 
The third main theme underlying studies of the Lebanese Shiʿa is 
sectarianism. The newer studies of the Shiʿa under Ottoman and French 
rule discussed earlier took on the question of sectarianism in a 
commendable effort to bring the Shiʿa into the Lebanese national narrative, 
from which they had long been excluded. Thus, the story of the Shiʿa 
during the French Mandate was about their struggle against marginality, 
and their pursuit of political inclusion in the Lebanese state as equals, but 
also as sectarians. However, the questions underlying this narrative have 
had a teleological focus imposed on them that seeks to understand when 
and how the Shiʿa became sectarian. This is a result of the initial scholarly 
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preoccupation with the distinctly sectarian Shiʿi political actors - Amal and 
Hizbullah. Since it is known that this is how the political mobilisation of 
the Shiʿa culminated, those studies that sought to delve further into this 
community’s history have that outcome in focus. Weiss’ study in particular 
is concerned with the process he describes as the Shiʿi community’s 
sectarianisation. This follows that the Shiʿi community’s struggle for 
inclusion is necessarily a story about the Shiʿa finding their sectarian 
identity, and adjusting to the rules of Lebanon’s sectarian political system 
in order to finally acquire their fair share at the communal table. The 
problem here is that the Shiʿi community’s desire for inclusion as sectarians 
is an assumed rather than proven objective of their political mobilisation in 
the aftermath of Lebanon’s independence.  
 
Weiss et al argue that the Shiʿa became sectarian under the French 
Mandate. 16  However, after French rule ended in 1943, the first Shiʿi 
sectarian political movements did not emerge until 1974, the year Musa al-
Sadr established the Movement of the Deprived. This is a significant 
historical gap. If the Shiʿa had a fully formed sectarian identity on the eve 
of Lebanon’s independence, and the Lebanese system necessitated 
sectarian mobilisation, why did it take more than thirty-years for the Shiʿa 
to establish a sectarian political movement? This study, in scrutinising this 
gap, finds that the Shiʿa did not have a cogent sectarian political identity in 
1943, nor was their political mobilisation characterised by the pursuit of 
inclusion in the political system as sectarians. On the contrary, upon 
Lebanon’s independence the Shiʿa were resisting the political system 
because of its sectarianism, and were utilising a political strategy that was 
distinctly anti-sectarian, and anti-system, rooted in the secular parties of 
the Lebanese left, and the LCP in particular. These political organisations 
sought the abolishment of the confessional political system in its entirety. 
These findings necessitate a shift away from the sectarian paradigm in 
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order to expand our view of the Shiʿi community’s political development in 
Lebanon after 1943.  
 
The rationale for this study stems from the important need to move beyond 
sectarian and religious themes in the study of the Lebanese Shiʿa. This 
thesis argues that these approaches have obscured the presence of secular 
political identities in the Shiʿi community’s identity repertoire. This study 
also seeks to move beyond the view that the development of sectarian 
identities among the Shiʿa was an inevitable process. The analysis 
presented by this thesis demonstrates that this was a highly contingent 
process, and unlike most studies of Amal and Hizbullah, it situates their 
rise firmly and appropriately in the domestic political environment of 
Lebanon at the time of their emergence. In this sense, this study does not 
avert from the fact that sectarian identities are a prevalent feature of the 
contemporary Shiʿi community of Lebanon. On the contrary, by examining 
the relationship between secular identities and the Shiʿa, this thesis 
provides a more dynamic consideration of the interplay between secular 
and sectarian identities in the political development of the Shiʿa between 
1943 and 1990.  
 
Secular Identities and the Shiʿa in the Literature 
Norton made an important observation in 1987 when he noted,  
To an extent that is not widely appreciated, the race to mobilize the 
Shiʿi community during the early 1970s was a race between secular 
creeds and a distinctly sectarian movement.17  
Norton did not elaborate on this statement; the focus of his study was the 
sectarian movement, Amal. Yet the field of Lebanese Shiʿi studies has yet to 
develop an appreciation of the role played by secular identities in their 
political mobilisation. Scholars are broadly aware of the range of secular 
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parties courted by the Shiʿa in the 1960s and 1970s.18 It is also well known 
that the terms ‘Shiʿi’ and ‘Shiyuʿi’ (communist) were used synonymously 
in Beirut’s popular parlance throughout this period, which was a play on 
the assonance between the shared Arabic root of each term.19 Why, then, has 
this relationship not been subject to rigorous scholarly analysis? There are 
two main explanations. 
Firstly, this thesis contends that studies of modern Lebanese history, 
particularly in the context and aftermath of the Lebanese Civil War, have 
marginalised from their analysis the secular movements of the Lebanese 
left. Weiss states that ‘Lebanese history has been more or less defined by its 
engagement with the problem of sectarianism.’20 Only a few exceptions to 
the sectarian narratives of Lebanon, and the civil war in particular, exist; 
and these contributions come from Marxist sociologists.21  The prevalence of 
the sectarian narrative, however, has hidden the role played by secular 
political identities in the social and political development of Lebanon. As 
this thesis shows, the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), an umbrella 
organisation comprising the LCP and multiple other political formations on 
the Lebanese left, came close to changing the sectarian political trajectory of 
Lebanon at the beginning of the civil war. The continuing failure to 
adequately explore the relationship between secular identities and the Shiʿa 
is therefore a symptom of the preoccupation with sectarian narratives in 
contemporary Lebanese studies. 
                                                
18 Brief references to the association appear across a range of studies on Lebanon and the 
Shiʿa: Rodger Shanahan, The Shiʿa of Lebanon: Clans, Parties and Clerics, London: I. B. Tauris, 
2005, 102; Ajami, The Vanished Imam,  72; Deeb, Gender and Public Piety, 74; Norton, Amal 
and the Shiʿa, 33; Augustus Richard Norton ‘Changing Actors and Leadership among the 
Shiites of Lebanon’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 482:Nov, 
1985: 113; Shaery-Eisenlohr, Shiʿite Lebanon, Preface-xiii;Halawi, A Lebanon Defied, 106; 
Sayigh, Too Many Enemies, 165. 
19 Silvia Naef, ‘Shiʿi-Shuyu’i or: How to become a Communist in a Holy City’, in Rainer 
Brunner & Werner Ende (eds), The Twelver Shia in Modern Times: Religious Culture & 
Political History, Leiden: Brill, 2001. 
20 Weiss, ‘The Historiography of Sectarianism in Lebanon’, 141. 
21 Fawwaz Traboulsi, Surat al-Fata bil-Ahmar, [A Portrait of the Young Man in Red] Beirut: 
Riad El-Rayyes Books, 1997; Fuad Shahin, al-Ta’ifiyya fi-Lubnan: Hahiruha al-Tarikhiyya wa 
al-Ijtima’iyya, [Sectarianism in Lebanon: its Historical and Social Present], Beirut: Dar al-
Hadatha), 1980; Mahdi ‘Amil, Bahth fi-Asbab al-Harb al-Ahliya fi Lubnan, [Study of the 
Reasons for the Cvil War in Lebanon] Beirut: Dar al-Farabi, 1979. 
  28 
Secondly, the conventional paradigms through which the Lebanese Shiʿa 
are studied (discussed earlier as the theory and practice of the Shiʿi faith, 
political Shiʿism and sectarianism), have also limited the potential for a 
wholesome consideration of secular political identities in the political 
mobilisation of the Shiʿa. While scholars are aware that there is an 
association, their peripheral treatment of the issue means that knowledge 
of the origins, nature and impact of the Shiʿi community’s interaction with 
secular political identities has remained piecemeal and incomplete.  
The ensuing discussion illustrates what is presently known about secular 
political identities and the Shiʿa. The limited attention devoted to this 
matter in the literature has produced underdeveloped accounts of when 
and why the Shiʿa joined the secular parties. For example, one scholar 
emphasises the role played by events external to both Lebanon and the 
Shiʿa, while others have focussed on domestic-level explanations, such as 
class and socio-economic factors. This study takes issue with both views, 
because neither provide a sufficient consideration of how the historical and 
political experiences of the Shiʿa in Lebanon shaped their interaction with 
the secular parties. In so doing, this study finds that ideational factors are a 
more convincing explanation for the initial attraction to the secular political 
parties. The discussion also addresses the question of what impact Shiʿi 
involvement in the secular parties had on the trajectory of Shiʿi political 
development, as well as the degree of political learning imparted on other 
political actors within the Shiʿi political community by their interaction 
with the secular political parties. This is particularly pertinent to the 
objective of developing a more dynamic consideration of the interplay 
between secular and sectarian identities among the Shiʿa. The discussion 
concludes with an explanation for why the LCP, and not the various other 
secular political parties with which the Shiʿa are known to have been 
associated, constitutes the best case-study for understanding the Shiʿi 
community’s relationship with secular political identities in Lebanon.  
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Secular Identities & The Shiʿa: Origins of the Relationship 
The existing narrative of the Shiʿi community’s association with the secular 
political parties is that it began in the late 1950s and lasted into the 1970s, 
before dissipating in the sectarian environment of the Lebanese Civil War.22 
Among the parties that the Shiʿs are known to have become associated with 
are the LCP, the Organisation for Communist Action in Lebanon (OCAL), 
the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), al-Murabitun (a Lebanon-based 
Nasserist party), as well as Syrian and Iraqi branches of the Baʿth Party in 
Lebanon. In addition, the Shiʿa also joined various Palestinian factions 
operating in Lebanon, including Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(DFLP). The political power of these parties in Lebanon peaked in the 1950s 
and 1960s, the heyday of the Arab left. Whilst it is logical that the Shiʿi 
community’s association with the secular left also peaked at this time, the 
literature remains non-specific on this point, meaning that only an 
inference can be made about its historical origins and duration. This study 
found that the first offices established by the LCP in the southern Shiʿi 
towns of Bint Jbeil and Nabatiyya were in 1936. From the outset this 
suggests that there is a longer history to the Shiʿi community’s association 
with the LCP. 
Staying with the existing narrative of when the relationship originated,  
there are different explanations for why the secular political parties 
appealed to the Shiʿa. Shanahan states that Shiʿi involvement in the LCP 
began in 1967, and should directly be associated with the aftermath of the 
Arab defeat in the Six Day War.23 This is problematic because it removes 
both the LCP and the Shiʿa from the territorial context of Lebanon in which 
the relationship was formed. More common explanations speak directly to 
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the Shiʿi predicament in Lebanon and the appeal of secular political 
identities on the basis of class and socio-economic factors.  
The class factor refers to the Shiʿi community’s historically marginalised 
status in Lebanon. Shaery-Eisenlohr argues that relative to Lebanon’s other 
main sectarian communities, the Shiʿa have consistently been worse off 
across most indicators of social, economic and political status: 
Figures on social status reveal how the Shiʿa situation was lower than 
all other sects - the Shiʿa were underrepresented in the ‘upper’ and 
‘middle’ occupational groups and considerably over-represented in 
the ‘lower’ category. This helps to explain why, in the 1970s, many 
Shiʿa sub-proletarians, workers, peasants, salaried staff, and students 
joined  leftist parties.24 
The Shiʿi community’s deprivation is therefore the basis upon which 
scholars have emphasised the appeal of secular political parties in class 
terms. Shanahan argues that ‘Marxist philosophy on the centrality of class 
struggle as a societal construct must have appealed to many of the Shiʿa.’25 
Too, Abisaab states, ‘In the 1960s hundreds of Shiʿis in South Lebanon 
expressed class-based resistance to the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie 
controlling the state.’26 Ajami also makes this connection. In romanticised 
terms he argues:  
The young displaced peasant speaking of Marx and Lenin and Stalin, 
the primary school teacher pushed off the land yet without a new 
world to anchor him, with a family still on the land making claims on 
his salary and sensibility, found in the ideological parties a world that 
could be made their own.27 
Following on from these readings, the existing literature states that the 
communist Shiʿa were workers and peasants. Shaery-Eisenlohr writes, 
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‘many Shiʿa sub-proletarians, workers, peasants, salaried staff, and 
students joined leftist parties like the LCP, the CAO and Arab Ba’ath.’28 
In analysing the social background of the Shiʿa who became communists, 
this thesis finds class and socio-economic factors to be inadequate 
explanations for the initial attraction. The Arab communist parties are well 
known for the difficulties they experienced recruiting from the traditional 
demographic groups associated with communist movements worldwide, 
i.e the workers and peasantry. The LCP also experienced this difficulty. 
Thus, the first Shiʿi communists, much like the rest of the LCP’s 
membership, were of well to do middle-class backgrounds. Furthermore, 
research carried out for this study found that the LCP’s opposition to the 
confessional political system in Lebanon constituted the initial basis of the 
Shiʿi community’s attraction to the party. This occurred at a time when the 
Shiʿa were transitioning from their pursuit of political inclusion to the 
politics of resistance in the aftermath of Lebanese independence.  
The existing literature offers limited and varied explanations for the origins 
and appeal of the secular political parties among the Lebanese Shiʿa. 
However, it offers much less in terms of the impact this association had on 
the trajectory of Shiʿi political mobilisation.  
Secular Identities & The Shiʿa: Impact and Legacies 
The impact of the Shiʿi community’s relationship with secular political 
ideas on other political actors within the community, before the Lebanese 
Civil War, constitutes a significant gap in the existing literature. The impact 
of the civil war on the relationship between the communist Shiʿa and the 
LCP is also unaccounted for. This implies that secular political identities 
had no lasting influence over Shiʿi political mobilisation. This study finds 
that the influence of secular political identities, particularly communism, 
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was simultaneously a source of fear, political mobilisation and emulation 
for the Shiʿi political families and clerics. Additionally, the LCP has 
continued to maintain a Shiʿi following in Lebanon, while the Shiʿi 
community’s interaction with secular identities has also imparted a lasting 
legacy over the broader trajectory of the Shiʿi community’s political 
mobilisation in Lebanon. 
Communism’s influence among the Shiʿa led directly to the political 
mobilisation of the Shiʿi community’s religious clerics. This was a concern 
that developed over many years. Abisaab notes that the Shiʿi religious 
centres of learning, the hawzas, in Iraq and Lebanon were by the late 1950s 
producing ‘polemical tracts and books’ against communist thought and its 
presence in Shiʿi locales.29 Musa al-Sadr’s political project in Lebanon was 
designed to counter the communist project with a distinctly communal one. 
This implicates communism in the rise of communal identities among the 
Shiʿa, which is different from the current assumption that the latter process 
was an inevitable outcome of Lebanon’s political system. The rise of the 
Shiʿi communal movements was directly predicted on the decline of 
communism.  The secular political movements constituted a school of 
political learning for their Shiʿi members, but also the wider political 
community of the Shiʿa who observed their activities closely. The new Shiʿi 
communal actors who emerged in the civil war, drew inspiration from the 
secular party’s successful mobilisation of the Shiʿa, coopting and 
repackaging many of their political platforms and mimicking their 
strategies of mobilisation. This study argues that the resistance identity is 
the most lasting legacy of the interaction between the secular political 
parties and the Shiʿa.  
Secular Identities & The Shiʿa: The Lebanese Communist Party 
The Shiʿa became associated with a wide range of political parties among 
the secular left in Lebanon throughout the 1950s and 1960s. This study 
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focusses on the relationship between the communist Shiʿa and the 
Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) as a case study of the Shiʿi community’s 
secular political identities. The relationship with the LCP was the most 
enduring; the party developed the largest Shiʿi following of all the secular 
political parties in Lebanon. This is explained in part by the fact that the 
LCP is also one of the eldest secular political parties in Lebanon. Although 
OCAL was also known for its significant Shiʿi following, it was not 
founded until 1971. It therefore lacks the historical association with the 
Shiʿa that the LCP holds on account of its founding in 1924, and early 
presence in Shiʿi areas of Lebanon. The other secular parties the Shiʿa 
joined, including the SSNP, Syrian and Iraqi Baʿth parties, as well as the 
various Palestinian factions, lacked a distinctly Lebanese identity. This 
could be a reason why the Shiʿa did not view them as viable vehicles for 
their long term political mobilisation. These parties were all non-Lebanese 
movements with political interests that extended beyond Lebanese borders. 
Whilst the LCP was also part of a transnational ideological movement, and 
indeed subject to the constraints of the Soviet Union’s directives, its 
Lebanese identity and political orientation was gradually consolidated in 
the years proceeding Lebanon’s independence. 
Originally founded in 1924 as the Communist Party of Syria and Lebanon, 
the LCP was established as an independent party in Lebanon in July 1943.30 
By 1948, the LCP had developed a reputation as a leading voice in the 
Lebanese opposition. The party was an effective mobiliser of trade union 
activity and strike action.31 Domestic protest movements spearheaded by 
the LCP were a regular feature of Lebanese politics following Lebanon’s 
independence in 1943 until the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975. 
Despite the LCP’s political prominence throughout these years, and the 
role it played in the broader Lebanese opposition movement, the LNM, the 
party has not attracted significant interest among scholars of modern 
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Lebanese history. The marginalisation of secular political parties from 
Lebanese scholarship was noted earlier.  
There are just two studies of the LCP’s history available in English.32 The 
Ismaels’ book is a sympathetic, and systematic, account of the party’s 
history through its published programmatic documents and the 
proceedings of its party conferences. Suleiman’s analysis is critical of the 
LCP’s apparently inconsistent stance on the Israel-Palestine conflict, as well 
as the frequency with which sudden changes to the party line would occur 
without adequate internal deliberations. Suleiman’s criticisms are echoed 
by several other outsider perspectives of the LCP’s history, which provide 
broadly negative appraisals of the party’s political programme and 
performance.33   
The points of criticism raised with the greatest frequency include, firstly, 
the LCP’s stance on national issues. The party is accused of sidelining the 
struggle for national sovereignty and independence, focussing instead on 
the issues of worker’s and farmer’s rights i.e social emancipation before 
national liberation. Secondly, the LCP is criticised for its failure to adopt a 
strong ideological adherence to scientific socialism. The 1943 May Day 
speech by Khaled Bakdash, in which he stated that the party did not aspire 
to a socialist system in Lebanon, is often quoted as evidence for this 
failing. 34  Bakdash’s leadership was universally acknowledged by both 
outsiders and insiders as having been highly damaging for the Syrian and 
Lebanese CPs. This relates in particular to Bakdash’s strict adherence to the 
Soviet Union’s directives and the lack of internal party democracy that his 
enforcement of Soviet loyalty necessitated. This is also related to the third 
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major point of criticism, which is the party’s alleged inconsistency over the 
Israel-Palestine conflict, specifically its treatment of Israel, the British 
Mandate, Jewish immigration to Palestine and the partition plan.     
Ilyas Murqus’ book is a highly critical account of the LCP from the 
perspective of a former communist, Syrian Arab nationalist. Murqus’ 
account is a rather selective presentation of LCP documents, publications 
and speeches, followed by his commentary. Murqus accuses the Syrian and 
Lebanese CP of many of the aforementioned failings, but extends these to 
include the issue of Arab regional unity. Unfortunately, Murqus’ criticism 
is frequently comprised of straw man arguments and semantics, or is 
otherwise lacking in adequate supporting evidence. For example, Murqus 
quotes directly from a speech by Khaled Bakdash published in the LCP 
paper, Sawt al-Sha’b, in which the LCP leader outlines the party’s position 
on Palestine as follows: 
‘…All the Arabs and honourable democratic powers in the Arab 
world have no choice but to agree on the demands of the Palestinian 
people: 
• Complete rejection of the partition of Palestine. 
• Preventing Jewish migration to Palestine. 
• Prohibiting the sale of Palestinian land. 
• Building a democratic constitutional system that ensures peace 
and quiet in Palestine’35 
Murqus’ commentary follows, in which he argues that readers of Bakdash’s 
book will not find any mention of the case for Palestinian independence, the 
evacuation of Jews from Palestine or the ending of the British Mandate in 
Palestine.36 This hardly substantiates Murqus’ claim about the CP’s failure 
to develop a strong position on Palestine. Additionally, Murqus suggests 
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that the largely non-Arab composition of most of the Arab communist 
parties accounts for their failure to properly understand the meaning of the 
loss of Palestine for the Arabs. While a tenuous link to make in the first 
instance, this simply does not apply to the LCP, which unlike the rest of the 
Arab region’s communist parties, its founders were all Arabs. In another 
example, Murqus takes issue with the Syrian and Lebanese CP’s national 
charter,  which states that the party is not only a party for the socialists but 
all loyal citizens. Murqus’ criticism is that it is not a party if it is designed to 
appeal to everyone. Despite the fact that all political parties seek to extend 
their popular appeal beyond their base, Murqus also accuses the party of 
failing to advocate unity both domestically and in the region. The 
contradictions in Murqus’ claims therefore, make for an unconvincing 
critique. 
The publication of historical accounts by the LCP provide some basis for 
cross-checking the outsider perspectives described above. Of course, some 
insider accounts, such as Dakrub’s early history of the party, also exhibit a 
tendency to be selective in their historical accounts, or simply gloss over 
the more controversial stages of the party’s history.37 Dakrub’s book is also 
only a narrative historical account. It is neither a Marxist nor analytical 
study. However, the volumes edited by Khalil al-Dibs and Dahir al-Akkari 
are valuable primary sources on the LCP’s history. Khalil al-Dib’s book is a 
comprehensive collection of the party’s newspaper publications.38 Although 
not every issue of each newspaper is present, the collection offers an 
invaluable insight into the party’s early historical development. Many of 
the articles contained within this volume serve to refute some of the 
criticisms the party has been subject to, particularly in relation to its 
position on Israel and the Palestinians. Articles dating back to the LCP’s 
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first newspaper, al-Insaniyya, show that the party has a long history of 
advocating Palestinian independence and self-determination.  
Dahir al-Akkari’s volume is also a collection of LCP publications, arranged 
thematically.39 The nature of themes are indicative of an attempt to respond 
directly to the criticisms that have been levelled at the party. For example, 
the first section is titled ‘In the heart of the struggle for independence and 
national sovereignty’ and ‘The people’s voice leads the evacuation (of 
foreign armies). This is a direct counter to the claims that the party 
neglected national issues. The second section, entitled ‘Towards a 
democratic Arab unity’ and ‘Defending Arab Palestine in the face of British 
occupation and the Zionist conspiracy’ are also clear attempts to counter 
the claims that the party spurned the issue of regional unity and was soft 
on the Palestine question. Addressing the matter of the party’s adherence 
to scientific socialism, there is also a section dedicated to ‘theoretical issues’ 
which is followed by a definition of scientific socialism and an analysis of 
the social situation in Lebanon. These core themes are interspersed with 
additional analysis of worldwide communist issues, the struggle against 
fascism and Nazism, as well as a section entitled ‘Toward freeing the Arab 
and Lebanese women.’40 
Yusef Ibrahim Yazbek’s book provides an additional insider account from 
one of the founders of the LCP.41 Yazbek’s account is analytical as well as 
reflective on his role in the party’s early development. He confesses that 
none of the party’s early founders had any grounding in Marxist-Leninist 
thought; they were simply inspired by this tradition and wished to follow 
in its footsteps. However, Yazbek also acknowledges that this lack of 
scientific knowledge, coupled with the relative regional isolation of the 
LCP, led to confusion and uncertainty with regard to the direction the 
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party should take in its early stages.42 With the exception of the Palestinian 
Communist Party, the LCP did not have any links with the Soviet Union or 
other communist parties in the Arab world. Yazbek also counters the 
accusations of anti-semitism levelled at the LCP, highlighting the important 
role played by Jewish communists in the founding of the LCP, and in 
establishing the party’s first links to the Soviet Union.43 This issue also 
highlights the contradictions in the critiques levelled at the LCP. On the 
one hand, the LCP is criticised for failing to support the Palestinian 
struggle for independence. On the other hand, the LCP is simultaneously 
accused of anti-semitism on the basis of its critiques of Israel and Zionism.  
Finally, Alexander Flores’ reconsideration of the LCP’s early history brings 
together the insider and outsider accounts to produce a more nuanced 
reading of the party’s achievements and failures.44 Flores demonstrates that 
many of the standard critiques of the LCP are without foundation. He finds 
the argument that the LCP failed to adopt a strong position on national 
issues and the Israel-Palestinian question to be inaccurate. In Flores’ 
reading:  
Indeed, from 1934 the communists spoke less about Arab unity than 
before, but they did not drop the subject altogether. They did not 
oppose Syrian independence but advocated it vigorously, if in a form 
open to criticism. They did not acquiesce in the ceding of Iskenderun 
but protested sharply against it. They did not neglect the Palestine 
problem but until 1947 advocated a unitary democratic solution to it.45 
However, Flores rightly upholds four other areas of criticism. Three of 
these are inter-related and concern the enforced adherence of the Arab 
communist parties to the Soviet line. In Flores’ view, this severely 
constrained the political freedom of the Arab communist parties, which 
were always required to take direction from the Soviet Union. This 
followed that the decisions made by the Arab communist parties often bore 
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little resemblance to their local reality, leading to significant domestic 
problems. The most infamous example of this situation occurred in the 
aftermath of the Soviet Union’s endorsement of Israel’s declaration of 
independence in 1948. Finally, Flores correctly highlights the problem of 
the communist party’s propensity for adopting sudden changes in its party 
line. The absence of democratic, internal deliberations over these decisions 
is also highlighted by Flores as detrimental to the party’s domestic 
credibility. 46  These points of criticism are further substantiated by this 
study’s findings in chapter five, later in the LCP’s history, where the 
analysis highlights the LCP’s failures in the context the Lebanese Civil War 
(1975-1990). 
Although the present study is not directly concerned with the history of the 
LCP, some of the issues raised by the literature are highly pertinent to this 
study’s consideration of the LCP’s relationship with the Shiʿa. This 
includes, firstly, the changeable nature of the LCP’s policies. In addition, 
the LCP’s position on both national and social emancipatory issues are also 
important for this study, particularly as they relate to the party’s stance on 
the sectarian political structure in Lebanon, and the issue of agricultural 
reform in the south. Finally, the Israel-Palestine question is a key facet of 
the Shiʿi community’s relationship with the LCP. Indeed, the LCP’s 
relationship with the Palestinians became pivotal to the Shiʿi community’s 
involvement in the party. This study therefore provides an important 
correction to the inaccurate historical narrative pertaining to the LCP’s 
position on the Israel-Palestine issue. Furthermore, while the shortcomings 
acknowledged by Yazbek and other party insiders are important, they only 
apply to the early history of the LCP. This study’s consideration of the later 
stages of the LCP’s activity, particularly in the context of the Lebanese Civil 
War, provides an updated account of the LCP’s political history in 
Lebanon.This study’s analysis of the Shiʿi community’s relationship with 
the LCP offers an alternative insight into the party’s political history in 
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Lebanon. The main area highlighted by this study is the LCP’s role in the 
movement to abolish Lebanon’s confessional political structure. This effort 
came very close to success during the early stages of the civil war, when an 
agreement on substantial political reforms was initially reached with the 
government. This study also highlights the LCP’s agricultural initiative for 
South Lebanon. This was an important component of the party’s political 
reform programme for Lebanon, and by extension, a major source of the 
Shiʿi community’s involvement in the party in South Lebanon. In addition, 
this study analyses the LCP’s armed resistance against Israel, and support 
for the Palestinian armed struggle based in South Lebanon. This thesis 
provides a different reading of how the LCP fared on the Israel-Palestinian 
issue, as the LCP largely recovered its reputation when it the established 
the Popular Guard in South Lebanon 1969. Then, the LCP pledged to 
protect South Lebanon’s villages from Israeli attacks. The LCP was 
therefore the first Lebanese party to enact a resistance agenda against 
Israel.  
The analysis of the literature shows that the role played by secular 
identities in the political development of the Lebanese Shiʿi is currently a 
well known but little studied relationship. The dominance of sectarian 
paradigms in the historiography of Lebanon has produced far more 
exhaustive analyses of sectarian identities and the Shiʿa. However, this has 
obscured an important episode in the story of the Shiʿi community’s 
political mobilisation in Lebanon post-1943: communism and the Shiʿa. In 
addressing this gap, this thesis’ original contribution to knowledge is its 
analysis of the origins and evolution of secular political identities in the 
political mobilisation of the Shiʿa. 
Hypothesis and Research Questions 
This thesis contends that the Shiʿi community’s involvement with the 
secular political parties of the Lebanese left, specifically the LCP, was in 
fact an important component of their political identity development and 
mobilisation between 1943 and 1975. Although the relationship between 
communism and the Shiʿa declined during the Lebanese Civil War, the 
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association will nevertheless be shown to have imparted a lasting legacy on 
the Shiʿi community’s political identities and mobilisation. To develop this 
hypothesis into a cogent project, the following research questions are 
posed: 
• What are the political identities of the Lebanese Shiʿa? 
• Who are the main political actors among the Lebanese Shiʿa? 
• What are the strategies of political mobilisation among the Lebanese 
Shiʿa? 
• What role did secular political identities and the LCP play in the political 
mobilisation of the Lebanese Shiʿa between 1943 and 1990?  
• Who were the communist Shiʿa? And what impact did their association 
with the LCP have on other political actors within the Shiʿi community? 
• What is the relationship between secular and sectarian identities in the 
political mobilisation of the Lebanese Shiʿa? 
Methodology 
Concepts and Definitions 
To answer the research questions, this thesis utilises a conceptual 
framework based on theories of identity and political mobilisation, in 
combination with primary source material obtained from fieldwork carried 
out in Lebanon. In chapter one, the analytical framework for this study is 
explained in detail. This framework is comprised of a hybridised approach 
to the study of identity, which draws on primordial and constructionist 
schools of thought.  This posits that primordial e.g. sectarian identities, are 
just one among many potentially mobilisable affinities on the identity 
repertoire of an individual or group. Rather than assuming that primordial 
identities are predisposed to dominate the hierarchy of the identity 
repertoire, the hybridised approach requires an analysis of the conditions 
under which a particular identity ascends the hierarchy, and becomes the 
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basis for political mobilisation. This entails an analysis of how identities are 
generated, and the role played by power structures, social interactions and 
state-society relations in that process. Chapter one also explores the concept 
of political mobilisation, highlighting two main variants: affirmative and 
resistive political mobilisation. The resulting framework for this study is 
built around an analysis of why and how identity entrepreneurs (e.g 
political parties or movement leaders) seek to create and mobilise 
resistance identities, with the objective of challenging, rejecting or 
significantly transforming the structure of the political system.  
In addition to the concepts of identity and political mobilisation, this 
study’s analytical framework is also informed by a particular 
conceptualisation of the Lebanese Shiʿi community. The deployment of the 
term ‘Shiʿi community’ as though it is a sociological or political category 
implies a type of monolithic, cohesive bloc. However, as Shaery-Eisenlohr 
has noted,  
there is no singular conception of what it means to be Shiʿi in 
Lebanon, nor a singular vision of Shiʿi Lebanon…Shiʿi identity is fluid, 
contentious and does not constitute a single, united project.47  
The notion of ‘Shiʿism’ is a question of definition, even self-construction: 
religion itself evolves, as has the meaning of Shiʿism. This study does not 
adopt the use of the category, ‘Shiʿi’ as an analytical form, nor assume that 
being ‘Shiʿi’ determines individual or group politics. As Brubaker notes, 
‘we should avoid unintentionally reproducing or reinforcing reification by 
uncritically adopting categories of practice as categories of analysis’.48 
The Shiʿa became a sect through a process of gradual definition. In this 
sense, the meaning of Shiʿsm has often emerged from an act of definition 
on the part of an authority - state, society, community or otherwise, and is 
therefore subject to change in the same way as such authorities. In short, 
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sectarian identities, like religious and political identities, reflect the most 
unifying feature of identity as a concept: diversity, inter-dependency, and 
of course, changeability. 
In light of this study’s emphasis on the Shiʿi community’s heterogeneity, it 
is important to clarify that the relationship between communism and the 
Shiʿa, when written as so, does not imply a reference to the whole 
community. As much as possible, this analysis refers to this dynamic as a 
relationship between the LCP and ‘the communist Shiʿa’ i.e those Shiʿa 
who were communists, and vice versa. Indeed, as stated earlier, part of the 
rationale for this study is to highlight the diversity of political identities 
held by the Lebanese Shiʿa, and not just those that were constructed on the 
basis of sectarian or religious identities. Communism represents one such 
alternative example of the Shiʿi community’s secular identities. 
These conceptualisations of identity, political mobilisation and the Shiʿi 
community comprise the analytical framework which informed the 
research work that was conducted in Lebanon for this thesis. 
Interviews 
Interviews constitute the main primary sources for this study. Alternative 
avenues for inquiry into the nature of Shiʿi involvement in the LCP were 
limited. This is partly because the relationship has not been the subject of a 
detailed study before. Additionally, publications by the LCP, and other 
primary sources relating to the party or the Lebanese Shiʿa do not provide 
significant insights into the particularities of the relationship between the 
two. Interviews also provided the benefit of an insiders perspective from 
current and former Shiʿi communists. It was also possible to compare and 
contrast these views with perspectives from the LCP’s party leadership, 
whom were also included in the interview sample. 
The first interview sample included current, former, retired or inactive Shiʿi 
members of the LCP. This category was important due to the historical 
nature of the research inquiry and the need for perspectives from before 
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and during the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990). Within this sample were 
rank-and-file as well as senior Shiʿi members of the LCP. This would 
enable an analysis of any differences in perceptions borne of the 
individual’s status in the party. It would also illustrate the depth of 
involvement by Shiʿi members in the LCP. The category of former 
communists was also selected for the input it would provide into the 
reasons why many communist Shiʿa departed or disassociated from the 
LCP in the post-civil war phase. Interviewees identified in this category 
include Karim Mroue (Deputy Secretary General, LCP), Ahmad Dreiki, 
Rabie Dreiki, Ahmad Dakroub, Ali Salman, Redwan Hamzeh, Nadeem ala 
al-Deen and Dr Ghazi Berro. 
The second interview sample consisted of current and former (non-Shiʿi) 
members of the LCP. This sample was selected to provide (in combination 
with the first interview group) a comparative insight into the official LCP 
perspective on its Shiʿi membership, with the actual experiences of the 
party’s Shiʿi members. Interviewees identified in this category include 
Maurice Nahle (Committee Secretary LCP), Mary Debes (senior LCP 
official), Khaled Hededeh (Secretary General LCP). 
The third sample included former Shiʿi members of the LCP who are now 
members of Hizbullah. This category was selected to provide an important 
insight into the reasons why many former communists gravitated toward 
Hizbullah in the aftermath of the Lebanese Civil War. Interviewees 
identified include Ibrahim el-Amin (Hizbullah sympathiser) and Saud al-
Mawla. It was intended that further respondents would emerge during the 
course of the fieldwork. 
The fourth interview group included current, senior officials within 
Hizbullah and the LCP, who were involved in the coordination of military 
resistance against Israel from the south Lebanese town of Srifa in the 2006 
Lebanon-Israel war. As this association marked an important stage in the 
rapprochement between two historic enemies (the LCP and Hizbullah), 
these interviews were to provide important insights in to the nature and 
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detail of a changing relationship. Intended initial interviewees were Khaled 
Hadedeh, Secretary General of the LCP and Ibrahim Musawi, Hizbullah’s 
media relations and communications manager.  
The fifth interview sample comprised Lebanese historians, particularly 
those with expertise on the country’s secular political movements and/or 
Lebanese Shiʿi history. This category was selected to provide a first level of 
critical reflection on the events leading up to and during the Lebanese Civil 
War as these related to the LCP and the Shiʿa. In particular, respondents in 
this category were asked for their reading of the LCP-Shiʿi relationship, 
including its origins, nature and aftermath. The information obtained 
would then be compared with the insights provided by the earlier 
interviews with party activists. Respondents in this category included Dr 
Munthir Jaber, Dr Ahmad Beydoun, Fawwaz Traboulsi, Tarif Khalidi, 
Hassan Krayem, Talal Itrisi and Wajih Kawtharani.  
The sixth interview sample consisted of political activists in Lebanon’s 
contemporary secular political parties and movements, including Laique 
Pride and Nahwa al-Muwatiniyya and other groups identified during the 
research process. The purpose of these interviews was to gain an insight 
into the broader secular movement in Lebanon, past and present. Among 
these respondents were also Bilal al-Amin and Maher Dib Abi Samra. 
Additional respondents that emerged during the course of fieldwork and 
were identified as potentially useful sources of information were Amal 
associates Habib Sadiq and Bilal Sharara. 
The interviews with senior LCP officials began by attaining the party’s 
narrative of its historical development in Lebanon, focussing on the party’s 
domestic political activities between 1943 and 1975, and then on the LCP’s 
reading of the Lebanese Civil War. This included the causes of the war, and 
its impact on the LCP. After discussing these issues the interviews moved 
on to the question of the LCP’s Shiʿi constituency. Officially, the party does 
not keep a record of the sectarian identities of its members, and its senior 
officials demonstrated a reluctance to discuss the matter of Shiʿi 
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membership. However, during the course of the one to two hour 
interviews, it was possible to broach the subject. The information obtained 
provides an official party perspective on why the LCP believes it 
developed an appeal among the Shiʿi community between 1943-1975. The 
interviews also provide an insight into how the party saw its relationship 
with the Shiʿa transform during the Lebanese Civil War. 
The interviews with former communist Shiʿi members of the LCP followed 
the same format. The insights obtained were then compared and contrasted 
with the interviews conducted with the LCP officials. The analysis found 
significant differences between the LCP’s perception of its Shiʿi 
constituency and how the former communist Shiʿa viewed their 
relationship with the LCP. These contrasting perspectives are critically 
engaged with in chapter three of this thesis. 
The interviews conducted with Lebanese historians provided an additional 
informed perspective on the LCP’s history in Lebanon and relationship 
with the Shiʿa. They were also the first stage in the process of verifying the 
historical narrative of events provided in the accounts of the LCP officials 
that were interviewed.  
During the 2012 fieldwork visit, the author obtained information about the 
LCP-Hizbullah rapprochement in 2006. Srifa, in south Lebanon was also 
identified as a potentially useful site for exploring the dynamics of political 
identities within Shiʿi households, where mixed affinities with the LCP, 
Hizbullah and Amal are present. A visit to Srifa was to be the main focus of 
the second visit to Lebanon. 
Obtaining access to interviewees was generally a smooth process. Members 
of the LCP, both current and former, were welcoming and cooperative. 
Only one respondent refused to be interviewed. He objected to the idea of 
focussing on ‘Shiʿi’ membership of the LCP, and was defensive in the 
telephone conversation. Following this experience, the author decided not 
to make explicit mention of the Shiʿi-LCP dimensions of this project in 
telephone conversations. The non-personal ‘cold call’ setting heightened 
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the potential for suspicion about the author's intentions to arise. The author 
always found that in a face-to-face interview, it was possible to explain the 
nature of the research inquiry and reasons for interest. Because 
conversation frequently occurred in Arabic, the author’s Jordanian 
background was always a matter up for discussion at the beginning of the 
interview encounter. Although wary of the implications of the author’s 
‘Sunni’ background, this did not lead to any reluctance on the part of the 
respondents once the author’s intentions as an academic researcher were 
communicated. Respondents were otherwise happy to answer questions 
and were effusive in their willingness to facilitate the research process.  
Fieldwork Limitations 
Fieldwork for this thesis was carried out between 5th and 28th December 
2012. This was intended as the first of two fieldwork visits to Lebanon. The 
purpose of the first visit was to conduct initial interviews, develop contacts 
and identify further potential respondents for the second, longer trip. 
Seven interviews were conducted during the first visit with the following 
respondents (identified above): Maurice Nahl, Karim Mroue, Ghazi Berro, 
Ahmad Dreiki, Rabie Dreiki, Munthir Jaber and Wajih Kawthawrani. The 
interviews all took place in Beirut. Five of these interviews were conducted 
in Arabic, with kind assistance from Dr Rami Siklawi with the colloquial 
Arabic translation. Dr Siklawi is a Lebanese specialist on Shiʿi-Palestinian 
relations. This facilitated the translation process and identification of 
additional interview respondents in the field.  
Travel grants from the AHRC and CBRL for the second fieldwork trip to 
Lebanon were awarded in the Spring of 2013. The research trip was 
scheduled for August 2013. However, at this time the conflict in Syria had 
reached a particularly precarious moment following the use of chemical 
weapons, and the prospect of armed intervention was on the international 
agenda. In addition, the author was aware of a Hizbullah directive 
embargoing any official contact with the media and researchers at this 
time. This made it unlikely that the author would be able to contact 
respondents identified in the fourth interview sample. The decision was 
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taken, in consultation with supervisors at the University of Edinburgh, to 
delay fieldwork to later in the year. Between December 2013 and February 
2014, and again from June 2014 to end-July 2014 the author experienced 
two interruptions of study as a result of extenuating personal 
circumstances. At this point, because the author was nearing the end of the 
fourth writing-up year of the PhD, a period which was not funded, the 
second field work visit did not take place. The constraints of time and 
financial need necessitated that the author focus on the material obtained in 
2012. A six-month extension to studies was granted in order to complete 
the writing-up of this material. As a result, the primary source material in 
this thesis falls far short of that which was originally intended. Each of the 
identified interview samples above was to have a minimum of five, ideally 
ten, respondents. However, the author maintains that the primary source 
material, in combination with the analytical conceptual framework, still 
constitutes an original contribution to knowledge. The author intends to 
carry out the remaining fieldwork before this thesis is transformed into a 
book publication.  
Other primary sources 
The analysis also draws from two party documents obtained from the LCP: 
Al-Qadiyah al-Ziraiyah fi-Lubnan (The Agricultural Issue in Lebanon) and Al-
Watha’iq al-Kamila lil-Mu’tamar al-Watani al-Thani lil-Hizb al-shiyuʿi al-
Lubnani (The Complete Documents: Second Congress of the Lebanese 
Communist Party). These offer an insight into the LCP’s political 
programme throughout the period of interest for this study. In particular, 
the document pertaining to the agricultural question illustrates the LCP’s 
efforts to expand its influence and appeal among its Shiʿi constituency in 
South Lebanon. These issues are also further explored in chapter three of 
this thesis. 
An additional primary source obtained in the field was the documentary 
film Shiyuʿiyyin Kunna (We Were Communists). The film was directed by 
the Lebanese filmmaker Maher Abi Samra. Born in 1965, he was educated 
in Beirut and France before becoming a photo journalist for Agence France 
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Presse, Reuters. Abi Samra is known for his use of film to explore both his 
own and Lebanon’s past. Before filming Shiyuʿiyyin Kunna, Maher had 
recently returned to Lebanon after residing in France for a period of fifteen-
years. Narrating the film, Maher states that the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war 
evoked memories of his involvement in the civil war in 1982. The film 
serves as the medium through which Maher reconnects with three of his 
former comrades in the LCP. Together they reconstruct and reflect upon 
their involvement with the communist party during the latter stages of the 
Lebanese Civil War. Maher states that in 1982 the LCP was the only 
political party fighting sectarianism inside Lebanon, while also dealing 
with the myriad external forces present in Lebanon. However, the film also 
documents how Maher and his comrades became disillusioned by the war 
and the decisions of the LCP in that environment. It is also clear that Maher 
laments what he describes as Hizbullah's monopolisation of the political 
resistance, originally conceived by the LCP. For the purposes of this thesis, 
the interviews contained within the documentary provide a rare insight 
into the identity dilemmas experienced by the communists in the aftermath 
of the civil war, and the LCP’s decline. The Shiʿi voices featured in the 
documentary are particularly useful for this study. They highlight the 
issues that led some of them to transition toward affiliation with Hizbullah. 
Of further interest to this study was the film’s exploration of the differences 
between the LCP’s and Hizbullah’s conceptualisations of the resistance. 
Thesis Structure 
Following the conceptual discussion in chapter one, the analysis in chapter 
two examines the identities and political mobilisation of the Shiʿa in the 
years preceding Lebanese independence. This involves an analysis of the 
Shiʿi community’s political development under the Ottoman Empire (1516-
1920) and French Mandate (1920-1943). The chapter begins by introducing 
the main political actors that emerged from the Shiʿi community 
throughout this period, including the zuʿamaʾ (political families), the wujaha 
(urban political families), literati, ʿUlamaʾ, workers and peasantry. The 
analysis in chapter two illustrates the variety of political identities that 
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emerged among these social groups throughout Ottoman and French Rule. 
This produced tensions between the pro-Ottoman inclinations of the Shiʿi 
zuʿamaʾ, and the Arab nationalist leanings of the Shiʿi intelligentsia. The 
analysis also highlights the nature of the Shiʿi community’s political 
mobilisation throughout these years, which was characterised by the 
pursuit of inclusion in the political system, and was enacted through a 
politics of demand and protest. Towards the end of the French Mandate, 
the analysis shows that the Shiʿi workers and peasantry had grown 
increasingly frustrated with French colonial policy. This strata was among 
one of the most restive and mobilised components of the Shiʿi community 
on the eve of Lebanese independence.  The main argument developed in 
chapter two is that, contrary to the conventional understanding of the Shiʿa 
in the French Mandate, the Shiʿi community’s political mobilisation was 
not characterised by a fully formed, or even dominant sectarian political 
identity. On the contrary, the only distinctive feature of the community’s 
political mobilisation in this period was the diversity of political identities 
expressed by the Shiʿa, and their high propensity for change and 
transformation.  
In chapter three the analysis moves on to Lebanon’s post-colonial era and 
the core subject matter of this thesis: secular political identities and the 
Lebanese Shiʿa. The analysis explores the origins, development and impact 
of the Shiʿi community’s relationship with the LCP between 1943-1975. It 
argues that the Shiʿi community’s continued marginalisation and 
deprivation in the aftermath of independence led to a critical juncture in 
their political mobilisation. This resulted in a departure from the politics of 
demand and protest in the pursuit of political inclusion, to a politics of 
resistance based on a rejection of the confessional political structure. The 
anti-system agenda of the secular political parties was the initial basis of 
the Shiʿi community’s attraction to them. The development of the 
relationship between the LCP and the Shiʿa is explored from the 
perspective of each actor, and their perceptions of the association are 
compared and contrasted. The Shiʿi community’s relationship with 
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communism directly influenced other political actors among the 
community, which led to the simultaneous rise of communist clerics and 
clerical-led opposition to communism’s growing influence among the 
Shiʿa. This is illustrated through an analysis of Musa al-Sadr’s perception of 
the communists, and his efforts to reduce their influence. 
In chapter four, the analysis explains the decline of the relationship 
between communism and the Shiʿa in the context of the Lebanese Civil 
War. This chapter shows how the decline of secular political identities 
facilitated the rise of sectarian identities among the Shiʿa. The analysis 
begins with an overview of the impact of the civil war on political life 
among the Shiʿa, highlighting the breakdown of the state, the security 
environment and the communalisation of identities. The analysis then 
explores the decline of the LCP in this environment, illustrating how this 
directly facilitated the rise of the new Shiʿi communal actors, Amal and 
Hizbullah.  
In chapter five, the analysis focusses on the identity dilemmas experienced 
by the communist Shiʿa in the aftermath of the LCP’s decline in the 
Lebanese Civil War. The chapter then assesses the Shiʿi alternatives in a 
comparative analysis of the different constituencies and relative appeals of 
the LCP, Amal and Hizbullah. It emerges that many of the former 
communist Shiʿa found Hizbullah to be their preferred alternative. The 
chapter ends with an analysis of the legacy of the Shiʿi community’s 
interaction with the LCP, while also highlighting the endurance of the 
LCP’s relationship with the communist Shiʿa. 
In the concluding chapter, the discussion draws together the main 
arguments of this thesis to assess their implications and importance for our 
contemporary understanding of the history of both the Lebanese Shiʿa and 
Lebanon. The limitations of this study, as well as future avenues for related 
research are also noted. The thesis concludes that secular narratives have 
been largely marginalised in favour of sectarian narratives in the field of 
modern Lebanese history. The struggle between the secular and sectarian 
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Shiʿa during the Lebanese Civil War is argued to have been a microcosm of 
a historic national struggle between secular and sectarian identities in 
Lebanon. The thesis concludes by calling for a renewed focus on the history 
of secularism in Lebanon. This study of the relationship between 
communism and the Shiʿa represents an attempt to showcase one such 
dimension of Lebanon’s secular past. 
The perception of the Shiʿi community’s relationship with communism is 
that it was a fleeting, inconsequential moment in the inexorable rise of 
sectarian political identities among the Shiʿa. The arguments presented in 
this thesis constitute a challenge to that perception. Not only does the LCP 
retain a relationship with the Shiʿa in Lebanon today, but the history of that 
association has imparted upon all the political actors within the Shiʿi 
community an enduring legacy: a resistance identity. 
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Chapter 1 ~ A Hybrid Theory of 
Identity and Resistance 
This chapter develops an analytical framework for the present study, based 
on a hybrid theory of identity and resistance. The objective is to provide an 
alternative framework for the study of the Shiʿi community’s political 
mobilisation that is not based on essentialist readings of identity. In this 
sense, the conceptual framework presented in this chapter constitutes a 
departure from the sectarian and religious paradigms through which the 
Lebanese Shiʿa have conventionally been studied. 
The analysis begins by defining the concept of identity. The key features of 
identity are analysed, including its relational characteristics, diversity, 
fluidity and high  propensity for transformation. The analysis then explores 
how identities are generated and transformed. This emphasises the role 
played by power and categorisation in the relationships between state and 
society, as well as sub-state interactions among individuals and 
communities within society. The analysis explores how identity generation 
produces new boundaries delineating who belongs and who does not. This 
constitutes the initial basis upon which identities emerge.  
After defining identity and the processes through which identities are 
generated, the analysis moves on to establish a method for the analysis of 
identity generation. The main schools of thought in the study of identity, 
primordialism and constructionism are outlined.  Elements of each school 
are then combined to propose a hybridised approach to the study of 
identity for this thesis. The theory of identity adopted by this study 
postulates that the identity repertoires of any individual or collectivity 
contain a hierarchy of diverse identities, some of which may be primordial 
and others constructionist. The superiority of primordial identities on this 
hierarchy is not assumed. Rather, the objective of the inquiry is to identify 
the processes through which a particular identity ascends this hierarchy 
and becomes the basis for political mobilisation. 
  54 
The chapter then explains the application of hybridisation to this thesis. 
The concepts of secularism and sectarianism are explored to that end, 
before analysing their origins and meaning in Lebanon. Finally, the chapter 
outlines the concept of resistance identity, exploring its origins and 
meaning in relation to theories of political mobilisation. Two types of 
political mobilisation are highlighted. The first form emerges from 
legitimising identities, which conform to the structural parameters of the 
political system. The second form, which arises from resistance identities, 
rejects the political system and seeks to fundamentally alter or transform it. 
The role of agency in political mobilisation is also explored here. The 
chapter concludes by delineating a framework for this thesis’ case study, 
based on a hybrid conceptualisation of secularism and sectarianism in the 
political mobilisation of resistance identities. 
Defining Identity 
According to Jenkins, identity is: 
a human capacity - rooted in language - to know “who’s who” (and 
hence, “what’s what”). This involves knowing who we are, who 
others are, them knowing who we are, us knowing who they think we 
are, and so on: a multidimensional classification or mapping of the 
human world and our places in it, as individuals and as members of 
collectivities.49  
Identification is a process that develops throughout a person’s lifetime. It is 
subject to multiple influences, which are highly dependent on the context 
or environment in which the individual lives and develops. In Maalouf’s 
terms, the individual ‘is not himself from the outset: nor does he just “grow 
aware” of what he is; he becomes what he is…he acquires it step by step.’50 
Identities are also subject to change - they are not a static given, rather they 
evolve and transform multiple times throughout an individual’s lifetime. 
One, or a group of people are defined by a cohabitation of multiple 
identities, which cannot easily be unravelled to reveal just one dominant 
type. As Maalouf states,  
                                                
49 Richard Jenkins, Social Identity, 3rd Edition, Oxon: Routledge, 2008, 5. 
50 Jenkins, Social Identity, 21. 
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Every individual is a meeting ground for many different allegiances, 
and sometimes these loyalties conflict with one another and confront 
the person who harbours them with difficult choices…Of course, not 
all these allegiances are equally strong, at least at any given moment. 
But none is entirely insignificant, either. All are components of 
personality…51 
Tilly defines identity in similar terms to Jenkins, noting that identities 
comprise a  
potent set of social arrangements in which people construct shared 
stories about who they are, how they are constructed, and what has 
happened to them.52  
These definitions capture an important facet of identity. This is an 
awareness of the self, or individual identity.  
The conditions under which political identities emerge and transform are 
highly specific, grounded in the particularities of the individuals or groups 
under consideration, and the context in which they are situated. As stated 
by Hall,  
…we need to understand them [identities] in specific historical and 
institutional sites within specific discursive formations and practices, 
by specific enunciative strategies.53  
Thus, for the purposes of this analysis, the context comprises Lebanon and 
the experience of the Shiʿi community in that particular environment. The 
main features of political identity discussed thus far are aptly summarised 
by the late Stuart Hall:  
Identities are never unified and, in late modern times, increasingly 
fragmented and fractured; never singular but multiply constructed 
across different, often intersecting and antagonistic, discourses, 
practices and positions. They are subject to a radical historicization, 
and are constantly in the process of change and transformation.54 
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Having defined the meaning of identity for the present study, the analysis 
now moves on to the complex task of understanding the processes through 
which identities are formed and transformed. 
Identity Formation and Transformation 
The concept of identification raises important issues about the identity 
formation process, and whether identities are self-constructed or externally 
imposed. Closely intertwined with this issue is the role of power. 
Foucault’s studies on the relationship between power and the individual 
are instructive. The analysis in this section examines the relational features 
of identity and the different actors involved in the construction of political 
identities in particular. 
In addition to the role identities play in the construction of an image of the 
self, identities are also constructed to distinguish the self relative to another 
person or group. As identities are constructed, they may indicate who 
belongs, as well as who does not. This process of identity construction can 
occur on the basis of a conscious effort by the individual, but also as a 
product of influence, or imposition, from an external actor. The dualistic, 
relational features of identity mean that it is subject to multiple sources of 
influence. As Jenkins notes,  
identification is often most consequential as the categorisation of 
others, rather than as self-identification...Identifying ourselves, or 
others, is a matter of meaning, and meaning always involves 
interaction.55 
A group may define its identity on the basis of an internally and 
collectively agreed formulation. However, the same group may also 
become subject to a collective external definition, or what Jenkins calls 
categorisation. 
Tilly breaks down these internal and external relational dimensions of 
identity into four main components: a boundary separating me from you or 
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us from them; a set of relations within a boundary; a set of relations across 
a boundary; and a set of stories about the boundary and the relations.56 
These internal and external definitions form a collective dialectic of 
identification - neither comes first and neither exists without the other, 
rather they mutually enforce, or transform, the individual or group 
identity. The sources of external categorisation are wide and varied. The 
creation of political identities, which are the main subject of this study, are 
frequently tied to relations of power, which implicates the modern state as 
an important agent of categorisation.  
As Bourdieu and Foucault argue, states seek to monopolise symbolic 
power. States name, identify and categorise. For Foucault, this lies at the 
heart of ‘governmentality’ in a modern state.57 However, identities, as 
defined and determined by the state, do not necessarily correspond to real 
or felt identities by soceity. The depth, resonance and power that state 
created categories hold over their citizens cannot be assumed, and requires 
careful observation. 58  Whilst identities may originate from state 
institutions, they may only become real identities if social actors internalise 
them, and construct their meaning around it. The process of identity 
construction therefore comprises a mutual interaction between both state 
and society. While the state may seek to define identities, and categorise 
society on the basis of such definitions, groups within society may not only 
refuse to accept these definitions, but actively resist them. 
Identities that are constructed by the state can result in a dialectic of power 
between the state and society. Individuals or groups in society may not 
accept the state defined identity. Although they may not have the power to 
change it, they can attempt to reposition their own identity, blending lines 
of power and creating a different space for the configuration of their 
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individual or collective identities.59 Who constructs identity, and for what 
purpose, will determine the symbolic content of this identity, including its 
meaning for those who choose to identify with it or, conversely, those who 
do not identify.60 The process through which identities are constructed 
always involves a relationship of power. This is particularly applicable to 
political identities, which form the main focus of the present study.  
According to Tilly, ‘identities become political identities when 
governments become parties to them.’ 61  However, political identities 
should not be conceived as mere byproducts of political processes, rather 
they make a difference in their own right. When political identities change, 
so do other meanings, practices and relations in society. Thus, political 
identities have transformative potential. Furthermore, political identities 
are often mobilised for the purposes of staking a claim for, or on behalf of, 
unrecognised political actors. In this sense identities are mobilised to resist 
the status quo - usually because one or more collectivities are excluded, or 
lack access to power; they therefore seek recognition.62 Castells defines 
these as resistance identities. Such identities are generated by ‘those actors 
who are in positions or conditions that are devalued or stigmatised by the 
logic of domination.’63 These political identities mobilise on the basis of 
principles that are different from, or opposed to, those of the state and its 
institutions. When political identities become activated, they produce sets 
of rights and obligations which serve to bind the mobilised participants in 
their political action. 
The power relationships through which identities are constructed, the role 
of state created identities in that process, and the possibility for individuals 
or collectivities within societies to resist certain identities, are all features of 
identity construction that are present in this study’s analysis of the 
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Lebanese Shiʿa. In fact, resistance identities became a core feature of the 
Shiʿi community’s political mobilisation as a result of political 
marginalisation and exclusion from access to political power. In addition, 
state imposed categories of identity, which in Lebanon are deeply sectarian, 
resulted in the mobilisation of collectivities who rejected the sectarian 
categorisations of political identity. The Shiʿa have historically been at the 
centre of such resistance movements throughout the modern history of 
Lebanon. 
So far, the analysis has explored definitions of identity and the processes 
through which identities are formed and transformed. The ensuing analysis 
builds on this discussion to develop a theory of identity for the present 
study. 
Primordialism and Constructionism 
The study of identity in the social sciences produced two main theoretical 
schools of thought: primordialism and constructionism. These conflicting 
conceptualisations of identity are analysed here for their pertinence to the 
present study.  
Primordialism posits that identities are developed during childhood, which 
upon integration into society, became relatively fixed and unchanging. In 
this view, features of identity, such as language and culture, are 
consciously shared among collectivities, and these are what constitute a 
group’s identity.64 In this sense, primordialists argue that people who share 
a culture, also share an essential understanding of their identity. This also 
follows that traditional loyalties tied to this identity give rise to very strong 
attachments. These affinities are the fundamental basis upon which the 
material and political interests of a group and its claims are based.65 The 
early thinkers associated with primordialism were Edward Shils and 
Clifford Geertz. Shils emphasised the role of kinship ties, or family, as the 
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main unit within which ‘natural’ ethnic bonds become fixed. He also 
argued that kinship ties comprised a relational characteristic that could 
only be described as primordial. Thus in Shil’s view, blood ties were an 
essential determinant of ones’s identity.66 Geertz continued this approach, 
arguing that primordial identities are ‘natural, ineffable and coercive.’67 
Durkheim also noted the importance of kinship, as well as moral and 
religious ties to the reinforcement of communal identities.68 
Primordial ideas about identity came under fierce criticism from scholars of 
modernisation and development. Benedict Anderson’s study of the role of 
print capitalism in the creation of ‘imagined communities’, argued that 
modernisation processes were contributing to the expansion of social 
relations beyond close-knit local and territorial communities. This created 
opportunities for new identifications with different social groupings, of 
which one was not necessarily a direct member.69 Thus, kinship ties were no 
longer the only determinant of an individual’s identity. Primordial notions 
of identity were also criticised for being unable to account for the origins, 
change, or even decline of various ethnic groups. Primordialists did not 
view the idea that identities could change or be superseded as a 
possibility.70 They also failed to account for the fusion of identities that 
occurs through intermarriage.71 An alternative explanation for the origins 
and nature of identities arose from the constructionist school. 
Constructionists view identity as boundary-less, highly flexible and 
adaptable.72 Identities emerge in the context of historically specific, practical 
conditions; they are therefore highly situational and their changeability 
                                                
66 Edward Shils, ‘Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties’, British Journal of Sociology, 8:2, 
1957, 142. 
67 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, New York: Basic Books, 1973, 259. 
68 Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, trans. Joseph Ward Swain, 
New York: Macmillan, 1915.  
69 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, London: New Left Books, 1983.  
70  Eric Kaufmann, ‘Primordialists and Constructionists: A Typology of Theories of 
Religion’, Religion, Brain and Behavior, 2:2, 2012, 141. 
71 Josep R. Llobera, ‘Recent Theories of Nationalism’, Working Paper, No. 164, Institue de 
Ciencies Politiques i Socials, Barcelona, 1999, 4. 
72 Josep R. Llobera, ‘Recent Theories of Nationalism’, 8.  
  61 
also renders them analytically elusive.73 Within the constructionist camp are 
many different explanations and sub-theories for explaining the 
constructed nature of identity. 
Instrumentalists view identities as the product of social, economic or 
political processes. These processes constitute the environment in which 
identities both emerge and transform. In this view, identity tools such as 
culture, kinship and ethnicity can be manipulated by individuals with 
political motivations.74 Instrumentalists do not view identities as consisting 
of fixed boundaries, they view them to be prone to change and 
transformation. The individual can also have multiple identities and be 
associated with one or more of these identities at the same time. 
Instrumentalists hold a more dynamic view of identity.75 Also within this 
camp are rational choice theorists. They emphasise the role played by 
individual preferences, whom they view as motivated by the desire to 
maximise benefits accrued to them, either in terms of economic gain, 
security or prestige.76 
Today, debates about identity are no longer so starkly divided between 
primordialist and constructionist views. In fact, very view scholars openly 
embrace the label ‘primordialist’.77 Extreme primordialism is now viewed as 
ahistorical because it locates collective identities in human nature. The 
debate now continues along a continuum between primoridalist and 
constructionist ideas. Scholars now prefer the latter approach, while others 
accept the constructed nature of identity, but view identities as slow to 
respond to rapid changes.78 A more useful approach emerges from the 
combination of primordialist and constructionist contributions to the study 
of identity. 
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A Hybrid Theory 
This study combines a selective adaptation of primordialism with a 
significant component of constructionism. This views primordial 
sentiments as an active element on any identity repertoire. In this sense, 
when a collectivity realises its common interests, it is usually because they 
find their existence or interests under threat from an external source, an 
other. However, collective identities are not necessarily fixed, they have the 
capacity to become mobilised in response to a perceived threat. The 
hybridised approach recognises the presence of primordial attachments, 
such as ethnicity, religion, culture and heritage. However, rather than 
viewing these sentiments as always dominant and unchanging, this 
approach focusses on the circumstances in which these attachments may be 
tapped into, or mobilised for a particular purpose, in a specific situation.79 
This hybridised approach is of particular utility to the present study. As 
highlighted in the introduction, one of the key objectives of this thesis is to 
expand our understanding of the Lebanese Shiʿa beyond exclusively 
sectarian readings of their identity and political mobilisation. To achieve 
this, the present study analyses the presence and mobilisation of non-
primordial identities. This approach emphasises the cohabitation of 
multiple identities on an individual’s or community’s identity repertoire.  
Secularism and Sectarianism as Hybrid Identities 
Secular and religious political identities are prime examples of the theory 
and practice of hybridisation. Whilst secular and religious identities are 
frequently presented as a binary, this study argues that the choice between 
the two is a false dichotomy. Secular and religious identities are highly 
interrelated- secularism develops in relation to religion, and also influences 
the rise of religious formations. As Jakobsen and Pellegrini have 
persuasively argued, secular and religious formations are  
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mutually constitutive in particular historical moments - and this 
relationship is inflected by a variety of power relations - European 
colonialism is one of them.80  
This analysis refers to religion as sectarianism, partly because it is a term 
appropriate to the Lebanese context of this study, but also in order to place 
the analytical focus on politicised religious identities, and not on issues of 
religious belief and practice. Although sectarianism is institutionalised in 
the Lebanese political system, and therefore a central feature of social, 
economic, political and cultural life, very few Lebanese openly admit 
subscribing to a sectarian identity. Most Lebanese practice dissimulation, 
availing themselves of secular identities for instrumentalist purposes, to 
obscure their sectarianism. 81  In this dynamic, sectarianism is regarded 
negatively as a regressive, anti-modern primordial identity, while 
secularism is the constructionist, progressive identity. However, secular 
identities have also played an important ideological role in Lebanese 
politics. Secularism, inspired by sectarianism, is a central concept among 
the Lebanese left.82 For this movement, secularism embodies an important 
counter narrative of resistance to the sectarian political structure.  
Secularism and sectarianism are core concepts in this thesis. Secularism is 
also heavily implicated in this study’s conceptualisation of resistance. 
However, these are also terms with highly complex, transnational histories 
and contested definitions. In this section, the analysis provides an overview 
of secularism, contrasting its Western (Euro-American) origins and 
definitions with its historical development opposite sectarianism in 
Lebanon. The discussion also notes the additional role played by 
colonialism in the development of secularism in Lebanon. The analysis 
demonstrates that, as in the West, the history of secularism is heavily 
intertwined with sectarianism in Lebanon. 
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Secularism and Sectarianism in Lebanon 
The development of secularism in Lebanon was influenced by universalist 
theories of secularism derived from the Western, particularly Franco, 
Enlightenment model. In the Lebanese context, this model accrued a 
national historical dimension, which produced new, local terms of 
reference for understanding secularism. As Jakobsen and Pellegrini have 
emphasised, secular traditions are multiple and diverse. In this sense, the 
concept is best understood in the plural, as secularisms. But these 
secularisms are not free from the dominant narrative of Western secular 
universalism.83 It is important therefore to begin by considering the Western 
origins and definitions of secularism, before analysing its origins and 
development in Lebanon.  
The origins of secularism as a political and governmental doctrine lie in 
19th century liberal European society.84 Beginning with the Renaissance, 
secularisation initiated a challenge to the traditional authority of the 
church. This posited that reason would progressively free itself from the 
bonds of religion, liberating humanity in the process.85 The principles of 
separation and neutrality emerged from the bitter religious wars that 
occurred in single-faith religious political systems in the West. In these 
systems, the state was defined as a common public authority in the service 
of both Protestants and Catholics, rather than as an instrument in the hands 
of these religious communities.86  
The Protestant Reformation broke the hegemonic status of the church, 
leading to numerous bloody religious wars among different factions, who 
fought over which religious framework should be enshrined in the state. 
The secularisation process posited that reason should replace religion as 
the basis of political power, which would allow multiple religious 
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communities to coexist with each other. In this framework, religion was 
relegated to the private sphere and became a personal commitment, while 
reason was relied upon for creating political and legal authority.87 The 
transition from religion to secularism was completed in the European 
Enlightenment period, and became a central feature in the formation of 
modern nation-states. The secularisation thesis posits that the move away 
from religious authority constitutes a moral advance towards greater 
intellectual liberation and knowledge creation, which results in the 
establishment of governance according to reason and, ultimately, 
democracy and peace.  
The origins of secularism are easier to delineate than a definition of the 
concept. Its historical development is indicative of a hostility toward 
religion, or a juridicial separation between the political and the religious 
spheres. 88  However, there is more to secularism than the separation 
between church and state.89 Among its other core features are concepts such 
as state neutrality and the public vs private sphere.90 According to Maclure 
and Taylor, secularism comprises two main principles: equality of respect 
and freedom of conscience. It also comprises two operational plains: the 
separation of church and state, and the neutrality of the state toward 
religions.91 However, the boundaries between these distinctions are blurred, 
and often contradictory. Although secularism claims a neutral stance, it can 
often lead to oppressive behaviour. Secular states tend to privilege one 
identity (usually the nation-state), over other identities, which either 
become less potent or reduce their adherents to second-class status. The 
nationalist regimes in Iraq (pre-2003), Syria and Tunisia (pre-2011 Arab 
Uprisings) were all secularist but exclusionary. In Turkey, secularism 
developed a highly discriminatory nature, resulting in the oppression of 
religious and ethnic communities in the name of secular nationalism.92 
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These are examples of how secularist states are still capable of violating 
other citizens’ rights and values, or forcing others to simply assimilate.93 
Thus, the assumption that secularism facilitates peace and democracy is 
questionable. Furthermore, tensions can arise between the principles of 
secularism, for example between respect for moral equality and protection 
of freedom of conscience. The contradiction between these secular values is 
manifested in the French debate about whether Muslim headscarfs should 
be permitted in public schools.94 
Jakobsen and Pellegrini provide a broader definition of secularism, which 
captures an important point about its contingency. Thus, secularism 
is a political project that deploys the concept of the secular, and it may 
do so regardless of the empirical state of secularisation. Although the 
state and law are central to the discourse of secularism, secularism is 
not reducible to doctrines like that of separation between church and 
state. Secularism works across other institutional sites, like the 
mainstream media, civil life and ceremony, and the market.95 
In this view, secularism is not empirically verifiable; it usually emerges as a 
moral or political goal, which is used to enforce the projects of those who 
aspire to a secularised society, against those who do not. Asad argues that 
secularism is part of a project that seeks to establish modernity as a 
‘hegemonic political goal.’96  This returns us to the issue of the binary 
between secularism and religion (specified as sectarianism in this study). 
Because secularism works through oppositions, the traditional narrative of 
secularisation fails to establish its precise meaning. It also makes claims 
about religion, and the meaning of religion, in the process. 
The standard narrative of secularisation described above, which is rooted 
in European and Christian origins, is not universally accepted. Secularism 
is not just a cultural import from the West. As stated by Jakobsen and 
Pellegrini,  
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it is precisely the interactions of various religious formations with 
various cultural imports that make for the complex secularisms that 
mark today’s world.97 
Indeed, secularisms are not necessarily Christian in origin, either. As the 
analysis now moves on to examine the historical development of 
sectarianism and secularism in Lebanon, the nuances in this study’s 
conceptualisations become evident. The historical origins of sectarianism 
and secularism in Lebanon, however, remain subject to as much dispute as 
their definitions. A general overview of the key historical moments are 
presented next, before discussing the working definitions of these concepts 
for this study. 
As Max Weiss has shown, there are multiple schools of thought concerning 
the origins of sectarianism in Lebanon. These range from the ‘organicity’ i.e 
primordialism, of Lebanese sects, to a range of constructionist arguments: 
sectarianism as an invented tradition by external powers, a failure of 
coexistence among Lebanon’s diverse religious communities or a critical 
analysis of the social, cultural and institutional underpinnings of 
sectarianism.98  
Among the key historical moments in the formation of sectarian and 
secular narratives in Lebanon are the religious wars of the 1800s, and in 
particular, the first Lebanese civil war of 1860 involving the Druze and 
Maronite Christian communities. The Ottoman Empire’s millet system 
introduced minority rights to its non-Muslim communities, and so 
emerged the concepts of tolerance, coexistence, but also religious 
difference. The establishment of the qa’immaqamiyya, a dual governorate, 
which twinned the Maronite and Druze polities, led to the brutal sectarian 
wars of the 1800s. This led the Ottomans to establish an alternative 
administrative system to govern Mount Lebanon in 1861, the 
Mutasarrifiyya, which initiated the practice of apportioning political office 
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on the basis of sectarian identities.99 These developments however, did not 
mean that sectarianism had become an inexorable process in Lebanon. 
Europe’s subsequent intervention also initiated a process of social 
engineering in relation to Lebanon’s various sects. 
The impetus toward the creation of a modern, territorially unified nation-
state in Lebanon came from French and European powers, and their 
interventions as colonial myth-makers. The Europeans utilised religion as a 
metaphor for the boundaries between modern civilisation and pre-modern 
barbarism. This distinction was used to legitimate Europe’s civilising 
mission among the world’s ‘backward’ Muslim populations. 100  This 
rendering of religious organisation transformed the social, political and 
economic role of religion into a new order, whereby religious identities 
alone defined individuals. However, prior to European encroachment in 
the region, the social structures in Mount Lebanon were not formulated on 
the basis of religious identities and distinctions. 
A hierarchical politics of notability, which transcended religious 
differences, characterised the administrative structure of Mount Lebanon. 
This contrasted with the European reading of social organisation in 19th 
century Lebanon. Demographic changes during this period led to 
increasing European penetration of the region, reforms to the Ottoman 
administered regional system, and its increased incorporation into 
European markets. These changes favoured Lebanon’s Maronite Christian 
population, who were inspired to make appeals to the European powers to 
legitimate their position in the changing environment of Mount Lebanon.  
The European powers singled out the Christian communities of the 
Ottoman Empire for special protection from the Muslim population. 
Christian missionaries were sent to the region, and Christian traders were 
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courted over others. The Maronite Christian silk merchants of Mount 
Lebanon were heavily favoured by France.101 In this environment, both 
Maronite Christian and Druze Muslim elites sought to organise according 
to exclusively religious definitions of community, subsuming their kinship, 
region and village ties beneath a dominant religious solidarity. This is how 
the sect, or ta’ifa became a quasi-nation defined against other sects. 
European encroachment and intervention was a strong element in the 
Lebanese experience of modern nation-state formation. The rise of the 
modern Lebanese state brought further interventions to the balance of 
power among the country’s sects. The question of how to integrate the 
Lebanese population into a new nation led to changes in electoral and 
personal status laws, in favour of religious affiliations. This meant that the 
definition of ‘Lebanese’ became tied to religious identity. The National Pact 
of 1943, which symbolised the emergence of an independent Lebanon, also 
institutionalised a sectarian conceptualisation of Lebanese citizenship. The 
second Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) and the Taif Accord (1989), which 
ended the war, are further episodes in the evolution of sectarianism in 
Lebanon, and the involvement of external actors - Western and Arab - in 
that process.  
As has been shown, there are multiple elements to the evolution of 
sectarianism in Lebanon, which span the country’s pre-state, proto-state 
and post-independence eras of political development. However, it is 
important to recognise that these developments do not represent the 
inexorable rise of sectarianism in Lebanon. The sectarian conflicts of the 
1800s and 1970s cannot simply be collapsed under the same heading of 
sectarian warfare. The antecedent factors in these conflicts, internal and 
external, arose under very different circumstances. Furthermore, each era 
of Lebanon’s modern development has seen periods of conflict and 
compromise among the country’s different communities. It is within this 
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context that secularism in Lebanon must also be located, and brought to the 
fore. 
As the earlier discussion highlighted, secular and sectarian identities are 
heavily implicated in each other’s development. Although sectarianism is 
the primary ‘signature’ identity in Lebanese society, it has long inspired a 
counter demand for secularism, understood as the removal of any religious 
identity markers from the political field.102 The emergence of secular ideas 
occurred in the context of the sectarian wars of the 1800s, and in particular 
the 1860 war in Mount Lebanon between the Maronite and Druze 
communities. The renowned writer and scholar of the 19th century, Butrus 
al-Bustani wrote in the war’s aftermath, calling for an end to religious 
solidarities. Al-Bustani’s view of secularism was heavily influenced by 
French laicism, which combined secularism with nationalism.103 Secularism 
as a national identity was seen as the vehicle for freeing Lebanon from 
sectarian particularities. Like many of his contemporaries, al-Bustani 
believed that this secular perspective was a call to peace, and a replacement 
identity for the sectarian hatred symbolised by the wars. 
Al-Bustani’s contemporaries included several other Christian Arabs.  
Ya’qub al-Sarruf (1852–1917), Farah Antun (1874–1922), Georgie Zaidan 
(1861–1914), Salama Musa (1887–1958), Nicholas Haddad (1878–1954) and 
Faris al-Nimr were among this secularising elite.104 All were graduates of the 
Syrian Protestant College (today the American University of Beirut), which 
was founded by Christian missionaries. These secular thinkers published 
their writings in two scientific journals, al-Muqtataf and al-Hilal. They 
espoused secularist ideas as an alternative to sectarianism and religion and 
embraced Darwinism. This brought al-Sarruf and al-Nimr into conflict with 
the missionary founders of the Protestant college, which resulted in their 
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expulsion to Egypt in 1884. 105  Another graduate of the college, Shibli 
Shumayyil was the first to introduce Darwinian ideas to the Arab world 
through his writing in al-Muqtataf. Shumayyil also linked these views 
directly to politics - calling for the separation of religion from political life. 
Through their extensive writing, these thinkers consolidated the 
foundations of secularism in the Arab world. Inspired by eighteenth and 
nineteenth century liberal western ideas, they argued in favour of reason as 
the standard of human relations. Their political goal was the establishment 
of a secular state, which in their view would facilitate peaceful coexistence 
and equality between Christians and Muslims. The late Ottoman period in 
which these thinkers emerged was the birthplace of a secularised resistance 
to sectarianism. In intellectual circles, this was referred to as the Nahda 
(cultural renaissance). 
The Nahda thinkers and the rise of Bolshevik Russia, inspired the formation 
of a variety of new secular socialist, nationalist and Arabist political parties 
during the colonial era, and following the rise of the modern Lebanese 
state. These included the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP), est. 1924, the 
Syrian Social National Party (SSNP), est. 1932 and the Progressive Socialist 
Party (PSP) est. 1949.106 These parties emerged as the main opposition to 
Lebanon’s liberal Maronite Christian and Sunni Muslim political elite. 
These parties called for a radical alternative to the laissez-faire economy in 
Lebanon, and - importantly - a demand for an end to the sectarian political 
structure.  
Lebanon’s secularist parties experienced they heyday in the 1960s and 
1970s. President Fuad Chehab’s efforts to implement a modicum of social 
reforms and a restructuring of the sectarian political system reflected the 
political pressure exerted on the elite by the secular parties. However, the 
Chehabist reforms were not enough, and with the rise of the Palestinian 
resistance movement in Lebanon, faltered in the face of a secularist alliance 
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with the Palestinian revolutionaries.107 In this period, the major players in 
the secular movement formed the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), 
under the leadership of the PSP’s Kemal Junblatt. This alliance entered the 
Lebanese Civil War in 1975, bringing together various parties of the 
communist, Palestinian and socialist left. 
As the fighting of the Lebanese Civil War erupted across the country, the 
LNM engaged in a debate with the leaders of the various sectarian 
communities over the contemporary role of sectarianism in Lebanon.108 They 
proposed abandoning Article 95 of the National Pact, which ensured the 
distribution of power according to sect. Instead, they proposed giving 
‘every Lebanese citizen the right to occupy any post in the Lebanese state 
including those of the President of the Republic, President of the Chamber 
and President of Government.’109 The Council of ʿUlamaʾ (a Sunni Muslim 
association) criticised the proposal, and what it regarded as its roots in the 
anti-religious Enlightenment, French and Russian revolutions.’ 110  These 
objections were echoed by the Vice-President of the Supreme Islamic Shiʿa 
Council, Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din. He argued that the secular state 
would fail to recognise the role of religion in society due to its derivation of 
authority from individual citizens. These religious leaders argued that 
secularism could not guarantee the religious freedom of Muslims. In this 
sense the confessional order afforded these communities some protection.111 
The secular movement failed to convince Lebanon’s religious leaders of 
their reforms. The debate that occurred in 1975-1976 also revealed the 
extent to which the religious communities were opposed to revoking 
Article 95. The LNM went in to decline in the context of the civil war, and 
following the death of its leader Kemal Junblatt. In the war’s aftermath, 
Lebanon’s secularists continued to struggle against the power of the 
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country’s religious institutions and the depth of attachment to sectarian 
identity. The post-war political landscape of the secularist movement has 
shifted away from the radical politics associated with the ‘60s and 70s 
toward a more incremental approach ‘towards citizenship’ or Nahwa al-
Muwatiniyya.112 
The analysis in this section presented an overview of the key historical 
moments in the evolution of sectarian and secular identities in Lebanon. It 
argued that secularism emerged as a resistance identity against the 
sectarian political structure. There also emerged a paradox in the way 
sectarianism is conceived by Lebanese society. Sectarianism is often used 
pejoratively in Lebanese political parlance, yet it is enshrined in the 
country’s political structure. As we have also seen, the leaders of Lebanon’s 
largest religious communities also view sectarianism as a guarantor of 
personal status rights. These differences point to a diversity of 
interpretations pertaining to the concepts of secularism and sectarianism in 
Lebanon. The analysis now turns to these questions of definition. 
Ta’ifiya translates directly as communalism, though it is also understood as 
confessionalism or sectarianism in Lebanon. As Beydoun has noted, it has a 
range of meanings which imparts a degree of vagueness on the term, while 
allowing for multiple ambiguities in its definition and implementation.113 
The dissimulation tendency in Lebanon arises from a particular 
interpretation of sectarianism. According to Makdissi, this refers to the, 
‘allegedly atavistic tendency among Lebanon’s various religious 
communities that undermines wataniyya (patriotism); thus the inter-
communal massacres of 1860 and, of course those that occurred 
between 1975 and 1990 are often cited as prominent examples of 
sectarianism.’114 
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This is the view that posits the secular nation as inclusive, stable and 
democratic, whereas sectarianism is portrayed as exclusionary, 
undemocratic and disorderly. 115  As we saw in the discussion on the 
development of secularism in Western contexts, sectarianism is depicted as 
the antithesis of the nationalist project, opposed to the territorially 
bounded, liberal nation-state. However, Makdissi makes an important 
intervention to this narrative: 
‘the nationalist approach to sectarianism, which poses a tolerant and 
secular modernity against a resurgent religious fundamentalism, has 
itself to be historicized.’116 
In this sense, the discourse of nationalism and sectarianism are 
fundamentally linked. This interaction is particularly felt by those 
communities in Lebanon that have historically felt excluded from national 
politics. The Shiʿa are one such community. As Shaery-Eisenlohr has 
shown in her study of the Lebanese Shiʿa, sectarianism and nationalism are 
not entirely separate categories. On the contrary, they form a dialectical 
relationship.117 This recalls the earlier points raised about the exclusionary, 
undemocratic possibilities in secular nationalist states. Beydoun highlights 
an additional factor that has further complicated the secular nationalist 
project in Lebanon. This is, 
the paradox of a national unity in a multi-religious society wherein 
religion is inscribed as the citizen’s most important public attribute -- 
stamped prominently on his or her identification and voter 
registration card.118 
This contradiction is a core problem for Lebanon’s secular nationalists. 
However, this particular conceptualisation of secularism (contra 
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sectarianism) is not the only possibility for Lebanon and indeed is not the 
focus of the present study.  
There are more neutral avenues for defining sectarianism in Lebanon that 
don’t automatically introduce a binary with secularism. Sectarianism can 
also refer to a variety of specific descriptions of the nature of the Lebanese 
political system. It may refer to any or several of the following: the political 
administrative system of government, the social reality of sectarianism, the 
institutional organisation of the sect, a collective or individual attitude that 
involves sectarian institutions in the management of society, the exclusive 
identification with a religious community, affiliation with an institution or 
even a communal way of thinking, behaving or living.119 The definition of 
sectarianism in Lebanon adopted by this study adopts Beydoun’s 
rendering, which is as follows: 
Confessionalism…is the subjective and objective sense of collective 
identification and its institutional expression in global society…[It is] 
an unequally accepted and diversely interpreted contract between the 
confessional communities that constitute Lebanese society: a contract 
that stipulates the preservation of a minimal public space that all 
communities expect will ensure the exercise of the internal functions 
and privileges of the state.120 
Whilst sectarianism is the primary identity in Lebanese society, this 
analysis has also shown that it has, historically, inspired a counter demand 
for secularism. Many Lebanese who are not religious find it very difficult to 
disassociate themselves form their ‘signature identity group’ i.e the sect.121   
However, secularism need not be understood singularly as a distancing of 
religion from the political field. An alternative view posits that secularism 
makes it possible for different communities to retain their identities, 
regardless of their status or rank in the political system. This requires 
secularism to be is conceived of as an additional, rather than replacement, 
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identity. This study adopts Ilya Harik’s contextual model of secularism, as 
a mode of behaviour rather than a fixed position of hostility to religion. In 
this view, secularism does not require the individual to throw off or 
disavow their sectarian identity, or simply replace it with a secular identity. 
On the contrary, it allows the expansion of the identity repertoire to include 
more than one active identity.122 This study’s analysis of the Lebanese Shiʿi 
community’s relationship with the LCP provides an empirical example of 
this type of fluidity in secular identifications.  
The contextual model of secularism allows the citizen to be mobile in the 
public sphere, defining his or her position and course of action according to 
the specific context, unhindered by their sectarian identity. This enables 
citizens from diverse backgrounds to find common ground in the public 
sphere, or to disassociate, a choice that is determined by the issue, rather 
than coercion.123 In this sense, the more diverse views that are expressed and 
taken by members of a particular sect, the greater the potential for the 
secularisation process to succeed. As Harik argues, free interaction among 
the sects has long been a feature of the Lebanese public sphere, but it is not 
conceived of as secularism, which is understood in the Western sense i.e 
the separation of religion and politics.124 
In line with the above delineation of secularism, the definition deployed by 
this study is as follows: 
Secularism is the freedom of the individual or group to move in and 
out across social borders in a process of interaction, which does not 
obliterate distinctive identities nor use them as a pretext to exclude 
others.125 
This definition of secularism represents an ideal type, which foregrounds 
the proceeding analysis. However, the empirical focus of this study also 
requires a practical conceptualisation of secularism among the groups 
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which constitute the Lebanese left. For this movement, the organising 
principal of sectarianism is a central element of its ideology. Thus, the 
binary model must still be treated as relevant to this study. To be a leftist, 
and for this study’s purposes, a communist, the adherent must seek to 
transgress, subvert and fundamentally challenge the boundaries between 
sects and their institutional organisation in law. Secularism is a core 
concept among the Lebanese left. As stated by Haugbolle,  
It [secularism] refers directly to their refutation of the basic principle 
of Lebanon’s political and social contract as it was formulated in the 
National Pact of 1943 and reaffirmed in the Taif Accord in 1989: that 
individuals are legally recognised as members of a religious sect first 
and as citizens second.126  
This study’s empirical analysis of communism and the Shiʿa therefore 
defines secularism as a political project that seeks to abolish political 
sectarianism in Lebanon. This returns us to an earlier point about the role 
of secularism in establishing a counter-narrative in Lebanese politics, or a 
resistance identity.  The questions that remain are, why and how did 
secularism become mobilised as a resistance identity in Lebanon? 
Resistance constitute the third major theme in this thesis. The analysis now 
moves on to explore the nature and function of resistance identities in the 
context of theories of political mobilisation. 
The Political Mobilisation of Resistance Identities 
Power plays a key role in the social construction of identities. In Lebanon, 
power relationships determine the interaction between secular and 
sectarian identities. Power struggles between the state elite and elements of 
Lebanese society produced a counter-narrative of resistance. Secular 
identities emerged as an important vehicle for the mobilisation of 
resistance against political sectarianism in Lebanon. However, theories of 
political mobilisation have conventionally overlooked the potential for 
resistance identities to be the driving force behind mobilisation. The focus 
has instead been on legitimising identities, which are produced by the state 
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and its institutions. For example, Nettl defines political mobilisation as ‘the 
collective and structured expression of commitment and support within 
society.’127 He views the main functions of political mobilisation as two-fold. 
First, to articulate interests and second, to legitimise authority. 128 
Nationalism is an example of a legitimising identity. In Lebanon 
sectarianism is a central component of state nationalism, which comprises 
the legitimising identity in this context.  
A second type of legitimising identity is mobilisation that seeks the 
redistribution of power, or the reshaping of the existing political structure 
in society.129 This allows for the possibility that actors might seek to adjust, 
rather than overhaul, the existing system. The mobilisation of legitimising 
identities can occur through a variety of mediums, for example political 
parties, interest groups or social movements. Nettl attributes the activities 
of such groups to societal divisions, which form the initial basis upon 
which mobilisation occurs. These divisions develop into issues that are 
adopted by the mobilised group as they mature and become self-
sustaining.130 These functions form the process of mobilisation. However, 
legitimising identities are not the only basis upon which political 
mobilisation occurs. 
Political mobilisation is not necessarily about acceptance of a regime or 
political system. New political identities often emerge as a form of 
resistance. An actor, or group of actors, may seek to radically change the 
existing distribution of power, rather than simply legitimise the existing 
order. Mobilisation may therefore represent resistance to the status quo, or 
opposition to a particular path of development adopted by a ruling 
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regime.131 This is the type of political mobilisation that occurs on the basis 
of a resistance identity. 
Recognition of the role played by resistance identities in political 
mobilisation must also entail an analysis of the process through which 
resistance identities are constructed i.e why and how they emerge. 
According to Castells, resistance identities are,  
generated by those actors who are in positions/conditions devalued 
or stigmatised by the logic of domination, thus building trenches of 
resistance and survival on the basis of principles different to, or 
opposed to, those permeating the institutions of society.132  
The generation of resistance identities builds on material from history, 
geography, collective memory, culture and religious revelations, among 
others.133 Generation can also be the product of more contemporary events, 
such as an unpopular governmental policy or the development of 
dissatisfaction with a regime over time. In this sense, the policy arena 
becomes an important context in which resistance identities arise.This can 
involve both the composition and decisions of the policy elites. As stated 
by Cameron,  
it is…the degree to which policies are perceived to be unresponsive to 
needs - the degree to which they create or maintain perceptions of 
relative deprivation - which provides the spark for mobilization 
efforts.134 
Castells argues that resistance identities are the most important type of 
mobilisation in our time.  Resistance identities lead to the formation of 
communities, which organise collective resistance against an otherwise 
unbearable opposition. Resistance identities, like other types of identities, 
are formed on the basis of history, geography or biology, which also 
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predisposes them to essentialism, much like the identities they seek to 
oppose.135  Resistance identities can therefore manifest as ‘the exclusion of 
the excluders by the excluded’ i.e the construction of a defensive identity 
vis a vis the dominant institutions and ideologies of the state, which serve 
to challenge the state’s hegemonic identity while also reinforcing the 
boundary between excluder and excluded.136 These features are visible in 
the case of Lebanon, where secularism constitutes a resistance identity, for 
example in the binary some adherents portray between secularism and 
sectarianism.  
Recognition is a core goal of political mobilisation on the basis of resistance 
identities. If resistance identities are generated by a perception of exclusion, 
or non-recognition, then it is clear why recognition becomes a central 
objective. If, for example, the state identity refuses, diminishes or displaces 
other identities, the affected communities may seek a reversal of this 
position. In addition, the state may impose identities that are at odds with 
the identity claims of those labelled. This therefore becomes the basis on 
which resistance to imposed or fixed identities occurs. 137  Claims for 
recognition are also often more than just claims for tolerance. The 
proponents of resistance identities may advocate for greater rights, such as 
recognition in employment, education or in legal treatment, to name a few 
possibilities. 
As with all issues pertaining to identity politics, how and by whom 
resistance identities are constructed, and with what outcomes, cannot be 
addressed in general, abstract terms. These issues are dependent on the 
social context. Resistance identities must therefore be situated historically.138 
In this study, secularism is the primary resistance identity under 
consideration. Secularism constitutes a resistance identity because it poses 
a structural counter-hegemonic challenge to the legitimising identity 
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(sectarianism) of the Lebanese state. As the empirical analysis will show, 
the relationship between the LCP and the Lebanese Shiʿa was coalesced 
around secularism as a resistance identity.  
The analysis so far has focussed on the generation of political mobilisation 
and two main types - legitimising identities and resistance identities. The 
discussion has explored the nature and functions of resistance identities 
and delineated this study’s application of resistance identity to the secular 
movement in Lebanon. The factors involved in the generation of resistance 
identities analysed above are important components of the broader process 
of political mobilisation. Of equal importance are how and by whom 
political mobilisation on the basis of resistance identities occurs. This brings 
us to the role of agency in political mobilisation, to which the analysis now 
turns.  
Agency in Political Mobilisation 
Early mobilisation theory identified social processes as the ultimate 
initiators of political mobilisation. The sociologist, Karl Deutsch, theorised 
that modernisation processes inevitably led to social mobilisation. Deutsch 
argued that mobilisation was a process in which ‘old social, economic, and 
psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become 
available for new patterns of socialization and behavior.’139 The sources of 
this uprootedness were, in this view, urbanisation, commercialisation and 
industrialisation. These processes were the necessary prior conditions for 
political mobilisation, which involved the introduction of the ‘socially up-
rooted’ into stable new patterns of behaviour and commitment. The 
outcomes of political mobilisation in this context include, 
increases in the number and membership of political or quasi political 
organisations, in the scope and exercise of the franchise, and in the 
policy role and policy impact of the national government.140  
                                                
139 Karl Deutsch, ‘Social Mobilization and Political Development’, The American Political 
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140 Cameron, ‘Toward a Theory of Political Mobilization’, 138. 
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The role of modernisation in political mobilisation is certainly important. 
However, whilst modernisation processes might be the factors that initially 
spark mobilisation, they provide no particular indication of how an 
individual or group is moved to action as a result. Cameron highlights 
three of the shortcomings associated with Deutsch’s mobilisation thesis. 
The first concerns the missing link between modernisation and 
mobilisation - i.e how the ‘socially available’ might become introduced to 
new or alternative patterns of political behaviour. Second, mobilisation is 
assumed to be the overriding feature of the modernisation process. 
However, the causal link between mobilisation processes and political 
mobilisation is missing. Thirdly, such theories are socially determinist in 
that they assume political mobilisation will always be the product of 
certain types of division and social change.141 The notion that such changes 
do in fact uproot individuals and break apart old social ties and identities is 
not adequately proven, and remains assumed. Indeed modernisation 
theory itself has drawn criticism for the assumption that traditional ties, 
usually meaning religious and communal bonds, become unravelled, 
producing more rational individuals with self-interests. So-called 
traditional forms of identification have been known to persist, despite the 
effects or urbanisation and related modernisation processes. 
An alternative approach focusses on the organisations and the leaders 
with which the newly mobilised individuals or collectivities become 
associated. The recruitment policies and promotional activities of 
political actors or movement leaders play a role in attracting individuals 
that might be prone to or available for mobilisation. Tilly notes the that 
the role of political entrepreneurs in this process are important. These 
might include party leaders, ethnic leaders or community organisers. 
These actors are responsible for creating the ‘we-they’ boundaries, 
generating new political identities and adherents, while simultaneously 
moving to suppress other competing identities.142  
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Political actors who seek to mobilise their movement participants, or 
attract new members, will seek to establish a positive image of 
themselves as a viable alternative to preexisting movements or political 
rivals, championing issues that are important to the newly mobilised 
stratum of society. The extent to which political actors or organisations 
can adapt their infrastructure to accommodate changes will determine 
their success. 143   This is a crucial element of their own survival 
techniques and strategies to remain politically relevant, and viable 
contenders for political power. For this purpose, the mobilising actor 
must be able to adapt its ideology to capture and articulate newly arisen 
discontent, which requires sufficient resources. 
Political mobilisation often results from a collective feeling of 
disillusionment by an aggrieved community, which feels neglected by the 
status quo. In this sense, political mobilisation is not always about lending 
legitimacy or support to a political system. On the contrary, it can also be a 
means of resisting the system. Any analysis of political mobilisation, 
particularly with regard to the process of how it takes place, should 
consider the role of the mobilising agent, or political entrepreneurs, and 
their attempts to create or redraw identity boundaries. How these actors 
promote themselves to potential adherents, and the extent to which they 
can successfully mould an ideology and resource infrastructure to both 
appeal to and cater for the desires of their adherents, is just as important a 
consideration as the question of why political mobilisation occurs. In this 
study, the analysis focusses in equal measure on the activities of the LCP in 
terms of the party’s efforts to appeal to and recruit communist Shiʿi 
adherents, as well as the factors conducive to the mobilisation of the Shiʿa, 
and their gravitation toward the LCP. 
Conclusion	  
The conceptualisation of identity deployed throughout this study has four 
main features. Firstly, identities are inherently diverse and changeable. 
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Every individual possesses a broad repertoire of cohabiting identities that 
are  organised along a fluid hierarchy. Secondly, the process through which 
identities are formed is primarily determined by the boundaries of 
inclusion/exclusion that are established by a variety of relational 
interactions e.g between individuals, groups or indeed the nation-state. 
Thirdly, the transformation of identity is determined by the context or 
environment in which the individual, group or collectivity exists. The 
process of transformation occurs after a change in the hierarchy of 
identities, for example where a previously dormant identity may supersede 
a more salient one. A hybridised understanding of identity is proposed for 
this study, which combines primordial with constructionist theories of 
identity. This recognises the presence of primordial attachments, such as 
sect, on an individual’s or community’s identity repertoire. However, the 
hybridised approach posits that primordial identities are not inherently 
salient, rather the conditions under which they or other identities become 
predominant must be proven and established. This thesis focusses on the 
interaction between secular and sectarian political identities in Lebanon as 
an example of hybridisation. The relationship between the Lebanese Shiʿa 
and communism represents an example of this hybridity.In order to 
analyse the processes through which political identities become mobilised, 
this study utilises a specific conceptualisation of political mobilisation. Two 
bases of mobilisation were highlighted in this chapter: legitimising 
identities and resistance identities. Legitimising identities accept the 
structural parameters of the existing political system and lead to 
affirmative forms of political mobilisation, in accordance with the political 
system. However, resistance identities lead to political mobilisation in 
opposition to the structural parameters of a political system. This usually  
occurs because the mobilised group feels unrepresented, marginalised or 
repressed by that system. In addition to the structural factors that give rise 
to political mobilisation however, the agents of political mobilisation are 
also an important component of mobilisation processes. The agents of 
mobilisation, or identity entrepreneurs, are usually movement leaders, 
political parties, social movements etc. They are the intermediaries who 
determine the strategies for political mobilisation. In this sense, structure 
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and agency are essential to understanding the causes and processes of 
political mobilisation.  
The ensuing analysis deploys a framework based on the relationship 
between secularism and sectarianism, as an example of hybridisation in the 
political mobilisation of a resistance identity among the Lebanese Shiʿa. 
The analysis shows how this identity of resistance has its origins in the 
Shiʿi community’s relationship with the secular parties of the Lebanese left, 
the LCP in particular. However, as the secular political movement in 
Lebanon faltered in the context of the Lebanese Civil War, this study shows 
how a secular resistance identity transformed into a sectarian resistance 
identity among the Lebanese Shiʿa. 
  
  86 
 
 
  87 
Chapter 2 ~ The Identities and 
Political Mobilisation of the Shiʿa 
during Ottoman and French Rule 
1516-1943 
This chapter details the early identities and political development of the 
Shiʿa during the Ottoman Empire (1516-1920) and French Mandate (1920-
1943). The analysis introduces the main political actors that emerged 
among the Shiʿa during this period. Whilst studies of the Lebanese Shiʿa 
tend to locate their political mobilisation in the 1960s and beyond, the 
analysis in this chapter shows that their mobilisation was already 
underway before Lebanon became independent in 1943. The Shiʿi 
community also developed a diverse range of political identities 
throughout this historical period. The ensuing analysis explains the genesis 
of these identities, while also demonstrating that the main objective of the 
Shiʿi community’s political mobilisation during these early years was their 
pursuit of inclusion in the emergent Lebanese state. 
This chapter develops four main arguments. Firstly, Shiʿi politics was 
characterised by the pursuit of inclusion in the political administrations of 
the Ottoman and French authorities. This is illustrated by examining the 
relationship between the Ottoman authorities and the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ. On the 
one hand, the Ottoman state officially regarded its Shiʿi minority as 
heretics, thus rendering the Shiʿa prone to exclusion and repression. On the 
other hand, the practicalities of administering the Empire led the Ottoman 
state to frequently co-opt powerful Shiʿi political families into its ruling 
administrative apparatus. The theory and practice of Ottoman rule is 
therefore more nuanced than early histories of the Shiʿa have recognised. 
Secondly, the analysis asserts that the sites of political mobilisation among 
the Shiʿa were varied and inclusive of different types of elites and non-
elites during this period. In this sense, Shiʿi politics was not solely the 
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purview of a small landed elite (the zuʿamaʾ). The analysis shows that 
Ottoman reforms led to the social stratification of the Shiʿa, and the 
emergence of new politicised elites, including the wujaha and literati 
(intellectuals). Furthermore, the imposition of the French Mandate in 1920 
initiated the rise of non-elite forms of mobilisation among the Shiʿi 
peasantry and workers. Although the zuʿamaʾ, wujaha, literati, peasants and 
workers were distinct social groupings among the Shiʿa, the analysis 
emphasises the interaction and cooperation between these groups towards 
the latter stages of the French Mandate. 
Thirdly, the analysis posits that Shiʿi political identities throughout this 
period were polytactic: multiple and changeable, but not 
sectarian/communal.144 The analysis challenges accounts of the Shiʿa that 
associate the  ‘sectarianisation’ of their political identities with the Mandate 
period, in particular.145 The analysis asserts that Shiʿi political identities 
must be situated in the local, national and transnational environments that 
fermented their diversity and transformation. In this sense, the decline of 
the Ottoman Empire and the rise of Arab nationalism towards the end of 
World War I, gave rise to rival pro-Ottoman and pan-Arabist identities 
among the Shiʿi elite. The imposition of the French Mandate initiated an 
anti-colonial movement among the Shiʿi peasantry and workers. These 
groups rejected France’s idea of Greater Lebanon, and instead sought 
reunification with Syria as part of the Arab nationalist movement. The 
analysis also shows that the unifying feature of these different Shiʿi social 
groupings was not their sectarian identity but their collective pursuit of 
inclusion and recognition in the developing Lebanese polity.   
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also subscribes to the notion that the Shiʿa acquired a sectarian identity during the French 
Mandate in Tamara Chalabi, The Shiʿis of Jabal ‘Amil and the New Lebanon, New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. 
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Fourthly, the analysis argues that the Shiʿi community’s strategies of 
mobilisation converged around a politics of demand and protest. These 
strategies included political lobbying, petitioning, editorialising (and other 
forms of literary activism), as well as strike action, demonstrations, armed 
rebellion and uprisings. The methods chosen depended on the particular 
social grouping undertaking action. For example, the zuʿamaʾ were more 
likely to partake in political lobbying and petitioning, while the 
intellectuals utilised the written word, and the peasantry pursued strike 
action, demonstrations and armed rebellion. 
To address the highlighted arguments, the first section of this chapter 
begins with an overview of the main social groups that emerged among the 
Shiʿa throughout this historical period. The analysis then moves on to 
explore the political development of the Shiʿa during the Ottoman Empire. 
This involves an analysis of the theory and practice of Ottoman rule as 
experienced by the Shiʿa, before detailing how the Ottoman reform process 
led to the social stratification of the community. The chapter then moves on 
to analyse the political development of the Shiʿa under the French 
Mandate. The discussion includes an analysis of the origins of the Shiʿi 
community’s relationship with the Palestinians, the nature of the Shiʿi 
community’s politics of demand and protest, and the political status of the 
Shiʿa on the eve of Lebanon’s independence. The analysis concludes that by 
the end of the French Mandate, the Shiʿi community was highly restive and 
mobilised, with great expectations for an improvement to their political, 
social and economic status in an independent Lebanon.  
Sites of Political Mobilisation among the Lebanese 
Shiʿa 
Lebanon’s Twelver Shiʿa have historically resided in Jabal ʿAmil and the 
Bekaa Valley. Jabal ʿAmil is a mountain located in the southern part of 
Lebanon, which extends between the slopes of the Lebanese coastal range 
and the anti-Lebanon in the east. To the west of Jabal ʿAmil lies the 
Mediterranean sea, with Palestine to the south and Jordan to the east. The 
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geographic status of Lebanon’s Shiʿi regions has been subject to change by 
the different entities ruling the territory. In the early Ottoman period, Jabal 
ʿAmil was part of the wilayet of Damascus, which lay on a direct trade 
route between Damascus and Sidon, then an active port city.146 
The Zuʿamaʾ 
The zuʿamaʾ, or traditional political families, are the most enduring feature 
of political organisation in Lebanon, and not just among the Shiʿa. They 
have survived in part due to the institutionalisation of sectarian identities 
in the Lebanese political system, which grants access to the political 
institutions of the state on the basis of sectarian ratios and portfolio 
allocations. An additional explanation for why the political families have 
survived for so  
long pertains to their political adaptiveness and ability to form symbiotic 
relations with the central political authority in Lebanon; from Ottoman 
rule, through to the French Mandate and into independent Lebanon. The 
analysis here begins with a simple definition of the zuʿamaʾ (sing. zaʿim) 
and their political functions. The discussion highlights their personalist, 
interest-driven  politics, which has frequently superseded the sectarian 
parameters of their existence in Lebanon. The analysis then moves on to 
highlight the key Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ families that have historically dominated the 
community’s political representation in Lebanon.  
According to Hottinger, a zaʿim is  
a recognised leader of a community who has the power to speak for 
his clients as a group of individuals, who is expected to take action in 
their and in his interest whenever necessary.147  
Traditionally, the interaction between a za’im and his supporters was 
characterised by a patron-client relationship. Clientalist networks are 
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developed around uneven but mutually beneficial relationships. The client 
gets what he needs and reciprocates with political loyalty.148 An individual 
would seek out his zaʿim if he had business to conduct with someone more 
powerful than himself, for example a government official. The political 
families also fulfilled the function of landlord, employer or the 
intermediary through which an individual sought access to employment. 
At times of war, it was the responsibility of the political families to defend 
their territory and followers. Those loyal or with vested interests in their 
zuʿamaʾ became their armed following. During peace time the relationship 
was more expansive, ranging from moral, political and commercial 
allegiance to the zaʿim, his family or the local group under his influence.149 
Episodes of state breakdown, experienced frequently in Lebanon, often 
served to invigorate the power of the political families. Where the state 
appeared absent or ineffectual, citizens turned to their families, including 
the zuʿamaʾ, for resources and protection.150 However, it is important to note 
that the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ were less adept at fulfilling these functions during 
wartime. In the Lebanese Civil War for example, the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ were 
superseded by the militias. The PLO represented a particular challenge to 
the military superiority of the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ.The first generation of Shiʿi 
zuʼamāʼ, whose descendants still occupy political office in modern Lebanon, 
comprise the Harfush and Hamadeh families in the Bekaa Valley and 
Mount Lebanon, and the al-Asʿad, ʿUsayran and al-Fadl families in Jabal 
ʿAmil. These families dominated political organisation throughout the 
early stages of the Ottoman Empire, before rival political families emerged, 
the wujaha. The most notable figure to emerge among the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ of 
Jabal ʿAmil was Kemal Bey al-Asʿad, born in 1870 in Taybeh, the seat of the 
dominant branch of the al-Asʿad clan. Kemal Bey claimed descent from the 
al-Saghir family which associates itself with Mohammad bin Haza al Waʿili 
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whom, according to Shiʿi tradition is believed to have inherited the emirate 
of Jabal ʿAmil in the early 16th century. Several of Kemal Bey’s ancestors 
are believed to have died in battle, defending land and faith. As a result, his 
words and actions carried significant weight among the community. Kemal 
Bey’s lineage was perceived as a symbolic example of Shiʿi historical 
projections of their past, characterised as struggle and  
martyrdom in the face of injustice.151 In this framework, Kemal Bey al Asʿad 
was well placed to rule over Jabal ʿAmil’s Shiʿa. The structure of the 
zuʿamaʾ system is hereditary. The title is passed from father to son, and 
only in rare cases from father to daughter. During the Ottoman Empire, the 
political families primarily derived their power from land ownership, 
social and political influence. 152  Political influence complemented land 
ownership since the zuʿamaʾ required significant wealth in order to 
effectively carry out their functions.  
The political families inherited both the wealth and political legacies of 
their predecessors. Where such legacies were strong, the zuʿamaʾ preserved 
their influence across multiple generations. However, the sources of their 
power and the nature of their political influence have undergone many 
changes and transformations in the context of Lebanon’s modern 
development. 
The first generation of Shiʿi political families derived their power from tax 
collection (iltizam), land ownership and the sheer size of their family unit. 
The sources of their power and influence can be further linked to eight key 
areas: family background, economic ownership (land and feudal ties), 
hospitality and generosity toward their community, coercion, support for 
the dominant political authority, resource and service provision and  
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Map of Mount Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley (from Stefan Winter, The Shiites of Lebanon under 
Ottoman Rule p. 32) 
finally, military prowess.153 However, the nature and sources of their power 
have also been subject to change, generally becoming more bureaucratic.  
As will be shown later in this chapter, Ottoman reforms had a significant 
impact on the nature of the political families’ power. The social position of 
the zuʿamaʾ was transferred to positions in the civil service. The reforms 
served to strengthen the power of the political families, whilst also giving 
rise to new notable families, known as the wujaha. 
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The Wujaha 
The rise of the wujaha occurred in the 1800s, in the aftermath of a series of 
Ottoman reforms. The Ottoman land law of 1858 facilitated this 
development, although its effects were not felt in Jabal ʿAmil until the 
1870s.154 This law regularised land taxes and the survey of land. Several 
families in Sidon, Tyre, Nabatiyya and Bint Jbeil acquired landed property 
or became multazims, effectively transforming themselves into new zuʿamaʾ 
families. 155  The three most prominent families who achieved this 
breakthrough were the ʿUsayran, Khalil and Zayn families. 156   The 
ʿUsayran’s family history began in Sidon in the 16th Century; they were 
landowning grain merchants originally from Baalbek. They also had 
historic ties to the Qajar rulers of Iran. In 1848 they were appointed 
‘Shabandars’ of Iran, which gave them access to commercial privileges.157 
The Zayn family claims descent from the Khazraj tribes in Medina, and 
trace their presence to the towns of Nabatiyya, Jibshit and Tyre in Jabal 
ʿAmil to the 16th Century.158 Of the older generation in Jabal ʿAmil, only the 
al-Asʿad family retained its position of privilege.  
The wujaha became an interrelated social group, bound by marriage. Their  
power arose from their successful manipulation of the newly instituted 
taxation system in Jabal ʿAmil, an outcome of the Ottoman land law. The 
wujaha became intermediaries between Ottoman surveyors and the local 
financial and judicial bureaucrats. The latter were poorly paid, which 
served as the avenue for their cooperation with the wujaha for mutual 
financial gain. Their wealth accrued them a significant degree of confidence 
and independence, thus the wujaha developed political voices, too.159  
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Map of Jabal ‘Amil (South Lebanon) from Max Weiss, In the Shadow of Sectarianism p. xii) 
The wujaha were primarily an urban bourgeoisie, their emergence 
transformed the socio-political dynamics of Jabal ʿAmil and they became 
rivals to the elder zuʿamaʾ. Several members of the Zayn family had links to 
the ʿulamaʾ in Najaf, Iraq. The most well known of these was Shaykh 
Ahmad ʿArif al-Zayn, who became the founder of the highly influential 
journal al-Irfan. 160  Out of the wujaha stratum emerged another social 
grouping among the Shiʿa - the intellectuals. 
The Literati 
The Shiʿi community’s intellectual elite is a difficult social grouping to 
define and trace. As already indicated, during the Ottoman era this group 
emerged from another distinct social group, the wujaha. Many of the most 
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prominent members of this intellectual elite also had ties to the Shiʿi 
ʿulamaʾ, and espoused enlightened religious sentiments in the various 
periodicals they wrote for. As mentioned, al-Irfan became a prominent 
mouthpiece for the ʿAmili Shiʿa during the Ottoman and French Mandate 
eras. Shaykh Ahmad ʿArif al-Zayn was joined by Shaykh Sulayman Dahir, 
Ahmad Rida and Muhammad Jaber al-Safa, all of whom were a part of 
Nabatiyya’s intellectual elite, and played important roles in the region’s 
cultural progress. 161  Although they were well educated, their level of 
education was not on par with the returning ʿulamaʾ from Najaf in Iraq.162 
The elevated status of these intellectuals among the community had more 
to do with their political activities than professional qualifications. 
The intellectuals developed good relations with the region’s other 
communities, particularly the Sunni grain merchants in Sidon; this also 
facilitated their urban connections. The intellectuals subscribed to a 
revisionist notion of Islamic identity that placed a greater emphasis on 
cultural and civilisational dimensions, rather than public worship and 
ritual practice. Jabal ʿAmil’s intellectuals were the first to muse about Arab 
nationalism, and the notion of an Arab state, as opposed to an Islamic one.163 
They did not espouse a distinctly ʿAmili (i.e sectarian) identity, unless 
dealing with the Ottoman authorities. Otherwise their Arab identity 
predominated. The most unifying feature of this intellectual elite was that 
they were a diffuse group with multiple connections to the Shiʿi 
community’s other main social groups. Unlike the ʿulamaʾ, they did not 
represent a distinct category, though they did maintain close ties with the 
ʿulamaʾ, which granted them greater legitimacy in the view of the local 
community.164  
The diffuse nature of the Shiʿi community’s intellectual elite is an enduring 
feature of this stratum. When Lebanon became independent in 1943, the 
                                                
161 Chalabi, The Shiʿis of Jabal ʿAmil, 33. 
162 Chalabi, The Shiʿis of Jabal ʿAmil, 35. 
163 Chalabi, The Shiʿis of Jabal ʿAmil, 34. 
164 Chalabi, The Shiʿis of Jabal ʿAmil, 35. 
  97 
community’s intellectuals remained disparate and difficult to define. The 
analysis in this thesis offers some further insights in to the role played by 
Shiʿi intellectuals in the LCP, and in the urban based protest movements 
emanating from the Lebanese University in Beirut in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Perhaps the most consistent feature of the intellectual elite is their more 
liberal engagement with Islamic political ideas. Much like the al-Irfan 
intellectuals, who adapted certain Islamic ideas over others, intellectuals 
among the communist Shiʿa, e.g. Husayn Muruwwa and Mahdi ‘Amil 
engaged in the same activity. Later in this thesis, examples of the 
intellectual exchange and interchange between communists ideas and Shiʿi 
clerics, provides further evidence of the Shiʿi community’s intellectual 
dynamism. The discussion now turns to examine the role and functions of 
the Shiʿi ʿulamaʾ.  
The ʿUlamaʾ 
The clerical families of Jabal ʿAmil have a long and distinguished 
reputation for religious learning and education that began as early as the 
14th century and lasted through to the 19th Century. During the Ottoman 
Empire, the ʿulamaʾ had a significant degree of juridicial autonomy in 
matters of personal status; this enabled the community to arbitrate disputes 
according to Jafari law rather than the Hanafi system. This challenges 
claims that the Shiʿa did not receive such religious rights until the French 
Mandate. The ʿulamaʾ families tended to establish dynasties, for example 
al-Amin, Sharaf al-Din and Shams al-Din are all well known religious 
families with a long heritage in South Lebanon. Despite the existence of 
these dynasties, however, the Shiʿi ʿulamaʾ were not significant political 
players during Ottoman and French rule.165 This was largely due to their 
dependency on the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ. 
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In order to enforce their judgements, the ʿulamaʾ relied on the influence of 
the zaʿim in their region, and formed a loose alliance for this purpose.166 The 
ʿulamaʾ rarely organised formal opposition over a political issue; on the 
rare occasion that a political stance was adopted, it would be according to 
lines already demarcated by other political actors, usually the zuʿamaʾ. 
Specific ʿulamaʾ families developed alliances with the political families that 
would last for generations.167  The ʿulamaʾ also lacked reliable sources of 
financial income, this was another source of their dependency on the 
political families, and the tendency toward political quietism.  
Very few ʿulamaʾ owned land; most lived on charitable donations and 
taxation. In the small villages, the ʿulamaʾ were wholly dependent upon 
donations from the local population. The khums (tax) remained voluntary,  
and while the pious and wealthy members of the community paid the 
senior ʿulamaʾ (sayyids) regularly, the tax was otherwise subject to regular 
bargaining.168 At times of heightened political tensions, the zuʿamaʾ would 
pay influential ʿulamaʾ families to support their position; thus the clerics 
did enjoy a level of legitimacy and religious authority over their 
communities, even if they lacked a definitive political role.169 The financial 
status of the ʿulamaʾ therefore meant that they were rarely effected by the 
economic changes that influenced the zuʿamaʾ, wujaha and peasantry. 
The Shiʿi clerics of Jabal ʿAmil developed strong transnational links with 
the other centres of Shiʿi learning, including Iran but to a greater extent, 
Najaf in Iraq, where many young scholars were sent for their religious 
education. Numerous stories abound of the poor Shiʿi villagers who sold 
off the entirety of their belongings in order to be able to send their sons to 
Najaf. By the 19th century, the Shiʿi scholarly curricula also paid more 
attention to the secular sciences than the Sunni curricular at this time. 
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It is important to note that the clerical families came from all strata of 
Lebanese Shiʿi society. It is not possible therefore to describe the ʿulamaʾ as 
a particular class. In this sense, poverty was as much a feature of the Shiʿi 
clerics as it was the Shiʿi peasantry and workers, to which the analysis now 
turns. 
Shiʿi Non-Elites: Workers and Peasants 
As stated by Chalabi, the peasants ‘silent on paper, are difficult to 
document.’170 Nevertheless, the ensuing analysis in this chapter documents 
significant episodes in the history of peasant-based mobilisation, in the 
form of uprisings, protests and rebellions against the French authorities. 
Peasant life was oppressive for the Shiʿa of Jabal ʿAmil. This was largely 
due to the imposition of a dual-taxation system on the region, which the 
local zuʿamaʾ frequently exploited for personal benefit. After 1882 Jabal 
ʿAmil paid disproportionately higher taxes for its main agricultural outputs 
than other cities in Lebanon. For example, while Jabal ʿAmil’s cereal crop 
was taxed at 50%, the comparable export from Mount Lebanon, silk 
production was only taxed at 25%.171 
The biggest burden on the peasantry came from the method through which 
taxes were collected, rather than the tax figure itself. There was no uniform 
system of collection. Taxes could be collected in cash or in kind. The 
process through which the tax was assessed could also be disruptive, as 
farmers would have to take their crops to market daily for the assessment 
to be carried out. Peasants also lived in a state of uncertainty over crop 
yields, weather, price changes and delayed payment for harvests. 
Furthermore, villages were not taxed on an equal basis. Rather, the rate 
depended on the power and influence of the landowning zuʿamaʾ.172 
Chalabi identifies three types of peasant during the Ottoman period. The 
first were landless, illiterate and the most exploited. The second group 
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were small landowners who had survived their levels of debt but were 
nevertheless a diminishing group. They eventually became part of the 
landless peasantry, and could not keep up with the new commercial 
environment unleashed by the Ottoman reform process. The third category 
consisted of the ‘rich’ peasants. These were the heads of villages, sheikhs 
and mukhtars, who were able to exploit their position and reclaim land 
they claimed was unusable. They employed workers to tend their land, and 
exploited the landless peasants who performed this job. 173  
The exploited peasantry became a restive and mobilised element of the 
Shiʿi community in the latter stages of the French Mandate. Rebellions 
occurred over a range of interconnected issues. This included the unfair 
taxation system Jabal ʿAmil was still subject to under French rule, as well as 
the imposition of the Regie, the French tobacco monopoly that devastated 
the Shiʿi workforce in this industry. Protests in Jabal ʿAmil also occurred 
over changes to the region’s economic system - the transfer of trade from 
the Port of Haifa to Beirut upset long held economic links between the 
southern Shiʿa and the Palestinians. The Shiʿa of Jabal ʿAmil also expressed 
their solidarity with the Palestinian national movement, organising 
demonstrations, trading in weaponry and even participating in local 
resistance activities against the Zionist militias.174 
The social groupings discussed thus far comprise the main sites of the Shiʿi 
community’s political mobilisation during the Ottoman Empire and French 
Mandate. The analysis now moves on to examine their activities in greater 
detail, beginning with the Ottoman era before moving into Mandate 
Lebanon.  
The Shiʿa in the Ottoman Empire 1516-1920 
Under Ottoman Rule, the Shiʿa were a religious minority, subject to 
periodic episodes of repression and persecution. Particularly violent 
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events, such as Ahmad Pasha al-Jazaar’s campaign to reimpose Ottoman 
control over Jabal ʿAmil in 1781, epitomise these readings. Emphasis on 
these experiences in Shiʿi historiography creates an impression that the 
Shiʿa were a politically marginalised and persecuted community under the 
Ottoman Empire, due to the latter’s sectarian prejudices. However, a 
nuanced reading of this relationship reveals contradictions between the 
theory and practice of Ottoman rulings pertaining to its Shiʿi minority. 
These nuances are examined below. 
Early Ottoman-Shiʿi relations in theory: Exclusion 
According to Ottoman Islamic law, the Shiʿa were considered heretics. The 
revolt of some Shiʿi militant groups (ghulat) against the establishment of 
Ottoman rule and Islamic law in Anatolia in the late 1400s and 1500s, 
resulted in the proclamation of a legal position on Shiʿism that permitted 
the use of deadly force against this religious minority. The rebellious Shiʿi 
groups were referred to by the Ottomans as Qizilbash, and they would 
apply this vocabulary against the Shiʿa to justify their repression of this 
minority in the 1800s. When the Shiʿa refused to pay taxes, and took up 
arms against the Ottoman authorities, the Ottomans denounce them as 
‘accursed Kizilbas whose elimination is a religious duty.’175 This view was 
also shaped by external factors, including the Ottoman Empire’s rivalry 
and conflict with the Safawid Shiʿi Empire of Iran. Consequently, the 
Ottomans were highly suspicious of their own Shiʿi populations, and their 
apparent relationship with Safawid Iran.176 Perceived occurrences, such as 
the invited migration of Shiʿi clerics from Jabal ʿAmil to Iran, served to 
heighten fears of collaboration. However, the reality of Jabal ʿAmil’s 
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cooperation with Safawid Persia and the migration of clerics was in fact 
minimal, and often exaggerated.177 
While the Ottomans displayed an official antagonism toward the Shiʿi 
community, which enabled the use of persecutory tactics against them at 
will, this did not always characterise the relationship. In fact, as Winter 
highlights in his extensive study of the Lebanese Shiʿa under Ottoman rule,  
away from the spotlight of histories of events…the mundane day-to-
day reality of life tells a more nuanced story of Shiʿite existence under 
Ottoman rule.178  
The demands and complexities of governing the vast and expansive 
territory of the Ottoman Empire produced very practical limitations. The 
diversity of the social and cultural composition of the Empire, as well as 
the Empire’s own desire to promulgate a heritage of metadoxy, mitigated 
against the application of religious uniformity. Thus, the Ottomans did not 
always view the Shiʿa in terms of their religious variance with Sunni Islam. 
Such sectarian boundaries were not yet clearly demarcated. The Ottoman 
Empire ruled over numerous non-Sunni sectarian groups which, like the 
Shiʿa, often comprised local majorities. In many instances the Ottomans 
selected to ‘blur, deny or even ignore Shiʿite identities of particular 
individuals or institutions.’179 As the ensuing analysis illustrates, the Shiʿa, 
like other non-Sunni groups within the Empire, were not continually 
engaged in a process of protesting the Ottoman authorities. Rather, they 
participated in the ruling order, and were often directly co-opted by the 
Ottomans to govern their territories. 
Early Ottoman-Shiʿi relations in practice: Inclusion 
Prior to the initiation of reforms in the late 1800s, the system of political 
power throughout the early Ottoman Empire depended entirely on the 
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economic control facilitated by land ownership. Social and political 
influence was accrued either by owning land or holding tax-raising 
powers.180 This system facilitated the dominance of the zuʿamaʾ. In Mount 
Lebanon the political system was called the iqta', whereby authority was 
distributed among the political families.181 The holder of an iqtaʾ, always a 
zaʿim, was given a short-term tax collecting contract called a muqataʿa.182 The 
main feature of the Ottoman tax collection system was the basic annual tax, 
miri, which was collected by the Porte. This relied on a tax-farming scheme 
whereby the responsibility for raising taxes within a province (wilayet) was 
sub-contracted to an individual known as a miltazim, i.e a zaʿim. In this 
way the zuʿamaʾ were empowered to implement the law on behalf of the 
local governor (wali).183  
The iqtaʾ system encouraged and institutionalised the influence of purely 
familial loyalties over and above communal identities. Despite official 
Ottoman attitudes toward their non-Sunni Muslim communities, the 
practicalities of every-day political administration frequently overrode 
their sectarian prejudices. In this sense, at the beginning of Ottoman rule, 
the dominant Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ families were ‘no less advocates of their own 
rural society than that of other local tax lord dynasties of the Ottoman 
period.’ 184  Thus the Ottomans recognised individual notables and their 
families, but did not enact a distinctive ideological position with regard to 
the Shiʿa. Likewise, the Shiʿa did not deem it necessary, or indeed helpful, 
given the precariousness of their official status, to express an overtly 
sectarian political identity at this time. Instead, the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ, in both 
the Bekaa and Jabal ʿAmil, enjoyed relative autonomy in the administration 
of their political affairs, as long as they consistently returned tax payments 
to the Porte. 
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In the Bekaa Valley and Mount Lebanon, some Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ enjoyed 
significant autonomy and political authority, despite their proximity to the 
powerful Druze and Maronite zuʿamaʾ. This was partly a result of 
commercial links, as the Bekaa was a source of grain and animal products 
for the Mountain. The Bekaa Valley’s rich agricultural produce was 
therefore highly sought after by the region’s walis.185 Two prominent Shiʿi 
families resided in this region, the Harfush and Hamadeh. 
The Harfush family typified the role of the iqtaʾ by the mid-1600s. As a 
cohesive family unit with military capability and strong relations with 
other zuʿamaʾ in the area, the Harfush family were well positioned to 
become the type of local administrator sought by the Ottoman authorities. 
In fact, the Harfush were among the first zuʿamaʾ to be co-opted as emirs 
into the imperial military apparatus of the Ottoman state. They were also 
the first to receive lump-sum tax collection contracts, as well as governor 
titles in the areas of Homs, Tadmur and Baalbek.186 Ibn Harfush became 
governor of Baalbek in 1497, and his family were the source of three more 
governors of the town over the next century. Despite their inter-familial 
rivalry, the Harfush also became linked to the powerful Maʿan dynasty, 
through the Fakh al-Din, by marriage. As long as the Harfush were able to 
deliver the required taxes to the Ottoman authorities, their rule was 
tolerated. This family was powerful enough to rival that of the Druze 
emirate of the Shuf throughout the early 17th century.187 
The Shiʿi Hamadeh family were also leading political actors in the Bekaa 
Valley. After the death of Fakhr al-Din in 1635, the Hamadehs were given 
the north of Lebanon as an iqta’ by the Ottoman governor of Tripoli. 
Thereafter, the Hamadeh family of Baalbek had taxation powers over the 
Maronite Christian districts of Bsharri, Batrun and Jubayl, as well as the 
Orthodox Christian district of Kura and the Sunni areas of al-Dinniya and 
Akkar. In this sense the power of some Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ extended well beyond 
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their own territory, where they exercised authority over non-Shiʿi 
communities. The Hamadeh family were a powerful force until they were 
defeated by Druze and Maronite forces under the leadership of Amir Yusuf 
Shihab in 1759.188  
Jabal ‘Amil came under Ottoman control in the early 1500s initially as part 
of the Damascus wilayet. Here the Shiʿa inhabited well-fortified villages in 
the mountainous regions. The physical isolation of this region from the 
provincial capital rendered Jabal ʿAmil’s Shiʿa largely autonomous.189 The 
dominant Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ here comprised the al-Asʿad, ʿUsayran and al-Fadl 
families. Throughout the early years of Ottoman rule, Jabal ʿAmil enjoyed 
relative independence and experienced a period of growth and prosperity. 
Given the degree of tolerance exhibited by the Ottomans toward those who 
could assist with the administration of the Empire, the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ 
aligned themselves with the Ottoman authorities in order to facilitate their 
inclusion in the administrative apparatus of the Empire. Between 1500 and 
the mid-1600s relations between the Ottoman authorities and the Shiʿi 
zuʿamaʾ were cooperative and mutually beneficial. In both the Bekaa and 
Jabal ʿAmil, the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ enjoyed relative autonomy as long as they 
fulfilled a tax-collecting role on behalf of the Porte. This is an important 
addendum to conventional analyses that emphasise sectarian prejudices as 
a source of perpetual tensions in Ottoman-Shiʿi relations. Indeed, as the 
analysis now moves on to focus on the emergent areas of conflict between 
the Ottomans and the Shiʿa, the discussion shows that the impetus for this 
tension is more accurately attributable to structural changes within the 
Ottoman Empire, brought about by reforms as well as European 
encroachment, rather than sectarianism. 
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Ottoman reforms and the social stratification of the Shiʿa 
Relations between the Ottomans and the Shiʿa of Jabal ʿAmil were 
transformed by the political reforms. The creation of a new wilayet in 1661 
transferred control of Jabal ʿAmil from Damascus to Sidon. This disrupted 
the strong trade and commercial routes connecting Jabal ʿAmil to 
Damascus, with detrimental repercussions for Jabal ʿAmil’s fragile 
economy. The changes led to successive periods of unrest and revolt 
among the Shiʿa inhabitants. The wali of Sidon came under pressure not 
just from the Shiʿa but the economic power of Dahir al-‘Umar, a strong 
tribal chief from Palestine, who was able to enlist the military support of 
Jabal ʿAmil’s Shiʿa in his efforts to resist Ottoman control. Their combined 
efforts were successful on two occasions in 1771 and 1772 where they 
defeated the wali of Damascus. 190  It was under these conditions, and 
following Dahir’s death, that the Ottomans sent the Ahmad al-Jazaar to 
regain control of Jabal ʿAmil in 1778.  
Al-Jazaar implemented a punitive campaign against the Shiʿa, defeating 
them in battle but also razing their villages and appointing new governors 
to the region.191 The brutality of al-Jazaar’s expedition destroyed many crops 
and villages in Jabal ʿAmil, placing increased pressure on the inhabitants to 
produce taxable products. In addition, while al-Jazaar continued to collect 
taxes from the population, so too did the traditional zuʿamaʾ leaders, thus 
effectively subjecting Jabal ʿAmil to a repressive and impoverishing double 
taxation system.192 The impact of these events on Jabal ʿAmil lasted well in 
to the 1800s. Its effects were severe.  
While early Ottoman reforms occurred to the detriment of the power of the 
traditional Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ in Jabal ʿAmil, the new political and economic 
structural adjustments associated with the Tanzimat (1839-1876) and 
administrative reforms of 1864, also led to the decline of the traditional 
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zuʿamaʾ in the Bekaa. Concurrently, however, these reforms also facilitated 
the emergence of new elites among the Shiʿa: the wujaha and literati. 
The establishment of the Règelment Organique in 1864 led to structural 
changes in the Ottoman provinces, establishing autonomy in Mount 
Lebanon  and a formal political organisational structure there. These 
reforms targeted the methods through which land was administered, 
effectively expanding access and the opportunities for ownership. 193  In 
Mount Lebanon, this often simply extended ownership for the existing 
zuʿamaʾ, enabling them to consolidate their control over land and populace. 
For the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ, the effects were disastrous as the Druze and Maronite 
zuʿamaʾ were the most empowered by these changes. This occurred as a 
result of the rising economic and political power of Mount Lebanon, and its 
Christian and Druze leaders. The increasing autonomy of the Druze 
emirates occurred at the expense of the Shiʿi emirates held by the Hamadeh 
and Harfush families. Relations between the Ottomans and the powerful 
Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ of the Bekaa therefore deteriorated in the 1800s. The rising 
prominence of Mount Lebanon and Beirut as a political and economic hub 
resulted in political losses as well as economic ones for the Shiʿa, 
particularly as Shiʿi merchant investments in the silk industry began to 
decline.194  
Relative to conditions in the Bekaa, the situation in Jabal ʿAmil was worse. 
The reforms now rendered Jabal ʿAmil a peripheral region, connecting it to 
the Beirut wilayet. The rise of Beirut as a centre for commerce and trade, as 
well as the emergence of Mount Lebanon as a significant economic hub, 
reduced Jabal ʿAmil’s status as well as its former trade links between 
Damascus and Sidon. The route to Damascus from Mount Lebanon became 
prominent while Sidon’s maritime status declined.195 Jabal ʿAmil suffered 
significant disadvantage relative to its neighbouring and prospering 
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Maronite Christian and Sunni Muslim communities in Mount Lebanon. 
Illiteracy, due to a lack of schools, and an absence of economic 
opportunities characterised the status of Jabal ʿAmil as the Ottoman 
Empire’s reforms thrust the region into a new international order.196 
However, Fuad Pasha sought to compensate Jabal ʿAmil’s leaders, granting 
them symbolic administrative functions, including the deliverance of new 
titles and the naming of military princes and regional governors. These 
reforms bureaucratised the power of the traditional zuʿamaʾ enabling their 
entry into the civil service, and thus becoming a bureaucratic arm of the 
Ottoman positions in the administration. Hundreds of Shiʿi families were 
elevated to this new status by acquiring landed property or becoming tax 
farmers (multazims) and subsequently representing their communities in 
the newly established Ottoman administrative councils.197 In this sense the 
traditional zuʿamaʾ were able to maintain their local political influence 
among their constituencies. However, these changes also empowered new 
political families: the wujaha.  
Emerging in the late 1800s, the new families were mostly grain merchants 
who were able to make use of the new Ottoman land laws and the Empire’s 
increased integration with the world economy.  For the traditional 
zuʿamaʾ, the modernisation of the land regime resulted in the loss of their 
monopoly, forcing them to adapt and develop alternative sources of 
political power. Based primarily in Sidon, Tyre and the coastal cities of 
Jabal ‘Amil, the wujaha combined landownership with commercial 
activities. Among these new elites were the ʿUsayran, al-Zein, al-Khalil, 
Beydoun and ‘Abdallah families.  
The wujaha were not linked to the traditional sources of political power. 
They were primarily an urban bourgeoise, whose ascendence transformed 
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the sociopolitical composition of Jabal ʿAmil.198 These new elites had grown 
up with a religious education, but as Ottoman reforms had led to the 
closure of many Shiʿi religious schools, they were subsequently educated at 
the secular missionary schools. 199  Their entry into the political system 
constituted a direct threat to the power of the traditional zuʿamaʾ - 
particularly the al-Asʿad family.200 These new families began to share the 
status of notables with those of the traditional political leadership.201 As a 
result, the power of some of the traditional zuʿamaʾ declined. The al-Asʿad 
family was more adept at survival, adapting to the new status quo and 
maintaining their supremacy until well in to the early twentieth century. 
Among the wujaha, a prominent intellectual elite emerged in Jabal ʿAmil. 
The major figureheads of this group were ʿAbd al- Karim al-Khalil, 
Muhammad Jaber al-Safa, Ahmad Rida, Ahmad ʿArif al-Zayn, Rashid 
ʿUsayran and Ismaʿil al-Khalil. These individuals were active within 
several Arab societies established between 1906-1911.202 Ahmad ʿArif al-
Zayn, Muhammad Jabir al-Safa, Ahmad Rida, known as the ‘ʿAmili Trio’ 
also created the prominent and influential Shiʿi journal al-Irfan in 1909, 
which became a leading mouthpiece for this group’s activism and 
intellectual thought.203 
For the literati, their loyalty to the Empire hinged on its continued 
commitment to modernisation, and they initially supported the activities of 
the Ottoman Empire’s Committee for Union and Progress (CUP), opening a 
branch of this office in Nabatiyya along side the many other clubs and 
societies they established between 1908-1911. These intellectuals also 
deployed their ʿulamaʾ to issue fatwas encouraging allegiance to the Empire 
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and resistance to any form of foreign intervention.204 However, the Empire’s 
failure to carry forward its promised reforms contributed to the loss of this 
important source of support from among the new Shiʿi elites. The 
combined effect of the external pressure on the Ottoman Empire to enact 
reforms, as well as the rise of the Arab nationalist movement in 1916 
produced the major turning point in Shiʿi attitudes to the Ottoman 
authorities. Two trends emerged, one loyal to the Ottoman Empire and the 
other Arab nationalist. 
The Ottoman loyalists among the Shiʿa generally hailed from the first 
generation of zuʼamāʼ. Weariness of increasing European encroachment, 
and a desire to maintain the political benefits accrued by attachment to the 
Ottoman administrative infrastructure, ensured their continued loyalty. 
Between 1839-1840, the development of commercial conventions between 
the Ottoman Empire and European powers facilitated the expansion of 
European economic encroachment in the region, transforming the 
dynamics of the Ottoman Empire’s relations with their religious 
minorities.205  
The European powers procured intermediaries among the various local 
religious communities, for which they sought to act as external protectors, 
and patrons. Britain established ties with the Druze, while France had 
historical ties to the Maronite Christians, and Russia supported the 
Orthodox Christians.206 As foreign protectors, the European powers came to 
play a vital role in promoting the interests of their respective communities. 
Direct European involvement in the aftermath of Lebanon’s first civil war 
in 1861 set a precedent for continued involvement in the region. At this 
time however, the Shiʿa lacked an external patron. Additionally, like the 
majority of the Empire’s Sunni Muslims, the Shiʿa viewed the prospect of 
European occupation and Christian rule with hesitation.207 The traditional 
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Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ therefore maintained their close ties to the Ottomans, whom 
they remained dependant upon for their own political status. 
The Shiʿi intellectuals associated with the ʿAmili Trio, as well as the wujaha 
became strong proponents of the Arab nationalist movement. Figures such 
as Rusum Haydar, from the Bekaa was a member of the nationalist al-Fatat 
society, and later participated in the Sharifian administration of 
Damascus.208 Many of these intellectual elites used their newly established 
clubs and societies, foremost among them the Arab Literary Club (founded. 
1909) to organise opposition against the Ottomans in Jabal ʿAmil, and 
established branches of the Decentralisation Party in Sidon and 
Nabatiyya.209 
The Ottomans responded to these Shiʿi nationalists with repressive 
measures, whilst also exploiting the newly arisen differences among the 
Shiʿa between the traditional zuʿamaʾ, who generally supported the 
Empire, and the wujaha and intellectuals, who supported the Arab 
nationalist movement. Jamal Pasha wrote that Kemal al-Asʿad betrayed 
Abd al-Karim al-Khalil, revealing his nationalist activities to the Ottomans, 
which led to his execution in Jabal ʿAmil in 1915.210 This was a prime 
example of the emergent rivalries among the different stratums, old and 
new, of the Shiʿi political elite. Other Shiʿi writers confirm that the motives 
of the al-Asʿad family during this time were primarily factional rather than 
ideological. Kemal al-Asʿad thus had a reputation for preventing the rise of 
competitors from within the Shiʿi community.211  
In addition, the Shiʿi intellectuals, ʿAbd Abd al- Karim al-Khalil, 
Muhammad Jabir Al Safa, Ahmad Rida, Ahmad ʿArif al-Zayn, Rashid 
ʿUsayran and Ismaʿil al-Khalil were among the many nationalist leaders 
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who were jailed by the Ottoman governor of Syria in 1915 for their anti-
Ottoman activities.  
The traditional zaʿim, Kemal al-Asʿad continued to rely on Ottoman 
support in order to preserve his power over Jabal ʿAmil until the middle of 
1918. At this point, the Sharif Hussein of Mecca, backed by British forces, 
entered Damascus in 1918 and established an Arab government over Syria, 
Lebanon, Palestine and Arabia.212  When the Arab forces in Damascus, led 
by Faysal appeared to be succeeding in their battle with the Ottoman 
Empire. Al-Asʿad then transferred his allegiance to the Arab nationalists. 
Despite al-Asʿad’s late adoption of an Arab nationalist stance, and the 
arguably more ideological commitment of the wujaha and intellectuals to 
the nationalists, the latter did not benefit from the Arab government’s early 
administrative appointments. These went instead to the traditional zuʿamaʾ 
who had mostly opposed the nationalist movement. Muhammad Fadl, a 
traditional Shiʿi zaʿim from Nabatiyya, was appointed as a representative of 
the new Arab government in 1918. And after Amir Faysal arrived in Syria, 
he appointed Kemal al-Asʿad as a leader in Jabal ʿAmil.213  
al-Asʿad’s loyalties continued to fluctuate into the French Mandate period. 
Upon the establishment of the Arab government, French forces on the coast 
were attempting not only to put a swift end to the new Arab government, 
but also to continue the Ottoman’s attempts to exploit Shiʿi rivalries, 
particularly that of the continued al-Sulh/al-Asʿad discord.214 As al-Asʿad 
sought to secure his position in Jabal ʿAmil, his stance now oscillated 
between the newly emerged political authorities of the territory: the Arab 
government on one side, and French forces on the other.  
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The relationship between the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ and the Ottoman Empire was 
characterised by periods of inclusion, cooption and repression. It would be 
erroneous to assert that sectarian identities or prejudices played a 
significant  role in these dynamics. Zuʿamaʾ politics was interest-driven, 
personalist and prone to factionalism. Ottoman repression borrowed from 
their legal justification of violence against the Shiʿa as heretics, but was 
more directly attributable to the Empire’s efforts to quell Shiʿi resistance to 
Ottoman reforms. The reform process strengthened the power of some 
traditional zuʿamaʾ, while giving rise to new Shiʿi elites in the form of the 
wujaha and literati. Towards the end of the Ottoman period, Shiʿi politics 
was characterised by intra-elite rivalries over power and identity. These 
elites held conflicting visions of where and how the Shiʿi community 
would be placed in the new Lebanese polity. As the analysis now moves on 
to the colonial era of the French Mandate, these intra-elite dynamics 
become more complex, with ideological and political allegiances subject to 
change. This is the result of the rise of new non-elite Shiʿi groups, the 
workers and peasantry, who exerted a powerful influence over the Shiʿi 
community’s political relations with France in the 1920s and 1930s.   
The Shiʿa in the French Mandate 1920-1943 
Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I, 
the League of Nations established the French Mandate over Greater Syria. 
On August 31, 1920 the French General, Henri Gouraud, proclaimed the 
State of Greater Lebanon, attaching the formerly Ottoman provinces of 
Tripoli, Sidon and the Bekaa Valley to Mount Lebanon. This produced 
substantial demographic transformations, with profound implications for 
socio-economic relations and trade routes, particularly in relation to the 
Bekaa Valley, which had formerly belonged to the province of Damascus. 
The separation of Baalbek from southern Syria also interrupted pre-existing 
trade routes between these areas. The re-drawing of regional territorial 
boundaries established by the Sykes-Picot agreement also had an impact on 
Jabal ʿAmil’s position vis a vis the new Lebanese state - the division of the 
Galilee between Palestine and South Lebanon contributed to the geo-
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political marginalisation of Jabal ʿAmil, rendering it on the periphery of 
Lebanon. 215  This territorial change also disrupted the southern Shiʿi 
community’s economic relations with Palestine. 
The analysis in this section begins by highlighting the close relations held 
by Jabal ʿAmil’s Shiʿa with the Palestinians in the 1930s, and the impact of 
the French Mandate on this relationship. The Shiʿi-Palestinian relationship 
becomes an important component of the analysis in chapter three;  the 
purpose here is to emphasise that the relationship has a longer history than 
is conventionally understood. The analysis then moves on to demonstrate 
how the different social groupings within the Shiʿi community, elite and 
non-elite, mobilised in pursuit of their political inclusion, utilising a politics 
of demand and protest directed at the French authorities. The analysis ends 
with a summary of the Shiʿi community on the eve of independence, 
emphasising their restive and mobilised status. 
Shiʿi-Palestinian Relations 
Until the late 1930s, Jabal ʿAmil maintained strong commercial links with 
Palestine. The port of Haifa lay at the centre of this relationship. France 
transferred Haifa’s functions to Beirut following the imposition of the 
Mandate. Jabal ʿAmil’s shoe makers and leather producers found strong 
markets for their goods in Palestine. Indeed, Nabatiyya, Bint Jbeil and 
ʿUdaysa all developed market exchanges with Palestine. 216  One of the 
reasons why Jabal ʿAmil’s residents aligned with the Arab nationalist 
movement that sought reunification with Syria was because the majority of 
their markets and trade relations occurred between Jabal ʿAmil, Syria and 
Palestine. However, trade links were not the only dimension of the 
southern Shiʿi community’s ties to Palestine. The other aspect related to the 
development of the Palestinian’s struggle with Zionism. Indeed, this 
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dynamic would become a lasting feature of Shiʿi-Palestinian relations in 
south Lebanon. 
After Britain permitted Jewish immigration to Palestine in the 1930s, 
Palestinian fears resonated with the southern Shiʿa, who mobilised in 
support of the 1936 Arab Revolt. In Bint Jbeil, the Shiʿa supported the 
Palestinian national resistance, granting Palestinian fighters refuge in the 
town. In Nabatiyya, the Shiʿa ran markets for young Palestinian fighters to 
purchase arms. The town’s inhabitants also intercepted several vehicles 
destined for the Zionist movement in Palestine. When Britain expelled the 
Grant Mufti of Jerusalem from Palestine in 1936, he went to Tyre where he 
met with the prominent Shiʿi cleric, Sayyid Husayn Sharaf al-Din. French 
administrators attempted to prevent the meeting from taking place, but 
were met with large local villager protests and demonstrations expressing 
their support for the Palestinian resistance. Nabatiyya was often the site of 
large demonstrations opposing Jewish immigration to Palestine, which was 
met with repression by the French administered police force.217  Protest 
marches and demonstrations against the French authorities were also a 
frequent occurrence in South Lebanon, as the ensuing analysis in this 
chapter demonstrates. These protests often mixed a number of issues, and 
solidarity with Palestine was an ever-present dynamic.  
Although the French Mandate began to disrupt the trade connections 
between Jabal ʿAmil and Palestine in the 1930s, the most significant split 
occurred in the aftermath of 1948. From then on, South Lebanon became a 
flashpoint in the war with Israel, cementing the Shiʿi community’s 
involvement in the conflict for many years to come. Zionist militias 
frequently invaded several southern villagers which bordered the 
emerging state of Israel, engaging in battles with the Arab Army of 
Salvation, a volunteer force comprised of Arab soldiers and officers, which 
was formed in 1947 to oppose the UN partition plan for Palestine The 
massacre at Houla in 1948 committed by Zionist militias against local Shiʿi 
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villagers set the scene for future relations between the Shiʿa and Israel 
thereafter.218 
The Shiʿi community’s relationship with the Palestinians, and involvement 
in the wars with Israel would become a lasting feature of the Shiʿi 
community’s political mobilisation, and is revisited later in this study. For 
now, the analysis returns to the other aspects of the Shiʿi community’s 
political mobilisation that were influenced by the imposition of the French 
Mandate, starting with the politics of demand. 
The Politics of Demand 
The new territorial realities of France’s Greater Lebanon were deeply 
unpopular among the Shiʿa. The changes incurred by Jabal ʿAmil caused 
particular consternation among its inhabitants. The restoration of the 
Ottoman taxation system here was disproportionate to the taxes levied 
elsewhere in Lebanon and strained an already fragile economy in South 
Lebanon. The Mandate tightened its economic hold over Greater Lebanon, 
and tied the Syrian currency to the unstable franc.219 Whilst Beirut swiftly 
began to prosper from the new territorial arrangements, Jabal ʿAmil was 
heavily taxed and generally neglected by French administrators. For these 
reasons, the French presence immediately mobilised a vigorous politics of 
demand and protest among the Shiʿi community. Although the traditional 
zuʿamaʾ sought to establish an alliance with the French in return for a share 
of political power, the strength of anti-colonial feeling among their 
constituencies frequently forced these zuʿamaʾ to participate in the politics 
of demand too.  
The politics of demand drew the participation of the wujaha, intellectuals 
and, when it was politically expedient to do so, the traditional zuʿamaʾ. The 
strategies utilised in pursuit of the politics demand, also referred to in the 
sources as matlabiyya, ranged from political lobbying and petitioning to 
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editorialising and other literary forms of protest.220 The substance of the 
demands included calls for infrastructural development in the south, such 
as the building of roads, schools, hospitals and clinics, as well as demands 
for greater political rights, representation and inclusion in the colonial 
state. The politics of demand also straddled ideological differences among 
the Shiʿi elite. It drew the participation of both those who opposed and 
accepted the French presence and her designs for the new Lebanon.  
The intellectuals expressed their demands via the press. The ʿAmili Trio led 
this intervention via the Shiʿi journal, al-Irfan, which carried numerous 
headlines and articles highlighting the difficult conditions endured by the 
inhabitants of Jabal ʿAmil. One such editorial in 1922 described the 
following situation: 
The sources of living in Jabal ʿAmil are spent this year. The season 
was famine. The taxes are coming while the land is still bemoaning 
the coup de grace tax already imposed by the French. Had it not been 
for working people in America and Beirut the situation would have 
been unbearable.221 
Al-Irfan had a regular news opinion section dedicated to the demands of 
Jabal ʿAmil. This column also frequently carried statements from the 
Shiʿi ʿulamaʾ: 
They [the Shiʿa] form the largest or second largest group of the 
inhabitants of the Grand Liban, and they pay nearly fifty percent of 
taxes, and despite this, the benefits go to others and the burden goes 
to them. There is not a single ''Amili civil servant in the capital. There 
are also very few in their district of South Lebanon for no justifiable 
reason. The state of education, the condition of the roads is very poor 
given what they [the 'Amilis] pay in terms of taxes. The increase in 
taxes is extortionate and cannot be supported by the state of the 
country [Jabal ‘Amil]. The wrongdoings of a few ignorant have 
become the burden of the many innocent [this is in reference to the 
fines imposed by the French following the massacres at Ayn Ibl in 
May 1920, see page 139 for  further details ]. Mercy for justice and 
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equality because the ʿAmili people, is a vigorous people with 
beneficence in their hearts.222 
The participation of the Shiʿi ʿulamaʾ in the politics of demand was a 
particularly notable event as they were a generally non-politicised 
element of the community. This illustrates the depth of feeling generated 
among the Shiʿa in the aftermath of the French Mandate’s imposition, 
and the pressure placed on all aspects of the community’s leadership to 
respond.  
The pleas from Jabal ʿAmil were joined by the Greek Orthodox 
communities in the south who also suffered from the new administrative 
realities. A headline in al-Ma’rad, a local non-Shiʿi newspaper, in 1927 
read ‘The new sons of Lebanon demand reform.’ Articles in a newspaper 
based in Marjayoun, Jaridat al-Qalam al-Sarih, addressed the position of 
South Lebanon with titles including ‘Are We Lebanese or What?’ and 
‘South Lebanon: Angry, Resentful and Bitter.’ The founder of this 
newspaper, Abu Samra wrote an open article addressed to the High 
Commissioner entitled ‘Governor of Lebanon, Save the South’: 
Your Excellency, we have resorted to different roles, and the different 
governments have turned on us and we are still in the role of 
experimentation, watching with a vigilant eye your final position on 
the South. This South that has not rightly enjoyed since joining (your 
Lebanon) any of the luxuries of the old [Mount Lebanon], so if you 
acted on realizing its demands) you would be doing a sacred 
duty…223 
Abu Samra then lists his demands, calling for the reduction of taxes, the 
establishment of a farmer’s union, the building of roads and 
nationalisation of schools.224 Another petition sent from ‘the inhabitants 
of Jabal ʿAmil’ to the French General in 1922 contained a detailed 
analysis of the socio-economic constraints besetting Jabal ʿAmil, and 
described the unfair nature of the taxation system the region was still 
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subject to. The petition called on Gouraud to treat Jabal ʿAmil and 
Mount Lebanon more fairly.225 
In addition to the involvement of Shiʿi intellectuals, both the wujaha and 
traditional zuʿamaʾ, partook in the politics of demand, despite the nature 
of their collaborative relations with the French. Rashid Beydoun, of the 
wujaha, established close ties to French Mandate authorities in Beirut, 
and sought to use the influence this brought to petition the authorities 
for improvements to Jabal ʿAmil’s Shiʿa. Beydoun wrote the following 
letter to the French Dean in 1933: 
Your highness, the Shiites with the Sunnis and Maronites constitute 
the majority in the Republic and the third sect in number. Does this 
sect receive its rights proportionate to its number, which according to 
the latest census is 154,218 out of 785,729 (20%)? Out of approximately 
300 judges, it has 4; out of 210 employees in the departments of 
general, financial, agricultural and internal affairs, it has 8; out of 5 
muhafizin it has 1; out of 18 commissaires it has 1; out of 
approximately 350 vice judges it has 4...We find that Shiites receive 
one part of 58 in the salaries paid by the government..while they pay 
about 1/4 of all that Lebanon gets in taxes..I believe that the only way 
to bring justice to the Shiite sect is for the government to hire only 
Shiites in a job when it becomes vacant, so that under your patronage 
this sect will receive part of its lost rights.226 
The traditional zuʿamaʾ appeared to embark on a complete reversal of their 
position on the French Mandate, instead advocating their support for 
Syrian unification, with the Arab nationalists. The US established the King-
Crane commission in 1919 to investigate public political aspirations in 
Anatolia, Palestine, Syria and Lebanon. The Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ of the Bekaa 
boycotted this process entirely.227 This was a protest against even discussing 
the prospect of formal European control over the region. In Jabal ʿAmil 
however, Kemal al-Asʿad appeared before the committee in Tyre, where he 
declared himself representative of ‘all ʿAmili Muslims’ and publicly 
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advocated the cause of Syrian unity.228 At the Coastal Conference in 1936, 
Shiʿi attendees voiced their views on the question of Lebanon. Subhi 
Haydar, the Shiʿi representative, was a signatory to the conference’s closing 
communique, which called for reunification with Syria. That same year, 
Haydar was a prominent member of the parliamentary opposition, and in 
June attended a congress for Syrian unity held in Damascus.229 The Shiʿi 
rejectionists were heavily influenced by the Christian and Sunni 
intellectuals and political families who also opposed French rule, and often 
coordinated their efforts. For example, one of the ‘al-Irfan intellectuals, Abd 
al-Karim al-Khalil’s was involved in the organisation of the Arab congress 
of Paris in 1913 alongside Christian and Sunni Muslim intellectuals.230 
Not all families of the traditional zuʿamaʾ elite were supporters of the 
nationalist movement. At the 1936 Coastal Conference ʿAdil ʿUsayran 
refused to sign the resolution calling for unity with Syria because he 
supported Lebanon’s right to exist as an independent state. The ʿUsayran 
family were known for their oscillating views on the issue but one of their 
members, Munir ʿUsayran offered vociferous support for the French 
presence:  
You have in effect entered the country, holding in your two hands the 
torch of freedom and independence, towards which the Lebanese 
have always turned…We have never doubted that France would 
achieve our independence because France has always fought and 
continued to fight for freedom and democracy….Vive General 
Catroux and his Allies! Vive General de Gaulle! Vive Lebanon!231 
The ʿUsayran family became supporters of Greater Lebanon and closely 
aligned with the Lebanese nationalist movement. However, as also 
occurred among the al-Asʿad family, ʿUsayran’s support for French rule 
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was known to change depending on circumstances. In 1943, for example, 
Adil ʿUsayran was jailed for his anti-French activism.232 
The French authorities sought to exploit these differences among the 
Shiʿi elite. To this end, two meetings were held in 1933 which drew 
together several notables from the Shiʿi wujaha and ‘ulama’. The first was 
held in Kafar Rumman, led by Sheikh Ali al-Zayn. The second meeting 
was held in Sidon, led by Najib ʿUsayran and Fadl al-Fadl (of the 
wujaha). The Sidon meeting circulated two petitions with conflicting 
demands - France reported the one which voiced support for the French 
Mandate and made few demands on behalf of the Shiʿa. The second 
petition listed several demands, including increasing representation of 
the Shiʿa in governmental posts, greater tobacco cultivation and the 
opening of new schools.  The conclusions of the Kafar Rumman petition 
stated,  
Until now, we, who form 20 per cent of the population of this 
republic, do not find ourselves in a situation of equality with the 
others, since the attachment of our region to the old Lebanon.233  
Disagreement subsequently arose among the Shiʿa over which petition 
was an adequate representation of the community’s real demands. 
Despite the polarisation among the Shiʿi elite at the beginning of the 
French Mandate, between those who supported reunion with Syria, and 
those who sought integration with Lebanon, the nature of their politics 
of demand remained the same. As stated by Chalabi,  
The unionists strongly expressed dissatisfaction with the economic 
and developmental status quo of the South but also called for further 
French involvement and improvement. The integrists expressed their 
belonging through strong demands for infrastructure investment in 
the South, in the form of schools, roads, electricity, and so on.234 
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The French responded to these petitions with indifference. Their stance was 
aided by the fact that some Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ cultivated alliances with the 
French, which the later pursued and reciprocated. In the 1934 
parliamentary elections, Sabri Hamadeh outmanoeuvred a rival from the 
Haydar family for the single Shiʿi seat. In response, the Haydar family 
began openly interacting with the pro-Syrian National bloc, publicly 
supporting the incorporation of the Bekaa Valley into Syria. France 
responded by offering the Haydars political appointments - Ibrahim 
Haydar became the only Shiʿi deputy appointed by the Mandate, whilst his 
cousin became a director in the Lebanese administration of the Mandate. 
These events are indicative of the absence of ideological political motives 
among the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ. Haydar’s advocacy of a nationalist stance was a 
political strategy designed to outdo his rivals. It was also a ploy to distract 
French authorities from pursuing a legal investigation into corruption (for 
which he would be culpable) at the Ministry of Finance. 235  Thus the 
alternating political allegiances of the zuʿamaʾ illustrated their primary 
concern with the preservation of their political power and status. 
The relationship between some of the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ and the French 
authorities has been interpreted by some scholars as symptomatic of a 
broader process of the Shiʿi community’s ‘sectarianization’ during the 
French Mandate.236 This was a two-way interaction between Shiʿi activists 
and French authorities whereby the Shiʿa made demands for sectarian 
rights and religious recognition ‘from below’, and the French encouraged 
the consolidation of such identities ‘from above’ by politicising and 
institutionalising sectarianism in Lebanon. The establishment of the Ja’fari 
Court, the Muslim 'Amili Higher Council and the Speakership of 
Parliament (for the Shiʿa) constituted ‘the historical process of 
institutionalising Shiʿi sectarianism in Mandate Lebanon.’237 Of note, this 
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sectarianism was not imposed by the French, rather it emerged out of 
‘routinized forms of cultural and social practice.’238  
This rendering of the interaction between the French and the Shiʿa requires 
greater scrutiny. Firstly, it is important to acknowledge that the Shiʿa ‘from 
below’ in this relationship are not the masses, but part of the elite and 
mostly the traditional zuʿamaʾ. Secondly, the motives of this elite as a 
power and interest-driven social structure must also be acknowledged, 
since this analysis has shown that such motives frequently overrode 
sectarian identities among the political families throughout this period. 
Thirdly, French motives should be acknowledged, too. France sought to 
incentivise the Shiʿa away from the Arab nationalist movement that 
opposed their rule. In this sense, the interaction between the French ‘above’ 
and the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ that they courted ‘below’, was one of reciprocation 
between two elites for mutual gain. The French deployed an overtly 
sectarian (and colonial) political strategy of divide and rule in order to 
separate Shiʿi elites from the broadly Sunni Arab nationalist movement. 
However, those Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ who agreed to accept France’s colonial 
authority did so not because of the sectarian rights and recognition they 
received in return, but because of the access to power these new rights, and 
the institutions they established, accrued to the zuʿamaʾ. 
The politics of demand failed to yield significant improvements to the lives 
of the Shiʿa under French rule. The collaboration of the community’s elites 
with the French authorities dismayed other elements of the Shiʿi 
community, and led to the rise of a peasant based Shiʿi revolt against the 
Mandate. This development also contributed to the radicalisation of the 
Shiʿi peasantry’s political strategy, from demand to protest. 
The Politics of Protest 
Despite the French Mandate’s promotion of some zuʿamaʾ and wujaha to 
political posts, the incorporation of these Shiʿi elites into the political 
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administration did little to improve the appearance of the Shiʿa in France’s 
administration of Lebanon, or increase the community’s presence in the 
political decision making about the emergent Lebanese polity. This 
situation contributed to a sense of frustration among the Shiʿi masses with 
their elite representatives, who drew no tangible benefits from their 
representatives’ collaboration with the colonial regime. The emergent 
political discourse and socioeconomic environment effectively excluded 
both the Shiʿi elite and the peasantry. In the 1930s, this situation 
contributed to the convergence of interests between different segments of 
the Shiʿi community. By 1936, the Shiʿa were collectively engaged in a 
broad-based movement initiated by the peasantry, but coordinated in 
alliance with the other Shiʿi elites, including the wujaha and intellectuals. 
The Shiʿi peasantry were expressing their opposition to the emergent 
sectarian culture of the 1930s, the Libanist discourse that accompanied it, 
while insisting on greater political representation, as well as an equal share 
in the economic resources of the developing state.239 In this sense, the Shiʿa 
were still pursuing a policy of political inclusion, but with a more radical 
political strategy.   
Two popular, peasant and worker-led Shiʿi protests against the French 
Mandate occurred in Jabal ʿAmil in 1920 and 1936. The first was a 
spontaneous uprising by the peasantry against the Mandate, and in 
particular against the dire conditions the inhabitants of Jabal ʿAmil were 
still experiencing. This uprising occurred on the basis of the same issues 
raised by the Shiʿi petitioners demanding improvements to Jabal ʿAmil’s 
infrastructure during the politics of demand. In this environment, little 
incentive existed among the Shiʿi peasantry to accept the French imposition 
of Greater Lebanon.240 It was in this environment that opposition to French 
rule emerged, and a call for unity with Syria from Jabal ʿAmil.  
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The first uprising occurred during Faysal’s short reign over Damascus, and 
encompassed both Jabal ʿAmil and the Bekaa regions. The rebellion took 
the form of banditry and was led by a Shiʿi rebel from the town of Tibnine, 
Adham Khanjar and associates, Sadiq Hamza and Mahmud Bazzi. Armed, 
these bandits emerged independently of Jabal ‘Amil’s zuʿamaʾ, wujaha and 
al-Irfan intellectuals.241 Their followers hailed from a mixed peasant base, 
comprising pastoralists and agriculturalists. 242  They attacked French 
positions as well as Lebanese towns who hosted French soldiers and 
personnel. They were loosely allied with Prince Faysal’s Arab government, 
and increased their attacks following Faysal’s failure to negotiate Syria’s 
future with the French Prime Minister in 1919.243  
In 1920 a group of these bandits from Bint Jbeil killed one hundred 
Maronite Christians from the town of ʿAyn Ibl. Although the massacre was 
widely condemned by the Shiʿi elite, including its ‘ulama’ and intellectuals, 
the French responded harshly, utilising air and ground attacks to target 
Jabal ʿAmil indiscriminately. The damage was severe, resulting in heavy 
loss of life and the arrest of scores of local residents suspected of 
involvement in the incident. France then imposed a new tax as punishment 
on the inhabitants. The severity of the French response foiled the uprising, 
and forced Jabal ʿAmil’s incorporation into Greater Lebanon for good.  
An additional explanation for the failure of this first uprising pertains to 
the absence of broad-based support from the rest of the Shiʿi community. 
The intellectuals did not develop an unequivocally supportive stance 
toward the bandits, displaying ‘a mixture of admiration, fear and disdain 
toward the rebels.’244 Abisaab links this issue to the differences in class 
status - the intellectuals viewed the bandits as ‘uncivilised.’245 The activities 
of the bandits, particularly the ʿAyn Ibl  incident also disturbed the Shiʿi 
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elites, including the ‘ulama’. In an effort to spur the increasing violence of 
the uprising, and fears of French retaliatory measures, Kemal al-Asʿad set 
up a consultation including over six-hundred community leaders in April 
1920, known as the Wadi al-Hujayr conference. The delegates discussed 
whether they should unify with Syria or integrate with Greater Lebanon. 
The rebel component of the meeting concluded that Jabal ʿAmil accepted 
incorporation into Faysal’s Kingdom, but demanded administrative 
autonomy within that framework. This required an increase in attacks on 
the French in order to assure continued support from Faysal.246 However, 
after ʿAyn Ibl, both the zuʿamaʾ and al-Irfan intellectuals sought to mediate 
between the armed groups and France to bring an end to the particularly 
brutal incidents.247 France viewed the intervention of the Shiʿi elites with 
ambivalence, and therefore did not discriminate in its military response to 
the massacre at ʿAyn Ibl. 
In the second major rebellion to occur in 1936, the intifada of Bint Jbeil, the 
Shiʿi peasantry appeared to learn from their previous experience. In this 
uprising the Shiʿi peasants established strong alliances with the Shiʿi elites, 
including the zuʿamaʾ and literati.248 The basis of this rebellion was socio-
economic, and resulted from changes incurred to the system of tobacco 
cultivation in Jabal ʿAmil following the takeover of the industry by a 
French monopoly.  
As France sought to incorporate Jabal ʿAmil’s economy with that of Mount 
Lebanon’s, the tobacco industry in the south became a significant 
dimension of its regional and global trade networks. Tobacco cultivation 
quickly overrode the declining silk industry as an alternative cash crop in 
Jabal ʿAmil. The extent of tobacco production from 1930-1935 was such that 
most families in the south planted tobacco instead of garden vegetables.249   
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However, the tobacco industry in Jabal ʿAmil was overtaken by a French 
monopoly, the Regie des Tabacs in 1935. French authorities imposed severe 
restrictions on tobacco cultivation, ruling where and how much tobacco 
farmers could grow.250 The motivations for doing so were often political - to 
put pressure on ‘radical’ zuʿamaʾ who opposed French rule, by punishing 
the peasantry.251 As the Regie continued to impose restrictions on cultivation 
and sales, many peasants were forced to emigrate or migrate. This led to a 
deterioration in crop yields and quality, and rising local resentment toward 
the French. This culminated in the Tobacco Revolt, which quickly 
expanded into a regular and organised protest movement against the 
French Mandate.252 
The Tobacco Revolt was a broad-based movement across Syrian and 
Lebanese towns and cities. It drew the participation of peasants, tobacco 
workers and elites, Muslim and Christian. Among the intellectuals who 
joined the uprising, a strong middle-class component was present, 
comprising graduate students of the schools of Damascus, recent 
employees in the Lebanese administration, schoolteachers and returning 
migrants who had accrued financial wealth abroad.253  It also drew the 
support of a number of literary clubs and cultural committees, which 
became central to the discourse of the uprising. Among the participants in 
these literary movements were reform-minded intellectuals as well as 
political figures from the wujaha including ‘Ali Bazzi, Musa al-Zayn 
Sharara and Ali Beydoun. These figures voiced their support for the 
uprising through the press, speeches, rallies and demonstrations.254  The 
intellectuals attached to al-Irfan also played a role in the uprising, with the 
journal again becoming a source of information and advocation for the 
resistance. Al-Irfan was banned twice by the French authorities in 1931 for 
its role in supporting the rebellion.255 Notable for their general absence from 
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this uprising were the traditional Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ and ʿulamaʾ. This did not go 
unnoticed by the other supporters of the rebellion who satirised the 
symbiotic relationship between these traditional notables.256  
The Tobacco Revolt was an extended uprising that continued to instigate 
general strikes, marches and protest movements across Jabal ʿAmil. 
However, in April 1936 a meeting was held at the al-Asʿad residence in 
Taybeh to discuss the repercussions of the revolt and the potential for a 
collective stance on the reality of Greater Lebanon. Among the members of 
wujaha that were present, the call was for Arab unity and reunification with 
Syria. However, the zuʿamaʾ and ʿulamaʾ in attendance rejected any talk of 
Syrian - or Arab - unity. These elites argued that the only remaining 
alternative for the Shiʿa was acceptance of the new territorial reality if they 
were to have any hope of securing their socioeconomic and political 
futures.257 Although the meeting concluded with a long list of Shiʿi demands 
to the French authorities, which again called attention to the lack of 
investment in the infrastructure of South Lebanon, it was the positions of 
the zuʿamaʾ and ʿulamaʾ that were ratified. Despite objections from the 
Shiʿi peasantry, wujaha and literati, who together had risen in revolt against 
France and her colonial designs for Lebanon, the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ had won the 
day. 
Conclusion	  
The reform process that presaged the collapse of the Ottoman Empire led 
to the social stratification of the Shiʿi community. The power of the 
traditional Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ became bureaucratised, while a new largely urban 
elite, the wujaha, emerged. The reform process also led to the political 
mobilisation of the Shiʿi literati, workers and peasantry. A diversity of 
political identities emerged both within and between the old and new Shiʿi 
social classes. Towards the end of the Ottoman Empire, far from having 
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developed a cohesive and distinctive sectarian identity, the Shiʿa were still 
pondering the very question of their identity and political position in the 
new Lebanese reality. Numerous editorials in the journal al-Irfan reflected 
these concerns. Ahmad Rida’s article, ‘Ma Hiya al-Umma?’ (What is the 
Nation?) shows Shiʿi intellectuals attempting to reconcile their sectarian 
identities with at least three other identity references: the Muslim 
(religious) community, the Ottoman (civic) community or nation, and the 
Arab national community (nationalist).258  
The imposition of the French Mandate in 1920 was deeply unpopular 
among the Shiʿi masses, and the switching of identities became a feature of 
the Shiʿi community’s elite politics during this period. Whilst the zuʿamaʾ 
oscillated between anti-French and pro-Arab nationalist inclinations, the 
Shiʿi literati and peasantry began to petition the colonial authorities for 
greater autonomy, as well as further social, economic and political rights in 
their territories. The Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ were also compelled to partake in this 
politics of demand, due to the depth of feeling and unrest the French 
presence generated among the Shiʿi community. 
By the end of the French Mandate, those among the traditional zuʿamaʾ 
who once held anti-French and pro-Arab nationalist leanings began to 
accept the new territorial reality of Lebanon, and participate in the electoral 
process. The participation of Kemal al-Asʿad was a significant turning 
point for this powerful political family, particularly since many of the 
influential Sunni zuʿamaʾ were still boycotting parliamentary elections and 
professing their Arab nationalism.259 The motivations of the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ for 
participating in the institutional apparatus of the French Mandate were the 
same as they had been under the Ottoman Empire: to preserve their 
political power and influence. Only the strategies changed, which in 
Mandate Lebanon required parliamentary representation. Seats in 
parliament conferred significant powers on their holders, including access 
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to government funds for the development of projects the zuʿamaʾ wished to 
support, as well as the opportunity to seek government jobs for their 
clients. Thus the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ adapted to the political institutions 
introduced by the French, eventually partaking in every election and 
accepting posts in the governmental administration. Their participation in 
the electoral process indicated a shift away from the Arab nationalist 
movement, towards integration with the national Lebanese political 
framework.260  
As elections primarily became arenas for contestation among rival elite 
political families, the other Shiʿi social groups had little means of access to 
the political system. For the Shiʿi literati, workers and peasantry, the 
politics of demand was an attempt to improve their livelihoods and draw 
the attention of the French authorities. The zuʿamaʾ also engaged in the 
politics of demand, but this was merely an effort to shore up popular 
legitimacy among their restive Shiʿi constituencies. As the politics of 
demand transformed into one of protest, the intermediary function of the 
zuʿamaʾ became overshadowed by the onset of regular popular protest 
movements, led by the Shiʿi workers and peasantry, and supported by the 
literati and wujaha. The politics of protest became a feature of the Shiʿi 
community’s political agitation against French rule towards the end of the 
Mandate. 
The politics of protest was a distinctly grass-roots movement that attracted 
broad-based social support in the Shiʿi community. It signified growing 
dissatisfaction with the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ from within, as well as the 
radicalisation of a community experiencing rapid socio-economic decline 
under colonial rule. For these Shiʿa, their aspiration for political inclusion 
had not been realised; the politics of demand and protest had failed and a 
new strategy was required. 
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Chapter 3 ~ The Making of a 
Resistance Identity: Communism 
and the Shiʿa 1943-1975 
The prospect of Lebanese independence was viewed enthusiastically by the 
restive and mobilised Shiʿa of the French Mandate era. When Lebanon 
became independent in 1943, these Shiʿa expected a swift improvement to 
their political, social and economic status in Lebanon. However, the 
political system established by the National Pact (1943) and the impact of 
Lebanon’s modernisation process institutionalised the Shiʿi community’s 
marginalisation and exclusion from the emergent Lebanese state. These 
circumstances formed a critical juncture in the Shiʿi community’s political 
mobilisation. Many Shiʿa viewed the confessional political system as the 
source of their systematic marginalisation from politics and life in Lebanon; 
they no longer sought to enact a politics of demand and protest in the 
service of acquiring their inclusion in that system. Instead, the Shiʿa 
pursued a politics of resistance against the status quo. The LCP became the 
primary vehicle for the mobilisation of that resistance identity. 
In this chapter, the analysis explains the genesis of the Shiʿi community’s 
resistance identity, why and how the LCP became the primary vehicle for 
its mobilisation, and the resulting impact of that association on the wider 
Shiʿi community. 
The analysis begins by highlighting three main events that led to the 
formation of a critical juncture in the Shiʿi community’s political 
mobilisation. The first issue pertains to the National Pact in 1943, which 
institutionalised Lebanon’s confessional political system and with it the 
marginalisation of the Lebanese Shiʿa. Secondly, the chapter considers the 
socio-economic status of the Shiʿa in the aftermath of independence, 
highlighting the continued deprivation of Shiʿi locales as a result of 
government neglect, but also as a direct economic outcome of Lebanon’s 
pursuit of a capitalist path toward modernisation. Thirdly, the analysis 
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explores an additional dimension of Lebanon’s modernisation process and 
its disproportionate impact on the Shiʿa: migration and urbanisation. The 
overall status of the Shiʿa in the aftermath of Lebanon’s independence, and 
the already restive nature of the Shiʿi community prior to 1943, are argued 
to have comprised the conditions under which the Shiʿa departed from 
their pursuit of inclusion in the political system, and instead formulated a 
resistance identity based on their outright rejection of the Lebanese political 
system’s sectarian structure. 
The chapter then moves on to explain how the Shiʿi community’s newly 
formed resistance identity became mobilised. The analysis challenges the 
conventional link between Lebanon’s modernisation process and the rise of 
sectarian identities and mobilisation among the Shiʿa. Instead, this chapter 
argues that secular political parties emerged as the primary vehicle for the 
mobilisation of the Shiʿi community’s resistance identity after 1943. 
Drawing on interviews with senior LCP officials and former Shiʿi 
communists, the analysis argues that the LCP’s anti-system, political 
reformist agenda, which advocated resistance against the sectarian regime 
in Lebanon, constituted the initial basis of the Shiʿi attraction to 
communism. The analysis continues to elaborate the appeal of communism 
among the Shiʿa, demonstrating that in addition to its anti-sectarian 
political agenda, the LCP attracted Shiʿi adherents on the basis of its 
agricultural reform initiative for South Lebanon, as well as the 
establishment of the LCP’s Popular Guard. The LCP pledged that this 
military unit in South Lebanon would protect and defend the Shiʿa from 
Israeli attacks, and provide support to the Palestinian resistance fighters 
that were also stationed there.  
After establishing the initial basis of the Shiʿi community’s attraction to 
communism, the analysis in this chapter moves on to explore in detail who 
the communist Shiʿa were. The LCP’s perception of its Shiʿi adherents is 
compared and contrasted with the view of the communist Shiʿa 
themselves. This reveals the contradictions between the image and reality 
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of the Shiʿi communists. While the LCP conceives of its Shiʿi members as 
workers and peasants i.e in traditional class terms, the analysis finds that 
the communist Shiʿa spanned a broader base of social classes within the 
community that included the middle-classes, intelligentsia and even 
ʿulamaʾ. Utilising the examples of the lives of  Husayn Muruwa and Mahdi 
‘Amil, the analysis explains why the LCP also generated an appeal among 
young Shiʿi clerics-in-training, as well as senior Shiʿi clerics.  
Finally, this chapter explains the impact of the Shiʿi community’s 
relationship with communism on other actors within the community, 
including the zuʿamaʾ and ʿulamaʾ. The chapter argues that the influence of 
communism led directly to the political mobilisation of the previously 
quietist Shiʿi clerical elite. This is illustrated by an analysis of Musa al-
Sadr’s interaction with the communists in Lebanon. Additionally, the 
appeal of communism is also shown to have led to cosmetic changes in the 
political organisation of the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ who sought to apply an 
ideological veneer to their activities, particularly at election time, in an 
effort to tap into the Shiʿi community’s engagement with the ideological 
political parties on the Lebanese left.  
The arguments in this chapter serve as an important corrective to 
conventional analyses of the Shiʿa during Lebanon’s post-independence 
period that posit these years as the origins of their sectarian identities and 
political mobilisation. On the contrary, this chapter argues that secular 
political identities were a central feature of the Shiʿi community’s political 
mobilisation between 1943 and 1975.  
The Formation of a Critical Juncture 
The politics of demand and protest that emerged during the colonial era 
was an expression of the Shiʿi community’s frustration with their 
subordinate status in the political institutions of the French administration, 
as well as the socio-economically disruptive effects of the new territorial 
reality of Greater Lebanon. Upon independence, and the departure of the 
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French colonial authorities, the Shiʿa hoped that their political status would 
improve. However, as the ensuing analysis demonstrates, the Shiʿa found 
themselves institutionally marginalised by the new political system. 
Political marginalisation 
The primary source of the Shiʿi community’s political marginalisation in 
1943 was the National Pact. This was an unwritten agreement that enabled 
the establishment of an independent Lebanon in 1943, the end of French 
colonial rule and the consolidation of the confessional political system. The 
latter dimension was particularly controversial for the Shiʿa. The new 
political system institutionalised political sectarianism, whereby sectarian 
identity determined entry and access to the political system and its 
bureaucracy. The formula upon which this allocation occurred was a 6:5 
ratio of Christians to Muslims.261 Thus the office of the President would, 
thereafter, always be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni and 
the Speaker of Parliament a Shiʿi.  
The new political system effectively accorded the Shiʿa third place in terms 
of their political power. However, the most disagreeable dimension of this 
formula was the population census upon which the statistical allocation of 
power was based. The census, conducted by the French colonial 
administrators, did not cover all the Shiʿi regions of the Bekaa Valley.262 In 
addition, at independence in 1943, thousands of Shiʿa who resided in the 
Baalbek-Hermel region were still not registered as Lebanese. This was due 
to their nomadic way of life as shepherds, where they would move out of 
the country for several months. The census contained multiple flaws and 
was beset by numerous administrative irregularities.263  
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The National Pact’s marginalisation of the Shiʿa disappointed the 
community’s high hopes for their political inclusion in an independent 
Lebanon. Lebanon has not had another official population census since 
1932. The process and predictable outcome is broadly understood to be too 
controversial for the country’s fragile political system to bear. 264 
Nevertheless, this also means that the political system has not evolved to 
reflect the country’s changing demographic realities. In today’s Lebanon 
this would certainly mean that the Muslim population outnumbers the 
Maronite Christians.265 The National Pact’s marginalisation of the Shiʿa is 
therefore also its legacy. This analysis contends that it imparted a 
commensurably enduring imprint on the nature of Shiʿi political 
mobilisation thereafter.  
All subsequent forms of Shiʿi mobilisation after 1943 have contained 
varying degrees of resistance to the Lebanese political system. To be clear, 
this should not be understood as a non-patriotic rejection of the Lebanese 
state. Rather, it is a nationalist rejection of the inequalities inherent within 
the sectarian foundations of the Lebanese political system. Whereas in 
chapter two we saw the Shiʿa deploy a politics of demand and protest in an 
effort to achieve their inclusion in the political system, after 1943 the 
strategy transformed into one of resistance against the system. The Shiʿa 
mobilised to reject the political structure that had excluded them. However, 
the National Pact was not the only factor that contributed to the 
marginalisation of the Shiʿa at independence. The affect of Lebanon’s 
modernisation process on Shiʿi regions had detrimental socioeconomic 
ramifications. 
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Socioeconomic status 
Upon independence, Lebanon’s political elites pursued a capitalist model 
of economic development. During the 1950s, the Lebanese economy was  
service-centred, principally based on trade and financial services, and 
centred in the Lebanese capital, Beirut.  As the economy boomed between 
1960 and 1970, Beirut developed an external reputation for being one of the 
most prosperous, liberal and democratic capitals in the region. This further 
fuelled its ability to lure investment and wealth.266 However, internally, 
Beirut’s image as a prosperous metropole contrasted sharply with the vast 
inequalities of wealth produced by Lebanon’s rapid modernisation. This 
was visible in the relative deprivation and impoverishment of Lebanon’s 
rural regions.267  
Both the Bekaa and Jabal ʿAmil lacked basic infrastructure such as 
communications, roads, schools, clinics and hospitals. Half the villages of 
Jabal ʿAmil did not have running water and neither the Bekaa nor Jabal 
ʿAmil had electricity supplies. Education levels were a particularly 
alarming indicator of the Shiʿi predicament: illiteracy levels were 68.9% in 
1943.268 More than half of Jabal ʿAmil’s children were still without schooling 
in the early 1960s; in the Bekaa the situation was worse. Health care was 
also a problem: Jabal ʿAmil had just three clinics, whereas the Bekaa had 
one hospital for the entire area. Relative to Lebanon’s other communal 
groupings the Shiʿi situation appeared disastrous. The Shiʿi standard of 
living was said to be five times lower than that of Beirut’s inhabitants in the 
early 1950s. And even by the early 1970s, 50% of  the Shiʿi community were 
still unschooled compared with a national average of 30%. The percentage 
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of Shiʿis who had a university education was 6.6%, compared with 15% of 
Sunnis and 17% of Christians.269 
Eighty-five per cent of the Shiʿa resided in Lebanon’s rural areas and 
depended on agricultural production for their livelihoods. Since 
agricultural output comprised only 15% of the Lebanese economy, the 
sector did not attract governmental investment. The agricultural sector also 
failed to produce enough output to sustain the 45% of the Lebanese 
population whose income and well-being depended on its output. 270 
Industries with a long history of Shiʿi involvement, including fruit, sugar 
beet and tobacco cultivation in the Bekaa and Jabal ʿAmil regions, all 
suffered from government neglect. 271  The standard of living for Shiʿi 
inhabitants of the countryside was five times lower than Beirut’s residents 
in the 1950s. 272  These conditions compounded the absence of adequate 
infrastructure in Shiʿi locales.273 
Lebanon’s capitalist modernisation process had a devastating impact on 
the Shiʿa in socioeconomic terms. However, as the discussion in chapter 
one on political mobilisation argued, theories of social mobilisation fail to 
adequately link cause with effect. Rather, they assume that poverty 
inherently leads to political mobility, without providing evidence for the 
latter process. Socioeconomic factors can and often do produce feelings of 
alienation and disaffection. However it cannot be assumed that this also 
entails mobilisation. In order to draw the latter connection, it is important 
to consider the agents and actors who become the practitioners and 
intermediaries of political mobilisation.  
Author interviews with Shiʿi communists and officials within the LCP 
provided different insights into the relationship between socioeconomic 
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status and political mobilisation. Some respondents did suggest a 
correlation, for example, family hardship and the experience of financial 
difficulty. However, these issues were never proffered as the only or 
indeed overriding factor in their decision to become communists. Other 
more complex factors emerged from interviews. One respondent 
experienced his ‘first brush with communism’ during the time he was 
educated in the Soviet Union. Others had a history of family involvement 
in the LCP, or were simply introduced to Marxism by a close friend or 
mentor.274 
Officials within the LCP were more likely to affirm the correlation between 
socioeconomic status and an attachment to communism. In the LCP’s view, 
the party’s political programme throughout the 1950s and 1960s centred on 
political and economic reform.  It is clear therefore, why they would 
advocate the resonance of their political manifesto with their membership. 
In this sense the LCP’s explanation for its Shiʿi membership was more 
structural and rooted in classic communist dichotomies: the bourgeois 
oppressors verses the downtrodden and poor proletariat. These 
explanations were also expounded by the LCP when asked about its Shiʿi 
membership in particular.275 
Existing analyses of the Shiʿi community’s involvement with communism 
resort to the poverty thesis. This states that because the Shiʿa were poor, 
effectively comprising a downtrodden working class, the attraction to 
communism was inevitable.276 A related argument raises the ideological 
attraction of Marxism. In this sense, because the Shiʿa were 
socioeconomically disadvantaged, any party proposing a fairer and more 
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equal distribution of power and wealth would appeal.277 Other explanations 
assert instrumentalist reasons, such as financial benefit and protection. 
These apply particularly to the cases of Shiʿi involvement with the 
Palestinian groups, for which Shiʿi volunteers received payment.278 
The difficulty with attempting to correlate socioeconomic factors with the 
Shiʿi community’s mobilisation is that they were not the only community 
in Lebanon who were adversely affected by Lebanon’s burgeoning 
capitalist economy. Other groups in Lebanon’s rural regions, including 
Tripoli, Akkar, Sidon and Tyre, which contained Maronite Christian, Sunni 
Muslim, Druze, as well as Shiʿi populations, were also adversely effected 
by Lebanon’s economic changes.279 Further still, dissatisfaction with the 
Lebanese economy and the political elites who spearheaded its 
transformation occurred in Beirut too, where mass anti-government 
protests, demonstrations and strike action took place. The violent civil 
unrest that culminated in the insurrection against President Shamʿun’s 
government in 1958 was the product of widespread popular dissatisfaction 
with socioeconomic conditions in Lebanon. 280  In this sense, the 
socioeconomic effects of Lebanon’s modernisation process cut across 
communal boundaries. This was why the main mobilisers of political 
opposition in this period were dominated by a coalition of mostly secular 
leftist political parties - the Lebanese National Movement (LNM). This 
alliance opposed the confessional political system and its capitalist oriented 
economy. Among the LCP’s adherents, in addition to the Shiʿa, were other 
minority communities who lacked representation in the confessional 
political structure. Lebanon’s non-Arab communities, such as the 
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Armenians and Kurds were among these.281 The LCP also drew adherents 
form the underrepresented Arab communities, such as the Orthodox 
Christians. Opposition to the confessional political structure in Lebanon 
that barred these communities from political  representation was the 
primary issue that the diverse communities that comprised the LCP’s 
membership had in common. 
The affects of Lebanon’s modernisation process on the socioeconomic 
status of the Shiʿa were severe. In fact, it unleashed an additional socio-
structural transformation. As agricultural output declined in the rural 
regions of Lebanon, and capital increasingly became concentrated in Beirut, 
the Shiʿi communities were forced to migrate in search of better 
opportunities of employment, education and an improved quality of life in 
general.  
Migration and urbanisation 
The decline of Lebanon’s agricultural sector produced a seismic shift in the 
demographics of the Shiʿi community. Whilst migration, like the 
socioeconomic effects outlined above, impacted many of Lebanon’s other 
communal groupings too, the effect on the Shiʿa was disproportionately 
greater. Such was the extent of the Shiʿi community’s migration to Beirut 
that by 1973, 50% of the Shiʿi communities in the Bekaa and Jabal ‘Amil left: 
43% had moved to the city, where they already comprised 29% of the 
population.282 The Shiʿa also emigrated abroad at this time too, most notably 
to West Africa. 
Historian Munthir Jaber argues that much of the impetus for Shiʿi 
migration originated from the search for employment. The migrants were 
typically the farm workers who could no longer find work at home.283 In 
Beirut, they became menial labourers, working in the city’s construction 
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industry and factories. These migrants generally settled in its northern and 
southern suburbs - Naba’a, Ghobeiry, Burj el-Barajneh. These areas came to 
be known as Beirut's Hizam al-Bu’us (Misery Belt), where the quality of life 
and standard of living was exceedingly low, and employment still difficult 
to acquire.284 However, it was here where the new Shiʿi migrants got a real 
glimpse of their relative deprivation.  
The paradox of Lebanon’s booming economy, epitomised by Beirut’s 
external image of flamboyance and luxury, verses the Beirut experienced 
by the Shiʿa, represented a stark contradiction. The impact of migration on 
the political mobilisation of the Shiʿa is subject to different interpretations. 
Some argue that migration produced a politically adrift community, 
isolated and in search of an identity, and opportunities for employment, 
upward mobility and political representation.285 However, it has also been 
argued that the Shiʿi community’s predicament in Beirut strengthened the 
community’s primordial attachments, i.e sectarian identity, and thus 
contributed to the ‘ruralisation of the city’.286 Thus, the Shiʿa maintained 
strong links with their places of origin and sought to reproduce familiar 
religious and cultural practices in order to affirm their Shiʿi identities. 
Because of this, the argument continues, migration and urbanisation 
contributed to the political mobilisation of the Shiʿa on the basis of sectarian 
identities.  
Elizabeth Picard asserts that the outcome of the aforementioned 
modernisation processes for the Shiʿa was ‘the search for radical change in 
a traditional way.’287 Augustus Richard Norton also argues that despite 
modernisation, which supposedly unravels traditional ties, sectarian 
identities persisted. Norton follows his analysis of the social mobilisation of 
the Shiʿa immediately with a discussion of ‘the persistence of sectarian 
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identity.’288 While both scholars acknowledge the role played by secular 
political parties in attracting Shiʿi members, it is clear from their analyses 
that they have prioritised the political mobilisation of the Shiʿa that 
occurred in sectarian terms. This is despite a significant historical gap of at 
least twenty-years between the aforementioned modernisation processes 
and the appearance of sectarian identities among the Shiʿa. Whilst it is 
correct to relate the impact of Lebanon’s modernisation processes to the 
political mobilisation of the Shiʿa, this analysis argues that it is inaccurate 
to also relate these processes to the formation of a specifically sectarian 
political identity. 
The net effect of migration on the Shiʿa was also not as negative as is 
usually asserted. On the contrary, migration also produced opportunities 
for the Shiʿa to improve their social and economic status.289 Indeed despite 
her stance, Picard acknowledges that opportunities for employment in 
Beirut’s exports and service sector were present, and some Shiʿa found 
work there.290 Other Shiʿa managed to break out of Beirut’s poverty through 
the acquisition of an education. This was facilitated by the availability of a 
secondary level education in Beirut as well as the establishment of the 
Lebanese University (LU) in 1951- the country’s first and only public 
university.291 Emigration also produced success stories, particularly among 
Shiʿi migrants to West Africa who accumulated wealth there. These 
migrants also maintained their ties to Lebanon, returning remittances to 
their families, and establishing businesses in Beirut. Migrants to West 
Africa developed into a burgeoning Shiʿi middle class.292 Improvements to 
the community’s social and economic status also expanded opportunities 
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for political mobility. The Lebanese University became an important 
component of the Shiʿi community’s mobilisation, and acquired a large 
Shiʿi student body. This contributed to the growth of a Shiʿi intelligentsia in 
Beirut. In fact, it was among the university’s Shiʿi staff and students in the 
1950s and 1960s that the LCP developed a strong following.293  
The role of migration and urbanisation in the political mobilisation of the 
Shiʿa is more complex than the story presented by existing studies. Whilst  
these modernisation processes sometimes enhanced cultural and religious 
identities among the Shiʿa of Beirut, it is a reification to suggest that this 
also resulted in the sectarianisation of Shiʿi political identities. In this sense, 
the impact of migration and urbanisation on the Lebanese Shiʿa was not 
their political mobilisation in sectarian terms. This process occurred later, 
under different circumstances of causality, namely the Lebanese Civil War. 
Migration and urbanisation constitutes the third and final factor that 
contributed to a historical juncture in the Shiʿi community’s political 
mobilisation. Crucially, however, the type of mobilisation initiated by these 
processes among the Shiʿa was decidedly secular - and anti-sectarian.  
The Making of a Resistance Identity 
The Shiʿi community’s experience of political, social and economic life in 
Lebanon after independence produced a critical juncture in their political 
mobilisation. This shifted the objective of their political activities away 
from the pursuit of political inclusion towards a radical politics of 
resistance. Now the Shiʿa required a vehicle for the mobilisation of their 
newly developed resistance identity. The ensuing analysis details the path 
taken by the Shiʿa in their search for a new strategy of political 
mobilisation. 
                                                
293 Interviews with Maurice Nahl and Ghazi Berro, Beirut: Lebanon (21/15 December 2012). 
  144 
In Search of a Political Alternative 
For the Shiʿa, frustrated and radicalised by their continued marginalisation 
and impoverishment in the new Lebanon, the existing political options 
within the community: the zuʿamaʾ and ʿulamaʾ, did not match the new 
criteria for political mobilisation, which was formulated around a 
resistance identity opposed to the status quo. On the contrary, the zuʿamaʾ 
represented precisely the confessional political structure that these Shiʿa 
rejected, and sought to overturn. The Shiʿi ʿulamaʾ also failed to comprise a 
viable alternative. Aside from their generally apolitical character at this 
time, the ʿulamaʾ also lacked political credibility due to their financial 
dependance on the zuʿamaʾ. The political families maintained alliances with 
the ʿulamaʾ in order to ensure the selection of their preferred candidates at 
election time. And in return for their loyalty and political quiescence, the 
ʿulamaʾ received financial backing to maintain their religious activities, e.g 
schools, seminaries and awqāf (religious endowments).294 In this sense the 
ʿulamaʾ were perceived in much the same terms as the zuʿamaʾ: as part of 
the Lebanese system, and an additional element that perpetuated the 
regressive sectarian logic of political power in Lebanon.  
Since the zuʿamaʾ and ʿulamaʾ represented part of the problem for those 
frustrated by political system, many Shiʿa embarked on a journey beyond 
the confines of their sect to find an alternative vehicle for their political 
mobilisation. By the 1960s, a wide range of political parties and movements 
attracted significant numbers of Shiʿi members and sympathisers. Among 
these were the LCP, the Organisation for Communist Action in Lebanon 
(OCAL), the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) and the Arab Socialist 
Ba’ath Party. The Shiʿa also became involved in the various Palestinian 
resistance organisations with bases in Lebanon, including the PLO, PFLP 
and DFLP.295  
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Scholars have struggled to provide an accurate characterisation of Shiʿi 
involvement in such a diverse range of political movements at this time. 
This is partly because they have not accorded this phenomenon any 
particular significance to the overall trajectory of Shiʿi political 
mobilisation. Norton’s conclusions summarise well why Shiʿi involvement 
in these parties is considered by scholars to be of little significance: 
No single party was overwhelmingly successful in the recruitment of 
Shiʿi members, and, in retrospect, it is the relatively broad ideological 
spectrum covered by the organizations that seems noteworthy [emphasis 
added].296 
The emphasis on the wide ideological spectrum of these parties overlooks 
an important aspect of what they all had in common. This was their 
rejectionist, anti-system, revolutionary resistance agenda. Whether it was 
the LCP’s pledge to abolish Lebanon’s communal political structure; the 
SSNP’s aspiration for Greater Syrian national unity (which by definition 
meant that it also opposed the sectarian political system institutionalised 
by the National Pact); the Baʿth party’s pan-Arabist vision of regional 
unity; or the Palestinian’s adoption of revolutionary armed-struggle, all 
these parties upheld a resistance agenda. In this sense, they matched the 
criteria for the Shiʿi community’s burgeoning resistance agenda, and 
offered a variety of expositions for how the Shiʿa might eventually pursue 
that agenda for themselves. 
Statistics denoting Shiʿi membership of these political organisation are 
extremely difficult to ascertain. As author interviews with the LCP also 
discovered, since an important ideological foundation of the LCP is its 
opposition to what it calls the sectarian regime in Lebanon, it is not in the 
interests of the party to acknowledge that it had significant following from 
a particular sectarian community. The party stated that it does not keep 
records of the sectarian identities of its members. Nevertheless, one 
available estimate of the LCP’s demographics in 1975 indicated that Shiʿi 
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members comprised 50%, the Greek Orthodox Christians 30% and the 
Sunni and Druze 15-20%.297 Given the high proportion of Shiʿi members of 
the LCP, the analysis now moves on to explore the history and 
development of the LCP 
The Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) - Early History 
The main founders of the LCP were Yusaf Ibrahim Yazbek and Fouad al-
Shimali. Shimali, a Lebanese tobacco worker, was the only founding 
member with a background in labour activism. He had worked in Egypt 
where he gained experience in the trade union movement. Shimali’s 
communist activity led to his expulsion from Egypt in 1923.298 Shortly after 
his arrival in Lebanon he met Yazbek, with whom he developed a strong 
friendship.  
Yusuf Ibrahim Yazbek was a Lebanese liberal intellectual inspired by the 
ideas of the French Revolution. Born in 1907, Yazbek was deeply affected 
by the devastating wartime situation, and the brutality of Turkish rule in 
Syria. His activism was inspired by this miserable reality. Yazbek began to 
develop his socialist views in this context. The first May Day celebration in 
Lebanon was a clandestine affair that took place in Raouche, Ras Beirut in 
1907. 299  Yazbek recalls the involvement of himself and Khairallah 
Khairallah, Mustafa al-Ghlayani, Daoud Ja’as, Flex Faris and Nicola Baz. 
They also liaised with a group called The Free Youth.300 
After this event, Yazbek began writing a series of letters and articles which 
appeared in the Zahle based newspaper entitled al-Sihai al-Ta’ih (The 
Wandering Journalist) between 1922-1924. This newspaper was the first 
vehicle for the expression of socialist ideas in Syria/Lebanon. Its target 
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audience was ‘the workers and the miserable.’301 It’s tagline called for class 
unity and respect for ‘the poor and the sad more than the wealthy and the 
happy.’302  
Yazbek, Shimali and their colleagues had no connections with the 
Communist International in the early stages of the Syrian/Lebanese 
movement. In fact, the initial connection was made with the help of several 
Jewish communists from the Palestinian Communist Party. Joseph Berger, 
a Jewish Palestinian communist of Polish origins played a prominent role 
in the early stages of the Syrian/Lebanese party. Berger noticed a socialist 
undertone in an article written by Yazbek on Anatole France’s death. He 
then travelled to Beirut where he met Yazbek, Shimali and several other 
communist workers from Bikfaya. 303  Together, this group officially 
established the party in Beirut on 24th October 1924 under the name of the 
Lebanese People’s Party (LPP). Yazbek was declared the party’s General 
Secretary. Although he was reluctant to be selected for this role, the 
decision was unanimous.304 In 1925, a small group of representatives from 
the Syrian Armenian Communist party, Spartacus, met with LPP 
representatives in Beirut. This lead to the unification of the two groups and 
the formation of the Communist Party of Syria and Lebanon (CPSL). The 
party’s remit spanned the territories of both Lebanon and Syria until 
separate parties were established in July 1943. Shimali moved to Bikfaya in 
Mount Lebanon where he worked in its tobacco factories and established 
the General Syndicate of Tobacco Workers. This was later incorporated into 
the CPSL with the Supreme Committee of Syndicates.305 Its interim central 
committee comprised Yazbak, Shimali and three others, two from the 
Spartacus leadership. The CPSL’s first conference was held in December 
1925 and was attended by fifteen representatives from Aleppo, Bikfaya, 
Zahleh and Beirut. 
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The origins of Lebanese/Syrian communism are markedly different from 
most other Arab communist parties. The early Lebanese communists were 
inspired by the French Revolution, and understood bolshevism as a more 
radical variant of West European humanistic socialism.306 They had only a 
minimal understanding of Marxist culture, which is acknowledged by 
Yazbek in his memoirs.307 The culture of Marxism-Leninism served more as 
an inspiration and stimulus rather than an organisational framework for 
the party. However, unlike most of the Arab communist parties, which 
were founded by non-Arab minorities or, in the Palestinian case, left-wing 
Zionist settlers, all the founders of the LCP were Lebanese Arabs.308 The LCP 
therefore emerged from a genuine Lebanese Arab tradition. 
The second May Day celebration in Lebanon took place in 1925 at the 
Crystal Cinema in Beirut. Unlike the 1907 May Day celebrations, this was a 
public affair that drew greater participation, as well as the attention of the 
French Mandate authorities. The programme of the CPSL was announced 
at this gathering, which consisted of support for the Syrian revolution of 
1925, strengthening the struggle against Imperialism and the struggle for 
national independence, democratic reforms, including a call for the end of 
sectarianism; worker’s rights in Syria and Lebanon, as well as a call for the 
confiscation of the private property of landowners who did not support the 
revolution.309 
After the May Day celebration, the CPSL established its first newspaper, al-
Insaniyya (Humanity) in Beirut. The paper announced a ‘call to the workers 
and farmers’ along with the CPSL’s principles. The version published in 
Khalil al-Dibs collection of party documents omits some of the contents of 
these announcements, emphasising the social dimensions of the party’s 
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political agenda e.g. the working day, a national minimum wage, anti-child 
labour laws etc. However, the pages of al-Insaniyya also contained regularly 
featured columns supporting the the Druze-led Syrian revolt against the 
French in 1925-1926, and calling for French troops to join the rebellion.310 For 
this reason, the party became the target of the French Mandate’s censors, 
and the newspaper was closed down after only five issues in June 1925. The 
party continued to circulate its articles in secret pamphlets until they 
established a second newspaper.311 Government suppression also targeted 
the party’s leadership, many of whom were arrested or fled in early 1926. 
The absence of its leadership effectively halted the party’s activities for two 
years until they were released from prison in 1928.312 During these early 
years, the CPSL came to be admired primarily for its anti-imperialist, anti-
colonialist platform, evidenced by its support for the Syrian revolt and 
later, its declaration for Arab unity in 1931.313 
Censorship of the CPSL’s newspapers became a regular feature of the 
party’s relationship with the French Mandate authorities, as well as the 
independent authorities of the Lebanese state after 1943. After al-Insaniyya 
came Sawt al-Ummal (Voice of the Workers). The first issue was published on 
17th March 1930. This was a weekly paper edited by Fouad Shimali. Its 
primary focus was on the workers, farmers and union activity.314 However, 
this paper was also shut down after only its second issue. The literary 
newspaper, al-Duhor, owned by Ibrahim Haddad served as an interim 
publishing outlet for the communists, and focussed mainly on scientific, 
philosophical and literary issues until it too was temporarily shut down in 
1932. Al-Talia followed in 1935, with the Arab youth its target demographic. 
The newspaper published articles in science and literature in an attempt to 
foster free thinking. The paper sought to bring together writers, poets and 
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Arab intellectuals to defend the national position against the French 
Mandate authorities.315 For this reason it remained a secret paper run by 
several key party officials including Yazbek, Shimali, Nicola Shawi, 
Farajallah al-Hilu and Khaled Bakdash.  
Another party newspaper, Sawt al-Sha’b (The People’s Voice), was established 
on 15th May 1937. This was arguably one of the LCP’s most successful and 
longest running newspapers. By the time of its censorship by the French 
High Commissioner in ‘independent’ Lebanon in 1948, the paper had 
reached a circulation of between 5-6,000 copies, and up to 20,000 copies 
were often printed on Sundays.316 Sawt al-Sha’b was a major voice in the 
Lebanese parliamentary elections of 1937, and had helped the party 
establish important organisational relationships with other parties in 
Lebanon. It is considered by the LCP to be a high point in the Lebanese 
communist movement’s history.317  
Several more LCP newspapers followed Sawt al-Sha’b, including al-Tarikh 
(The Path), al-Sarkha (The Scream), and al-Akhbar (News), culminating with al-
Nida’ (The Call), which continues to be in circulation today. Al-Sarkha was 
managed by Farajallah al-Hilu from a secret room rented near LCP 
headquarters in Beirut. This paper filled the immediate void left by Sawt al-
Sh’ab.318 Al-Sarkha was situated in the post-1948 Arab regional context. Yusuf 
Khatar al-Hilu characterised the newspaper’s placement in this period of 
LCP history as follows: 
Issued after 1948, when the Lebanese prisons were full of socialists, 
dictatorship was controlling Syria, the blood of the communists were 
shed in Baghdad, Libya under the Mandate, Morocco under the 
control of the French, the Gulf under British control, and the Cold 
War was at its peak, and the chances of another third world war were 
very high.319 
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Al-Sarkha was shut down in 1947 until 1951. In its place, al-Tarikh filled the 
gap as a monthly newspaper, while LCP leaflets and flyers provided the 
party with the minimum organisational and political support. At this time 
the party viewed the ability to publish a weekly newspaper as an essential 
element of the communist struggle in Lebanon. Al-Akhbar began circulating 
in October 1954. It sought to mobilise Lebanon’s workers, farmers, students 
and intellectuals, and propose solutions to national issues. The LCP 
believes that Al-Akhbar’s success was evidenced by its censorship in several 
Arab counties. The newspaper had a circulation of between 13,000 and 
20,000 copies throughout the 1950s, and the LCP argues that socialist ideas 
in Lebanon at this time were progressing very well, alongside the 
increasing power of the Lebanese National Movement (LNM).  
The Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) - After independence 
As was noted in this study’s literature review, most studies of the LCP 
provide a negative appraisal of their political performance.320 The main 
source of criticism surrounds the conscious decision by party elites in 1943 
not to pursue a rigidly scientific socialist agenda in Lebanon. Ahead of 
parliamentary elections in 1943, the then leader of the party, Khaled 
Bakdash stated, ‘the issue before us is not to establish socialism in Syria or 
Lebanon…all that we want…is the introduction of certain democratic 
reforms talked about by everyone.’321 Bakdash mentioned the traditional 
targets of communist movements worldwide in his speech: the ‘national 
capitalist’, the ‘national factory owner’ and the ‘owner of land.’322 However, 
his message was that the communists meant them no harm. Instead, the 
LCP’s First Congress, held in 1944, established the party’s primary aims as 
the pursuit of moderate democratic reforms, national unity and the 
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establishment of a democratic republican regime in Lebanon.323 Because of 
this decision, Suleiman concludes that the party did not pursue a radical 
socialist agenda, and was therefore non-revolutionary. Government 
pressure, internal party dissent and an Arab public wary of communism 
are argued to have ‘forced the party to limit is revolutionary activities and 
resort to “peaceful means” to spread its ideology.’324 
If the LCP’s ideology was indeed ‘non-revolutionary’ it is difficult to see 
how it could possibly meet the criteria for an anti-system, resistance party. 
The problem with the above historical readings is that they hold the LCP 
rigidly accountable to an ideological agenda that the party itself did not 
seek to pursue. This leads the Ismaels to conclude that soaring membership 
of the LCP between 1947 and 1948 is because of the party’s accommodation 
of ‘liberal bourgeois principles’, evidenced by the LCP’s decision to 
compete with other national parties in Lebanon for popular support.325 
However, this conclusion tells us very little about what exactly accounted 
for the LCP’s popularity during this period. In essence, the Ismaels argue 
that the LCP’s ascendency cannot be attributed to its communist ideology. 
This leaves open the question of what exactly did contribute to the party’s 
domestic popularity. 
Suleiman offers an alternative explanation for the LCP’s popularity at this 
time: ‘…this support is merely protest registered against the confessional 
sectarian set-up in government and society.’326 Although Suleiman appeared 
to regard such anti-confessional protest as peripheral, his observation is 
highly pertinent to the present analysis, and the question of how the LCP 
came to be at the forefront of Lebanon’s anti-system movements during 
this period. An analysis of the LCP’s programme and activities in Lebanon 
helps account for the LCP’s national popularity during the first twenty 
years of Lebanon’s post-independence period. The LCP’s domestic political 
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agenda in Lebanon at this time constitutes an important component of the 
explanation for the interest shown by the communist Shiʿa in the party. 
According to LCP officials, the main focus of the party’s activities in the 
late 1940s and after was to force political reforms. Their efforts specifically 
targeted Lebanon’s sectarian political structure which, in their reading, 
constituted the main obstacle to the incorporation of all citizens, 
irrespective of religious background, into the Lebanese state. 327 
Characterising the political field in Lebanon at this time, one respondent 
stated, 
prior to the Lebanese Civil War, the main issue was that between the 
[political] left and right: non-sectarian, democratic reform of the 
system, verses preservation of the status quo.328  
Asked whether such political reforms superseded the LCP’s economic 
agenda, party officials responded in the affirmative, though would also 
hasten to add that the economy remained a priority area. As we have 
already seen, LCP pronouncements at the time certainly referenced the 
economy, but the type of economic reforms sought did not seek to bring 
down Lebanon’s capitalist economic model. Nevertheless, respondents 
indicate that the party’s call for a more equitable distribution of wealth in 
Lebanese society was intertwined with their aspirations for political 
reform. One senior party official said,  
The core issues of concern for the parties of the secular left in the 
1950s-1960s were resistance against the sectarian regime and the 
economy.329 
These statements from LCP officials are corroborated by our existing 
knowledge of historical events in Lebanon at the time. The LCP was a 
prominent participant in a vibrant leftist domestic protest movement in 
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Lebanon, which arose in the late 1940s, and experienced its golden years 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The Rose-Water Revolution of 1952, which 
forced the resignation of Lebanon’s first post-independence President, 
Bishara al-Khoury over allegations of economic mismanagement and 
corruption, was the first success story for this burgeoning movement.330 
Comprising an informal parliamentary opposition group led by PSP leader 
Kamal Jumblatt, this movement also involved the LCP and several unions 
that it controlled. Thus, the LCP oversaw regular strike action among 
workers, including bakers, taxi-drivers and lawyers until the President’s 
resignation. 
Whilst membership of the LCP at this time is estimated to have been 
between 10,000-18000, the party’s reach is also understood to have 
extended far beyond its card-carrying members, to include an estimated 
40,000 followers.331 This was because the party controlled several peace 
movements, labour unions and syndicates. In 1945 the LCP established the 
General Union of Workers.332 It also controlled the the Federation of Trade 
Unions, which encompassed carpenters, builders and printers unions.333 The 
LCP also controlled the Lebanese Partisans of Peace. This latter movement 
continued to be involved in the protest movement against the new 
Lebanese President, Kamil Sham’un, which culminated in the May 1958 
insurrection against the government. During this time, the government’s 
concerns over the country’s security were such that it requested American 
military support. The Partisans of Peace called on Lebanese citizens to:  
fight them wherever you find them with the bullets of your guns and 
machine-guns, aim your bombs at them; attack them with everything 
that comes to your hands, tear them with your teeth and make their 
life an inferno on our free land, so that they should depart 
vanquished.334 
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While the LCP had already been described in 1948 as ‘one of the strongest 
parties in the country’, in the aftermath of 1958, the LCP remarked that 
apart from making the renewal of Sham’un’s Presidential mandate 
impossible, the events of that year increased among the populous ‘a strong 
sense of belonging to a free, independent and sovereign Lebanon.’335 The 
‘Shihab Reforms’ initiated by President Sham’un’s presidential successor 
are generally viewed as an attempt to address some of the issues raised by 
the protest movement, and in particular, regional sectarian economic 
inequalities - particularly as they related to the Shiʿi predicament.336  
The LCP’s public advocacy of systemic reform to Lebanon’s communal 
political structure continued until the outbreak of war in 1975. In April of 
that year, the LCP initiated a national debate about the nature of the 
country’s sectarian system. They developed a critique of the political 
system on the basis of its preservation of key governmental positions for 
the Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims, advocating its replacement 
with a secular democratic political structure.337 The resultant nation-wide 
deliberations over the subject engaged representatives from all of 
Lebanon’s different sects - all of whom rejected the proposal for a secular 
political model in Lebanon. 338  Regardless of the outcome, this episode 
illustrates that a complete overhaul of the Lebanese political structure was 
a key aspiration of the LCP. 
Senior LCP officials’ accounts of this historical period argue that 
transforming Lebanon’s sectarian political structure was the primary 
objective of the party. This is corroborated by the evidence of the party’s 
calls for such reform, as well as their involvement in protest and strike 
action against successive Lebanese governments between 1943 and 1975. 
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This illustrates why and how the LCP did in fact constitute an anti-system, 
resistance party. As a political party at the forefront of Lebanon’s domestic 
protest movement, this also explains why the political agenda of the Shiʿa 
found its initial home with the LCP. As the LCP became aware of its 
growing Shiʿi constituency, the party sought to both maintain and expand 
that following. Thus the appeal of communism among the Shiʿa developed 
still further.  
The Appeal of Communism 
The foundations of the LCP’s appeal among the Shiʿa lay in the party’s 
resistance agenda and specifically the party’s call for the abolishment of 
Lebanon’s confessional political structure. In this section, the analysis 
draws on further evidence from interviews with LCP officials and Shiʿi 
members of the party, as well as party documents to demonstrate how the 
LCP expanded its appeal among the Shiʿa. 
Agricultural Reform 
The formulation of the LCP’s reform initiative for Lebanon’s agricultural 
sector contains many indications of the party’s awareness of its burgeoning 
appeal among the Shiʿa, and the party’s attempt to build and strengthen 
that appeal. Indeed, one of the largest projects developed by the LCP in 
South Lebanon was its agricultural reform initiative. Such was the extent of 
the LCP’s investment in this issue that it discussed the matter at length 
during party congresses and published pamphlets and books containing a 
detailed diagnosis of the maladies of Lebanon’s agricultural sector, as well 
as detailed proposals for its reform. The LCP’s analysis of the agricultural 
situation is considered here, as well as the proposed reforms. In addition, 
the analysis notes how frequently the LCP’s description of agricultural 
conditions in South Lebanon expanded to include many other aspects of 
the south’s deprivation, including the status of its infrastructure, 
educational provision and healthcare system. In this sense, the LCP was 
undoubtedly speaking to the Shiʿa of South Lebanon, and pledging much 
needed reforms that extended beyond the agricultural realm.  
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During the LCP’s Second Congress in 1968, the party noted the impact of 
Lebanon’s modernisation process on the country’s farmers, referring to the 
regions of the Bekaa and Jabal ‘Amil specifically. The party reported that 
Lebanon’s industrial agricultural sector was undergoing significant decline, 
with growth only averaging between 2-4.5% a year.339 This is attributed to 
the government’s neglect of industry in favour of the service sector. The 
LCP  also notes that the initiation of free trade, which encouraged foreign 
investment and the entry of ‘bourgeois elements’, flooded Lebanon with 
foreign goods to the detriment of local production. The LCP argues that  
despite the government’s neglect, the agricultural industry remained a 
source of employment for 50% of the Lebanese population, but that 
production levels were falling far below a level that could sustain the 
country.340 In the LCP’s analysis, the impact of government neglect meant 
that the agricultural workers and farmers suffered from low living 
standards and only seasonal employment. This pushed many thousands of 
agricultural labourers to migrate to the cities, or emigrate. The LCP was 
effectively describing the experience of South Lebanon’s Shiʿa community 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s. 
High on the agenda of the LCP’s Second Congress in 1968 was the 
agricultural issue. The discussion produced a summary of the main issues 
facing Lebanese agriculture. These included the need to secure land, water 
and investment in machinery for agricultural workers and peasants 
deprived of their land. They also called for the provision of greater social 
rights for agricultural labourers, including freeing young workers from 
landlords and financial oligarchies, reclaiming all lands (nationalisation), 
and increasing productivity and secure exports. The LCP presented a ten-
point ‘Agricultural Reform Initiative’ which covered a broad number of 
issues, ranging from defining a minimum wage for agricultural workers, 
establishing new and fairer laws for land rental, protection for workers 
from debt, reform and reallocation of all neglected or unused land, 
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nationalisation of imports and exports control and, significantly, the 
annexation of the tobacco monopoly (the Regie) for the public sector.341 The 
latter issue would have held particular appeal among Jabal ʿAmil’s Shiʿa, 
who revolted against France’s imposition of the Regie in 1936. 
The pronouncements at the LCP’s Second Congress were followed soon 
after by the publication of a detailed study that had been carried out by the 
party, entitled ‘The Agricultural Issue in Lebanon.’342 This book echoes 
many of the public statements made at the party conference, but contains 
more detailed policy proposals. The study analyses the 1936 Tobacco 
Revolt in Bint Jbeil, and criticises the (French) government’s response to the 
revolt as antagonistic to the whole agricultural system, favouring the 
monopolies and big owners against the local farmers in South Lebanon. 
The LCP’s analysis also notes that this event demonstrates the potential for 
union among the farmers, and their ability to lead reforms, but that they 
require assistance.343 Clearly the study is also positioning the LCP as a 
potential vanguard for rural (Shiʿi) workers.  
The LCP’s book publication on the agricultural issue is also notable for the 
additional terrain it covers on social conditions in South Lebanon. The 
analysis references the absence of general services and facilities in the 
south, noting for example that not one publicly administered hospital exists 
in the region, while all government-administered hospitals were located in 
Beirut. The study also argues that ‘out of 122 private hospitals in Lebanon, 
there is only one in al-Bekaa and fourteen in the south…’344 The analysis 
continues to note the unavailability of clinics, pharmacies, doctors and 
nurses. In addition to the state of the health sectors, the LCP also 
considered the state of the region’s infrastructure, finding the status of 
roads, communications, water supplies and schools to all be inadequate. 
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Illiteracy rates and school attendance in the south and Bekaa are all noted 
as being below the national average in 1971.345 
The LCP concluded its report with a five-point pledge to deal with all these 
areas: 
1. Provision of water resources, electricity, roads, and public 
telephones.2. Building sufficient number of schools to cope with the 
population figures. 
3. Building large, modern hospitals in every district, and small 
hospitals in every village, and groups of clinics in the main towns and 
mobile clinics to perform rounds. 
4. Building cultural and sporting clubs, public libraries and providing 
facilities for the younger generation. 
5. Programme for ending illiteracy.346 
These proposals were part of the LCP’s efforts to spearhead Lebanon’s 
agricultural reform movement. In the process, it also positioned the LCP 
favourably among the southern Shiʿa, who were most affected by 
Lebanon’s declining agricultural sector. Thus, the LCP expanded its 
influence beyond Beirut’s Shiʿi community to include the Shiʿa of South 
Lebanon.. The LCP’s analysis of conditions in the Bekaa and Jabal ʿAmil 
certainly reflected the Shiʿi experience there in the wake of Lebanon’s 
capitalist reforms and modernisation process. These were the issues 
identified earlier as creating the impetus for Shiʿi migration to Beirut, and 
elsewhere. Indeed, by the end of the 1960s a rural proletariat, 
predominantly Shiʿa, had emerged in the Bekaa and Jabal ʿAmil. The 
commercialisation of agriculture saw the number of destitute agricultural 
workers increase from 20,000 to 60,000 between 1950 and 1970.347 Under 
these conditions, the LCP notes that the leftist presence in South Lebanon 
increased in 1967, leading to a power struggle over the social issues of 
importance to the south, which simultaneously raised the profile of these 
issues. 348  As we have seen, the LCP’s formulation of a comprehensive 
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agricultural reform initiative sought to target those Shiʿa affected by these 
processes. Indeed, the LCP drew increasing numbers of support from these 
areas, and particularly Nabatiyya, where the party attracted supporters 
from among the agricultural and tobacco industry workers.349 In the end, the 
party failed to follow through on most, if not all, the above pledges. This 
failure would not become apparent to the Shiʿa until the Lebanese Civil 
War, however. 
The LCP’s activities at this time were not confined to the rural regions. 
Indeed, many of the destitute Shiʿi agricultural workers formed an urban 
proletariat in the southern and eastern suburbs of Beirut, where they 
comprised the majority of the city’s factory workers during the 1970s.350 
The LCP followed these Shiʿi migrants to Beirut too. For those who could 
find work as menial labourers or factor workers in Beirut, they were 
introduced to the LCP via its syndicates and trade union organisations in 
the city.351 However, the LCP’s championing of the agricultural issue was 
not the only element of the party’s programme that generated appeal 
among the Shiʿa of these locales at the time. An additional issue also 
emerged as highly salient for the LCP: the party’s development of a hostile 
attitude toward Israel. 
Israel and the Palestinians 
The LCP’s support for the Palestinian struggle for independence, as well as 
the party’s own armed resistance activities against Israel, became an 
important source of the party’s appeal among the Shiʿa, particularly in 
Jabal ʿAmil. The analysis in chapter two explained the origins of the Shiʿi 
community’s affinity and friendship with the Palestinians, and opposition 
toward Israel, which dated back to the 1930s. However, the history of the 
LCP’s position on Israel is arguably one of the most inconsistent aspects of 
the party’s political programme in Lebanon. The analysis in this section 
                                                
349 Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut, London: Ithaca Press, 1986, 172. 
350 Shanahan, The Shiʿa of Lebanon, 102. 
351 Interview with Maurice Nahl, Beirut: Lebanon, (21 December 2012) 
  161 
begins with an overview of the evolution of the LCP’s stance on Israel and 
the Palestinians. The discussion then moves on to show how the LCP’s 
position on this issue became an important source of the Shiʿi community’s 
attachment to the LCP. In particular, the analysis shows how the LCP was 
the first party to coin the concept of resistance with regard to Israel. 
Additionally, the analysis shows that the LCP also conducted martyrdom 
operations against Israel. These are two issues that, when it comes to the 
Shiʿa, are conventionally associated with Hizbullah’s activities. In this 
sense, the analysis in this section shows how the resistance against Israel 
was originally constructed in secular political terms by the LCP. 
The LCP on Israel 
Until 1947 the LCP’s position on Israel, reflected that of the Soviet Union. 
The LCP therefore opposed the partition of Palestine, and supported the 
Palestinians in their struggle against Zionism.352 However, following the UN 
resolution on the partition of Palestine into an Arab and Jewish state in 
May 1947, the Soviet Union recognised the resolution, stating that there 
were two nations in Palestine - Arab and Jewish - ‘having equal historic 
roots in the country.’353 Khaled Bakdash immediately announced that the 
Syrian and Lebanese communist parties would also recognise the partition 
plan. He also denounced the resulting Arab-Israeli war as an imperialist 
plot initiated by Jordan’s King Abdullah.354 
The resultant shift in the LCP’s position on this issue, forced by Moscow, 
was disastrous for the party, and indeed all communist parties in the Arab 
world. Party offices were burned and ransacked in Damascus. In Lebanon 
the government saw an opportunity to clamp down on LCP activities, 
which if we recall, were heavily involved in the domestic protest 
movements of this era. The party’s newspaper, Sawt al-Sha’ab was shut 
down, while the LCP was banned in Lebanon on 8th June 1948. Arab 
nationalists region-wide capitalised on the opportunity to denounce their 
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fiercest rivals, the communists, for their recognition of Israel.355 Such was the 
extent of the damage caused to the LCP that party membership severely 
declined; internal party dissent over the decision led to the expulsion of 
further members, while others left of their own accord. Under these 
conditions it is difficult to see how the LCP generated any appeal among 
the Shiʿa for its position on Israel. A shift in the party’s political position 
had to occur before this issue became a significant factor in the relationship 
between communism and the Shiʿa. 
The necessary change came in 1956, when Moscow again reversed its 
position on partition. The communists of both Syria and Lebanon 
immediately followed suit, describing the idea of a Jewish national home as  
from the beginning, an imperialistic, aggressive and unjust 
idea…Israel has proved since its existence, to be a base for 
imperialism in the heart of the Arab East.356  
In October of 1967, the LCP Secretary-General Nicola Shawi wrote in the 
Lebanese newspaper, al-Akhbar, calling for the Soviet Union’s acceptance of 
UN Resolution 242, which called for the full withdrawal of Israeli military 
forces from Arab territories occupied during the war. The article called for 
a solution to the Palestinian problem, and was critical of Israel and its links 
with imperialism. The new program adopted by the party declared,  
The complete solution of the Palestinian problem must be based on 
principled positions and must begin with the recognition of the 
inalienable rights of the Palestinian Arabs to their soil and their 
homeland; hence the recognition of their right to return to that 
homeland and their right to self-determination. One cannot justify 
anything founded upon violence and robbery; and the presence today 
of Jews in Palestine cannot prejudice the historical and natural right of 
the Palestinian Arabs to their land.357 
The LCP’s reversal of its highly controversial stance on the Israel-Palestine 
issue was an important turning point in the party’s reconciliation in 
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Lebanon among its members and regional allies. The party began operating 
publicly in Lebanon again between 1953 and the mid-1960s. In 1970, Kamal 
Jumblatt, in his capacity as Interior Minister legalised the LCP once more.358 
At this point, not only did the LCP completely reverse its position on the 
conflict, but it adopted a far more radical attitude toward Israel, 
formulating an agenda of armed resistance. 
In 1968 the LCP established a military wing called al-Haras al-Sha’by (The 
Popular Guard) in South Lebanon. The organisation actively participated in 
offensive and defensive military mobilisations against Israel from Jabal 
ʿAmil The party justified its military mobilisation as defensive and in the 
service of the local Shiʿi population. The LCP frequently lamented the 
Lebanese government’s failure to adequately protect the southern villages 
from Israeli attacks, simultaneously promoting itself as the only force 
willing and capable of protecting the Shiʿa from Israeli attacks and 
territorial encroachment. But the party also justified its action in offensive 
terms, in support of the Palestinian struggle for self-determination, and 
therefore also proclaimed its presence in the south as being in the service of 
the Palestinian resistance fighters stationed there, close to the border with 
Israel.359 As LCP involvement in armed resistance against Israel increased, it 
joined the wider Lebanese National Movement (LNM) and fought 
alongside PLO military forces.  
The LCP was therefore the first movement with a large Shiʿi following to  
establish a resistance agenda against Israel. This agenda had two main 
components. The first was the LCP’s pledge to provide security and 
protection for the local Shiʿi populace that bordered the disputed territory 
of Israel, and suffered disproportionately from Israeli reprisal attacks that 
deliberately targeted Shiʿa homes.360 Secondly, the LCP pledged that its 
Popular Guard, based in South Lebanon, would provide active military 
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support for the Palestinian resistance against Israel. As the LCP’s 
involvement in the wars with Israel increased, the party’s resistance 
strategy acquired another dimension that would also impart a lasting 
legacy over the Shiʿi community’s resistance activities: martyrdom 
operations. This aspect is explored in the next chapter, since it occurred in 
the context of the 1982 war with Israel. 
As the LCP continued to expand its appeal among the Shiʿi community, the 
social classes from which the communist Shiʿa arose also transformed. 
While the early communist Shiʿa tended to come from the middle-class and 
intellectual elite, the development of the LCP’s political programme for 
South Lebanon was designed to appeal to the traditional base of the 
communist party - the workers and peasantry. In the next section, the 
analysis critically assesses the image and reality of the LCP’s Shiʿi 
following, comparing and contrasting the official LCP view with the views 
of the former communist Shiʿa. 
The Communist Shiʿa  
The social basis of communism’s appeal among the Shiʿa was broad-based. 
In this sense, the conventional tendency to link communism’s appeal to 
class based or socioeconomic factors alone is problematic. As the ensuing 
discussion demonstrates, the Shiʿi communists arose from multiple class 
and socioeconomic backgrounds including the peasantry, workers, middle-
classes, intellectuals, professionals and even clerics. 
Class and Communism 
Ilya Harik has contributed some important insights in to the concept of 
class as applied to Lebanon. He found that class consciousness was often 
obscured by primordial identities - sectarianism. Referencing the Lebanese 
Shiʿa in particular, Harik argues that ‘objective socio-economic conditions 
and primordial sentiments so overlap, that it is difficult to disaggregate one 
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from the other.’361 Norton also correctly notes that ‘the depressed economic 
status of the Shiʿa provides a basis for defining the communal reference 
group, but it has not led to significant class-based participation across 
confessions.’362 These observations illustrate the complexities of associating 
class with the political mobility of the Lebanese Shiʿa. However, the 
assumption that class-based factors explain adherence to communist 
parties has persisted in attempts to explain the Shiʿi community’s 
involvement in the LCP. For example: 
The second group of Shiʿites, principally of working class or from 
poor agricultural backgrounds, couched their demands to the state in 
the form of activism in leftist parties such as the Lebanese Communist 
Party…363 
The notion that the communist Shiʿa were principally from working class 
backgrounds is an assumption. In fact, the LCP’s membership base in 
general has historically lacked a dominant working class component. The 
LCP’s cadres typically hail from middle and upper class backgrounds. 
Lawyers, physicians, engineers, merchants, students, teachers and 
intellectuals dominate the party’s membership. Workers, or the traditional 
proletarians associated with communist parties worldwide, are a distinct 
minority - though a presence, nonetheless. Suleiman provides two 
explanations for this. First, he points to the political dominance of the 
feudal zuʿamaʾ and religious (sectarian) leaders in Lebanon, which left the 
intelligentsia with few political options other than communism. Secondly, 
Suleiman argues that since religion is a powerful force in Lebanon, ‘the 
poor and largely ignorant masses have strongly clung to their religious 
affiliation, rejecting communism as a godless monster.’364 On the latter point, 
Suleiman exaggerates, since the LCP eventually developed a working class 
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attachment among the rural Shiʿa as a result of its agricultural initiative 
and resistance activities against Israel. 
Although Suleiman notes the regions in Lebanon where the LCP 
predominated as including Baalbek and Tyre, he did not mention the 
party’s strong Shiʿi following in these areas. In fact, the LCP attracted Shiʿa 
from both the Bekaa and to a greater extent, from Jabal ʿAmil. As a more 
conservative, nomadic and tribally based society, the Shiʿa of the Bekaa are 
believed to have been less responsive to ‘foreign’ ideologies such as 
communism.365 Jabal ʿAmil, however, despite the presence of a strong Shiʿi 
religious tradition in the area, is still considered a more liberal, progressive 
society - and contributed greater numbers of communist Shiʿa than the 
Bekaa.366 Beirut also became a hub for communist Shiʿa following their 
migration there.  
Batatu acknowledges the LCP’s Shiʿi base, noting that as early as 1935, 
‘membership of the LCP came in majority from the Christian and Shiʿi 
communities.’ 367  Among the Christian community it was the Greek 
Orthodox that predominated, though the party also comprised Maronite 
Christians too, to a lesser extent. The LCP also had a following among the 
Druze, particularly in the south-eastern towns of Hasbaya and Shebʿa. The 
Sunni Muslim presence hailed from Sidon and Tyre.368 In this sense, the 
LCP’s appeal cut across communal and ethnic boundaries in Lebanon, a 
claim made by many political parties in Lebanon, usually falsely. 
The LCP’s Shiʿi following reflects the observations made above about the 
class background of the party. The first communist Shiʿa, and those who 
made it in to the party’s leadership cadres, were either of middle class 
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background or from among the student body, and emergent Shiʿi 
intelligentsia, of the Lebanese University (LU) in Beirut. The LCP 
developed a strong campus presence in the form of the Union of 
Democratic youth, and gained between 35-40% of the Student Union’s 
membership in the early 1970s.369 Many of the student demonstrations and 
strike actions of the 1960s, described earlier, were planned and initiated 
from the campuses of the LU.  In fact, a survey conducted among LU 
students towards the end of the 1960s found that 61% of Shiʿi students 
questioned considered themselves leftists, compared to 45% of their Sunni 
counterparts, 35% Druze and 20% Maronite. In addition, 68% of Shiʿi 
respondents agreed with the statement ‘What is needed in Lebanon is 
revolution not reform’.370 This lends further credence to the claim that the 
roots of the LCP’s attraction among the Shiʿa lay in its anti-system, 
resistance agenda. At the same time, the predominantly middle class 
background of the communist Shiʿa illustrates why class factors fail to 
adequately explain why the communist Shiʿa did indeed become 
communists. However, the LCP, too insists on explaining its appeal among 
the Shiʿa in class-based terms, emphasising the Shiʿi community’s poverty.  
The LCP: Image of the Communist 
The LCP explains the Shiʿi community’s attraction to communism on the 
basis of class and socio-economic factors:  
The party was not interested in sectarianism or the Shiʿa specifically 
because they were Shiʿa  - but those who were poor, 
deprived…because they needed representation. Social situation was 
paramount.371  
In this sense, the LCP argues that it championed the cause of the deprived 
in Lebanon’s rural areas, the south and the Bekaa. The party also notes the 
its presence among the Shiʿi migrants in Beirut whose social conditions 
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were still fraught, even when they were able to acquire menial jobs.372 Thus, 
the argument continues, because the Shiʿa were not well represented in the 
state, the LCP became an attractive option.373 The limitations of class and 
socioeconomic based explanations have already been highlighted. It is 
nevertheless important to demonstrate that these factors are not just raised 
as explanations for the relationship by historians or scholars of the Shiʿa, 
but by the LCP itself.  
There are two issues that make it important to critically evaluate the LCP’s 
own explanations for its appeal among the Shiʿa. The first factor pertains to 
the reality that the LCP was conscious of its working class membership 
deficiency from very early on in its existence. In fact, the decision to replace 
Ibrahim Yazbak with Fuad al-Shamali as Secretary General of the party in 
1926 occurred because the party wanted to see the leadership transferred 
from the intellectuals to the workers.374 However, the imbalance remained, 
irrespective of this move. Such was the extent of the gap, that party leaders 
considered themselves representatives of the working class, while seeking 
to offset the problem by reference to Lebanon’s apparently unique 
circumstances - its limited industrialisation as well as ‘imperialist 
domination, feudal tyranny and the weakness of class struggle.’375 As we 
have already seen, the majority of the LCP’s members were neither poor 
nor working class, but middle and upper class, with a few workers placed 
in the party’s command for symbolic effect.376  This constitutes the first 
reason why it would have been in the interests of the LCP to describe Shiʿi 
involvement with the party in class terms, since in this reading, the Shiʿa 
constituted a demographic that the LCP sorely needed. 
The second related factor is that there is evidence of the LCP actively and 
deliberately pursuing a Shiʿi constituency; the party’s agricultural reform 
initiative and stance on Israel was indicative of that agenda. In this sense, it 
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served the party’s interests to attribute its Shiʿi membership to inherent - 
class based - factors, which would produce a natural attraction to 
communism among class-conscious Shiʿa. In this way the implication is 
that the Shiʿa found the LCP, and not vice versa. Thus, the LCP protects 
itself from the type of criticism that is frequently directed at political parties 
in Lebanon - the sectarian bias of their membership. Such criticism would 
be particularly harmful to the LCP since, as we have seen, a foundational 
element of the party’s political programme in Lebanon was its opposition 
to the country’s sectarian political structure.  
Despite the propensity for both scholars and LCP officials alike to attribute 
class and socioeconomic factors to their Shiʿi following, these factors alone 
do not provide a complete picture of communism’s appeal. The influence 
of communist ideas in Shiʿi clerical circles represents a case in point. 
Communism and the Clerics 
The appeal of communism extended to many Shiʿi clerical families in South 
Lebanon, producing a number of adherents to communism. Two 
individuals in particular: Husayn Muruwa and Hassan Hamdan (Mahdi 
ʿAmil) became the LCP’s most prominent Shiʿi intellectual ideologues. In 
this section, the analysis shows how the attraction to communism 
resonated in Shiʿi clerical circles, leading some to abandon their religious 
education. The analysis explores the life trajectories of these two figures. In 
addition, the experiences of Muruwa and ʿAmil illustrate the transnational 
dimensions of communism’s appeal among the Shiʿa. Both Muruwa and 
ʿAmil spent time studying in Najaf, Iraq. Hailing from prominent clerical 
families, they were expected to embark on a lifetime of religious learning. 
Instead, they became communists.  
The themes discussed thus far in this chapter: political marginalisation, 
socio-economic upheaval, migration and urbanisation, the status of 
agriculture in South Lebanon, the Israel-Palestine issue, and the position of 
the LCP on these issues, were all important dimensions of communism’s 
appeal among the Shiʿa. The Shiʿi community’s clerical elites were not 
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isolated from the debates occurring about these issues in Lebanon, and 
indeed among the Shiʿa, who were arguably most affected by these 
processes. In fact, in Jabal ʿAmil, communism peaked the interest of some 
members of the Shiʿi clerical community, including Sayyid Jaʿfar al-Amin, 
who came to be known as a ‘Red Cleric’, as well as Husayn Muruwa and 
Mahdi ʿAmil.  
The example of Husayn Muruwa’s life (1910-1987) demonstrates the 
particularly interesting dilemmas posed for those Shiʿa that hailed from 
deeply religious family backgrounds. Muruwa was born in the village of 
Hadatha, Bint Jbeil in 1910. He was the son of a prominent local cleric who 
had studied in the holy Shiʿa town of Najaf in Iraq. Muruwa's father’s 
position pre-destined him to follow a similar pathway, and embark on a 
religious education in Najaf too.377  Muruwa's childhood in Jabal ʿAmil 
reflected the impoverishment of his surroundings; he was also aware of 
that reality, despite his youth. Muruwa deplored Jabal ʿAmil’s conditions 
and was highly critical of the exploitative nature of the zuʿamaʾ.378 His family 
could not afford the cost of his travel to Najaf, and relied on the efforts of a 
local Shiʿi cleric to raise money among the villagers in order to finance 
Muruwa's education in Iraq. 
The hawza in Najaf was an environment in which Muruwa could combine 
his traditional religious education with exposure to modern and classical 
literature. He became a prolific reader as a result. Muruwa also joined a 
number of youth groups and clubs, where he interacted with fellow 
students from both Jabal ʿAmil and Najaf. While a student, Muruwa's 
thought was torn between his strong religious identity and an attraction to 
modernism and secular nationalism. He supported Jabal ʿAmil’s revolts 
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against the French, and the pro-Syrian nationalist sentiment present in the 
area at that time.379  
Upon graduating from Najaf, Muruwa resided in the politically turbulent 
environs of Baghdad throughout the 1940s, where he worked as a teacher 
and journalist. Much like the situation in Lebanon, Iraq was experiencing 
regular protest and political demonstrations by 1948 in protest against 
British colonial policy. It was under these conditions that Muruwa was first 
introduced to communism. He met Husayn Muhammad al-Shabibi, a 
prominent member of the committee of the Iraqi Communist Party who 
introduced him to Marxist ideas. Al-Shabibi gave Muruwa a copy of the 
Communist Manifesto, which also led him to discover Lenin’s The State 
and Revolution and Stalin’s Dialectical and Historical Materialism.380 As 
Muruwa regularly published articles in support of the Iraqi intellectuals 
and nationalist activists involved in the country’s demonstrations, he was 
eventually expelled from the country in 1949, whereafter he returned to 
Lebanon. 
Muruwa's interest in communism continued upon his return to Lebanon, 
where he became a journalist for the newspaper al-Hayat. He later founded 
the cultural periodical Al-Thaqafa al-Wataniyya (National Culture) in 1951 
alongside some of the founding members of the LCP, including Farajallah 
al-Hilu. Muruwa eventually joined the LCP in 1951 and continued to work 
in Lebanon as a writer, journalist, literary critic and high school teacher. He 
also travelled to Moscow in the 1960s where he conducted research toward 
the publication of one of his most renowned titles, ‘Materialist Trends in 
Arabo-Islamic Philosophy’. 381  Upon his return to Lebanon from Moscow, 
Muruwa had developed a new fascination with the theory of Socialist 
Realism. He thereafter continued his involvement in the LCP as one of their 
most prized theorisers and activists. 
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Tracing Muruwa’s physical movements and evolution as an individual 
illustrates the influence exerted upon his political identity by the various 
places in which he lived, and the impact of each specific environment on 
his intellectual thought and development. Muruwa did not ‘convert’ from 
Shiʿism to communism, rather his intellectual journey can be extracted from 
his movements and experiences in every city he lived in: from his 
experience of Jabal ‘Amil’s poverty to his religious and literary learning in 
Najaf’s hawza; from his participation in Baghdad’s Arab nationalist 
uprising and discourse, to his joining of the LCP in Beirut under similar 
conditions of domestic upheaval. The time Muruwa spent in Moscow was 
also significant; there he engaged directly with socialist theory and practice 
and developed an intrigue, before returning, finally, to Beirut where he 
consolidated and refined his own ideas and sense of identity. 
In the end, Muruwa chose to remain in Lebanon, where he performed a key 
role in the development of the LCP’s revolutionary project throughout the 
1970s. His contribution to the party’s intellectual thought was thoroughly 
influenced by his own life experiences, which he sought to reconcile with 
events in Lebanon, and develop solutions to the country’s myriad crises 
during this period.  
Further evidence of how the life experiences of Shiʿi individuals could 
shape their political formation as communists, is illustrated by the case of 
Mahdi ʿAmil, who also became one of the LCP’s prominent political 
thinkers. 
Mahdi ʿAmil (1936-1987) was the pen name of Hassan Hamdan, born in 
Beirut in 1936, though he grew up between Beirut and his family’s village, 
Haruf, in South Lebanon. His pen name illustrates his identification with 
his home town, Jabal ʿAmil. Like Muruwa, ʿAmil was cognisant of the 
realities of Jabal ʿAmil’s impoverishment. He became involved in 
Lebanon’s domestic protest movement in the 1950s and 1960s, though with 
more Arab nationalist leanings at first. He would, however, later travel 
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throughout the tobacco farmers’ bases in Jabal ʿAmil, giving lectures on 
Marxism and its contemporary relevance to Lebanon.382   
While studying in France, ʿAmil became influenced by French philosophy, 
encountering the work of Marxist thinkers such as Louis Althusser and 
Nicos Poulantzas. His doctoral thesis reflected an interest in French 
colonialism and while in France his interaction with leftist circles further 
exposed him to the ideas of Marxism, colonialism and Third World studies. 
He moved to Algeria in 1963 as a result of his developing interest in anti-
colonial struggles. As well as teaching there, ʿAmil also began to publish in 
Algerian journals about revolutionary struggle and Frantz Fanon’s theories 
of colonialism.383 
ʿAmil returned home to Lebanon in 1967, where domestic political unrest 
was rife. ʿAmil joined the LCP and played a central role in the party’s 
reformulation of its political strategy at the Second Congress in 1968.384 
Thereafter he began publishing in the LCP’s monthly journal, al-Tariq. In 
the 1970s he also taught at the Lebanese University, noted earlier as a hub 
for Shiʿi intellectuals and communist sympathisers among the student 
body. ʿAmil was active in Beirut’s student protest movements, and wrote 
regularly on the subject of educational reform in Lebanon.385 
After Mahdi ʿAmil settled in Lebanon, his intellectual thought reflected his 
encounter with Marxism and a desire to reconcile this with the realities of 
the Arab world, and in particular, Lebanon. Like Muruwa, Mahdi ʿAmil’s 
curiosity about communism was borne of his life experiences, in South 
Lebanon but also in the countries he travelled to, and the colonial struggles 
he came to be intrigued by.  Both cases represent examples of an 
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attachment to the LCP on the basis of a genuine ideological commitment to 
communism and the political programmes of the communist party. In 
Mahdi ʿAmil’s case, such was his engagement in the political thought of 
Marx and their application to the the Arab world, that he published 
profusely on these matters. ʿAmil is remembered foremost as the Middle 
East’s greatest Marxist thinker. In this sense, the life stories of Husayn 
Muruwa and Mahdi ʿAmil demonstrate that Shiʿi involvement in 
communism and the LCP could and did occur on the basis of ideological 
attachments. 
In addition to their fascination with communism, Husayn Muruwa and 
Mahdi ʿAmil noticed many parallels between communist ideas and Shiʿi 
doctrine across a range of issues, including social justice, emancipation and 
resistance to oppression. They developed innovative methods for 
combining Islamic tradition with elements of Western modernity and 
intellectual thought. Husayn Mruwwa did not view the utility of Islamic 
symbolism as merely a tactic to promote secularism in society. He believed 
that components of both Islamic and Western scientific and philosophical 
traditions could, together, provide solutions to modern problems. Thus, as 
the Abisaabs argue,  
Marxism in Lebanon, far from leading to the demise of religious 
sensibilities, encouraged new ways of approaching religion and 
Islamic tradition, which is not the same as “using” religious 
symbolisms to promote secular organisation of society.386  
During an ʿAshuraʾ procession in Nabatiyya in 1970, young men from the 
LCP publicly urged people in the town to stop chastising themselves and 
instead direct their anger ‘against the enemies of both class and nation.’387 
This event was illustrative of the intellectual exchange taking place 
between communism and Shiʿism inside the LCP.  
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While communism evoked the curiosity of many Shiʿi scholars and clerics, 
both in Lebanon and Iraq, it also led to the mobilisation of others in the 
religious community to counter communism’s growing influence among 
the Shiʿa. As the ensuing analysis demonstrates, communism’s continued 
influence over the Shiʿa led directly to the political mobilisation of the 
previously quietist Shiʿi clerical elite in Lebanon.  
Communism and the other Shiʿa 
Earlier in the discussion it was noted that for the communist Shiʿa, the 
other political actors within the community - the zuʿamaʾ and ʿulamaʾ- did 
not adequately represent the type of resistance identity the communist 
Shiʿa advocated. However, while the zuʿamaʾ remained active and relevant 
political players within the Shiʿi community, Shiʿi involvement in the LCP 
led directly to the mobilisation of the previously quietist Shiʿi ʿulamaʾ and 
the rise of the first successful clerical political actor among the Shiʿi 
community in Lebanon: Musa al-Sadr. The impact of Shiʿi engagement 
with the LCP on Musa al-Sadr’s activities is considered here. In addition, 
the adjustments made by the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ in their efforts to stem the rise 
of communism among the Shiʿa are also explored. 
Musa al-Sadr and Communism 
Musa al-Sadr moved to Lebanon from Iran in 1959. This was a time when 
the Shiʿi clerical establishment region-wide had become increasingly 
concerned over the rise of communism among its ranks.388 Sadr’s reputation 
for worldliness, reform and intellect endeared him to the prominent 
Lebanese Shiʿi cleric, Sayyid Husayn Sharaf al-Din, who would eventually 
nominate Sadr to succeed him. Many among the clerical elite in Iraq saw 
Sadr as their best option for combatting the challenge presented by 
communism. 
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Sadr’s opposition to communism stemmed from principle, as a religious 
scholar, but also as a result of the threat it posed to his political project for 
Lebanon’s Shia. A conversation between Musa Sadr and the US 
Ambassador to Lebanon illustrated Sadr’s concern: 
...[Sadr] then discussed the Communist menace...He is optimistic that 
peace can return to this part of the world and that Muslims can 
devote their energies to repairing inroads that the Communists had 
made in recent years...He believed the Government of Lebanon had 
underestimated the effectiveness of Communist propaganda which 
has found fertile soil among young southerners who are able easily to 
compare Beirut extravagance with backwardness and poverty that 
exist only an hour or so away from the affluent capital. The “rulers” in 
Beirut are only slowly realising the importance of this problem.389 
While Sadr shared some of the LCP’s ambitions for political and socio-
economic reform, he sought to craft a political programme and 
mobilisation strategy that was distinct from his major rivals, and 
particularly that of the LCP’s. In this sense Sadr rejected any form of a 
secular state in society, arguing that religion was the basis of morality in 
society. While he agreed with the LCP that the zuʿamaʾ represented a 
feudal political structure to be abolished, he did not agree that the solution 
was through total secularisation of the state.390 Sadr also expressed a firm 
Lebanese patriotism, associating the Shiʿa with the very foundations of 
Lebanon’s existence, a throwback to the politics of demand expressed by 
the Shiʿa toward the end of the French Mandate: ‘It is the Shiʿites who 
guard Lebanon’s frontiers, it is Shiites who work the Lebanese soil.’391 
Overall, Sadr’s project for Lebanon is best viewed as an attempt to establish 
a middle way between the communists and the zuʿamaʾ, who in Sadr’s 
view represented two extremes: ‘It was the politics of polarities: feudalism 
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(al-iqṭā') on one side, extremism (al-taṭarruf), on the other. A new way had 
to be found’.392  
Sadr’s political project for the Shiʿa was inherently different to that which 
was represented by the LCP’s. Sadr’s project effectively sought the revival 
of the Shiʿi community’s pre-1943 political strategy, which sought the Shiʿi 
community’s inclusion in the Lebanese state. However, Sadr’s project 
represented a new form of Shiʿi political mobilisation in its sectarian 
strategy. Sadr sought the Shiʿi community’s inclusion for the purposes of 
attaining Shiʿi privileges, and access to the state in accordance with its 
sectarian rules.  
A core element of Sadr’s political strategy was to highlight the flaws in the 
community’s current leadership, while also establishing a renewed sense of 
community awareness and belonging. This latter project borrowed 
extensively from the religious dimensions of Shiʿi identity. Sadr skilfully 
deployed the central principles of Shiʿism, particularly the martyrdom of 
Imam Husayn, to mobilise support among the Shiʿi community. Sadr held 
up Husayn’s tragic end as a great example of bravery and commitment that 
all Shiʿa could strive for in the face of oppression.393 Sadr spoke with greater 
authority on Shiʿi religious occasions than his rivals in the LCP. If we recall 
the incident mentioned earlier where members of the LCP interrupted an 
ʿAshuraʾprocession in an effort to encourage revolution rather than 
lamentation, these individuals were admonished and removed from the 
crowd. However, just four years later when Musa al-Sadr appeared on the 
scene, advocating a similar re-interpretation of ʿAshuraʾ to that of the LCP 
activists who interrupted the Nabatiyya procession, Sadr’s interjection was 
both welcomed and embraced. In this sense, Sadr was increasingly able to 
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take up the causes of the left, but present them in a language that 
illustrated Sadr’s potential for success.394 
Sadr publicly called for a more just distribution of access to state 
employment, as well as greater expenditure on Shiʿi locales. Unlike the 
LCP however, he was not calling for the complete overhaul of the country’s 
sectarian system, only its adjustment for the purposes of parity and fairness 
of opportunity. Although Sadr became associated with the LNM for a short 
time, participating in regular strike action and demonstrations, he did not 
direct his criticism at specific employers or the economic system as a whole.  
These activities therefore established Sadr as the foremost Shiʿi national 
figure in Lebanon, and were indicative of his intentions to reach a 
compromise with the state in order to improve the Shiʿi predicament.  
On the issue of Israel and the Palestinians, Sadr shared the LCP’s post-1967 
view.  He viewed the Palestinian struggle for independence as sharing 
many similarities in experience to the plight of Jabal ʿAmil’s Shiʿa.  On this 
basis, the LCP initially approached Sadr in 1974 to explore possibilities for 
cooperation in coordinating resistance activities against Israel. A secret 
meeting to such effect occurred in 1974 when senior LCP figures, George 
Hawi, Karim Muruwa and Ali Abed met with Sadr to discuss the 
possibility of coordinating their activities. In this meeting the LCP 
proposed quiet collaboration over common issues. Sadr reportedly 
expressed his agreement with the ‘notion’ but that the differences between 
his religiosity and the LCP’s secularism were too fundamental to put to one 
side. Sadr indicated they had a long way to go before they could work on 
common issues together.395 Sadr was known for his ability to work with 
both his allies and rivals by this time, particularly the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ so it 
may seem unusual that he rejected the opportunity to cooperate with the 
LCP. However, since the primary motivation with which Sadr arrived to 
Lebanon was to curb the influence of communism among the Shiʿa, it 
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becomes clear why he did not wish to emphasise any shared ground 
between his project and that of the LCP’s. 
Sadr’s objectives, in terms of reducing communism’s influence among the 
Shiʿa produced mixed results. He successfully adopted many of the causes 
of the LCP, imbuing them with a religious language that resonated with the 
Shiʿa. Unlike the LCP, Sadr also achieved some success at the ballot box, 
which made him a greater threat to the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ than the LCP were by 
1974. However, the demographics of Sadr’s Shiʿi constituency transformed 
by the onset of civil war. Whilst his initial appeal was among the Shiʿi 
masses, and the most impoverished working-class stratum of the Shiʿa, a 
constituency we have seen was also pursued by the LCP, Sadr’s appeal 
began to increasingly attract a different section of the Shiʿi community.  
Sadr’s Movement of the Deprived was most successful in recruiting the 
returning Shiʿi migrants from West Africa, who accrued a significant 
amount of wealth and had returned to Lebanon in search of business 
opportunities and new forms of political representation. 396  This new, 
relatively wealthy middle class were not attracted to communism or the 
traditional zuʿamaʾ. Instead, they favoured Sadr’s movement, and became a 
sizeable element of his Shiʿi constituency in Lebanon. In this sense, Sadr’s 
project and appeal among the Shiʿa was significantly different from that of 
the LCP’s. Sadr’s political project however, was the first indication of the 
development of a sectarian political identity among the Shiʿa. In the next 
chapter, the analysis shows how sectarian identities came to represent the 
biggest threat to the LCP’s Shiʿi constituency in the context of the Lebanese 
Civil War. 
In contrast to the LCP, whose political engagement with the Shiʿa began 
with its middle and upper classes, and ended with its working classes, 
Musa al-Sadr’s project started with the Shiʿi masses, the working classes in 
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particular, and later settled with the upper and middle classes. However, as 
the analysis now moves on to consider the impact of communism on the 
Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ, the locus of politics shifts once more, not in class terms, but in 
spheres of influence. To some extent, both Sadr and the LCP were 
operating in the sphere of popular politics and mass mobilisation. 
However, the zone of influence for the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ was and has always 
remained in the domain of formal politics, where power is acquired 
through politicking and electioneering. 
The Shiʿi Zuʿamaʾ and Communism 
The LCP’s ability to mobilise the Shiʿa did not extend to significant wins at 
the ballot box, or to political appointments. By contrast, the zuʿamaʾ have 
consistently dominated the political representation of the Shiʿa in 
parliament and in government. Despite these differences, the LCP’s 
popularity and ability to influence the Shiʿa did in fact become a significant 
source of concern among these traditional political families. This is 
evidenced by the attempts of the zuʿamaʾ to adapt their politics and 
strategies to meet the ideological challenge presented by communism. 
Throughout the various popular mobilisations, strike actions and episodes 
of civil unrest that occurred in Lebanon between 1950-1975, the Shiʿi 
zuʿamaʾ often discovered that their political survival was highly dependant 
upon the positions they publicly adopted on these issues. The influence of 
communism among the Shiʿa during this time had, in the view of the 
zuʿamaʾ, served to politicise the community and introduce a politics based 
on ideology, rather than the kind of interest-based politics that 
characterised the activities of the political families. This led the zuʿamaʾ to 
increasingly adopt political issues in their daily activities, in an effort to 
retain legitimacy among their traditional constituencies.397 Several of the 
powerful families displayed a populist political stance, aligning themselves 
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with the anti-government protests and Arab nationalist currents in 
Lebanon and the region.  
Where the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ failed to heed to popular currents, they often 
discovered the repercussions at election time. The Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ who 
supported the Lebanese government during the 1958 crisis ultimately paid 
the price at the ballot box in the 1960 parliamentary elections. Khazem al-
Khalil lost his seat to candidates from the anti-government, pro-Arab camp, 
and was not able to return to parliament for a further twelve years. ʿAdil 
ʿUsayran also lost his position as Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, 
punishment for acting as a mediator between rival parties during the crisis, 
despite his otherwise pro-Arab stance. In contrast, all who opposed 
Shamʿun’s government and supported the Arab nationalists earned 
political capital, including Sabri Hamadeh, Ahmad and Kamil al-As’ad.398 
Indeed the role of Speaker of the parliament oscillated continuously 
between Sabri Hamadeh and Kamil al-Asʿad for the period between 1960-
1984. 
Whilst those zuʿamaʾ who were able to navigate the opportunities and 
pitfalls of a more populist politics received the reward of electoral wins, it 
did not signify their ultimate victory over the LCP’s rising influence. Kamil 
al-Asʿad set up his own ‘Democratic Socialist Party’ (DSP) in an effort to 
tap in to the appeal of the political left among the Shiʿa. But al-Asʿad was 
neither a socialist nor a democrat, and his party failed to delude those he 
was targeting. Unlike the LCP and other parties al-Asʿad sought to 
challenge, the DSP had no manifesto other than support of his personal 
viewpoint. Its committee was comprised of close associates of al-Asʿad. 
Despite proclaiming that it was opposed to feudal-style politics, it operated 
in precisely that way.399  
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In their efforts to combat the ideological influence of parties like the LCP, 
the zuʿamaʾ proved less adept. Al-Asʿad experiment with the DSP 
illustrates a failure to understand the nature of the LCP’s appeal. A later 
statement by Kamil al-Asʿad following his re-election as Speaker in 1972 
shows that he understood the implications of the rising influence of the 
LCP - for his own power,  
While there are many who are calling for reform in this country, the 
leftists are calling for essential changes that did deep into the 
country’s basic set-up .[T]he people must resist such change.400 
This statement indicates the realisation of the political families that their 
status was stable in the present environment, since they retained an ability 
to win at the ballot box and thus secure their political authority. However, 
a fundamental change to the system, which is what the LCP was agitating 
for, represented the larger threat to the zuʿamaʾ, because it targeted the very 
foundations of their political power. 
Conclusion	  
In the aftermath of Lebanese independence in 1943, the Shiʿi community 
reached a critical historical juncture in their political mobilisation. This 
produced a pivot away from the pursuit of political inclusion in the 
emergent Lebanese state, which had been the objective of the Shiʿi 
community’s politics of demand and protest during the colonial era. 
Instead, the Shiʿa developed a resistance identity formulated around a 
rejection of the political status quo in Lebanon, and in particular the 
confessional political structure that the Shiʿa deemed responsible for their 
marginalisation. This was the initial basis of the Shiʿi community’s 
resistance identity - and their subsequent involvement in the LCP. As the 
LCP sought to capitalise on its Shiʿi constituency, it developed a 
comprehensive agricultural reform programme, as well as a resistance 
agenda directed at Israel. The LCP positioned itself among the Shiʿa of 
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South Lebanon as a provider of security and protection from Israeli attacks, 
as well as a supporter of the Palestinian resistance against Israel. This 
resonated with the local Shiʿi community who were shown in chapter two 
to have long been advocates for the Palestinian struggle against Israel. 
The analysis in this chapter also emphasised the broad-based nature of 
communism’s appeal among the Shiʿa, challenging the conventional 
‘poverty thesis’, promulgated by both the LCP and existing scholarship, 
that links the Shiʿi-communist association to class-based and 
socioeconomic factors. However, the analysis argued that the LCP’s appeal 
among the Shiʿa cut across class and social status, drawing Shiʿa from the 
middle class, intelligentsia as well as those who had previously been 
associated with Shiʿi clerical circles as the cases of Mahdi ‘Amil and 
Husayn Mroue demonstrated. The chapter also argued that the interaction 
between communism and the Shiʿa had a significant impact on the 
trajectory of Shiʿi political mobilisation thereafter. Concern over the 
growing appeal of communism among the Shiʿa mobilised the previously 
quietist Shiʿi ʿulamaʾ in Lebanon. This was illustrated by Musa al-Sadr’s 
political efforts to erode communism’s influence among the Shiʿa. The Shiʿi 
zuʿamaʾ also felt threatened by the ideological appeal of the LCP among the 
Shiʿa, and thus sought to imbue their politics with an ideological veneer. 
Conventionally, the Shiʿi community’s political, social and economic 
situation in the aftermath of Lebanese independence in 1943 is argued to 
have initiated a ‘search for radical change in a traditional way.’401 This 
followed that Musa al-Sadr’s political activities, which saw the 
establishment of a Shiʿi sectarian political movement in 1974, the 
Movement of the Deprived, was the realisation of both the radical and 
traditional dimensions of the Shiʿi community’s post-1943 mobilisation. 
Challenging this narrative, this chapter has argued that the LCP was in fact 
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the first vehicle for the Shiʿi community’s radical political mobilisation, 
while the form it took as a party political, secular ideological movement 
was decidedly non-traditional. Further still, the Shiʿi community’s 
involvement in the LCP as an anti-system party that rejected the sectarian 
political structure in Lebanon, constituted a far more radical agenda than 
that which was later promulgated by Sadr. While the communist Shiʿa 
mobilised on the basis of a resistance identity that rejected the sectarian 
foundations of the Lebanese political system, Sadr’s movement represented 
a renewal of the Shiʿi community’s Mandate-era politics of demand and 
protest, and the pursuit of inclusion in the confessional political system as 
Shiʿa.  
The arguments in this chapter also demonstrate that the relationship 
between communism and the Shiʿa was a formative period in the 
development of the Shiʿi community’s resistance identity. Under the LCP’s 
political framework, the resistance identity had two core components: a 
political agenda of resistance directed at the Lebanese confessional system, 
and a military agenda of resistance directed at Israel. The political 
component of this agenda manifested in the protest activity and strike 
action orchestrated by the LCP and its leftist allies (the LNM) in the 
aftermath of Lebanese independence. As the next chapter shows, this 
political agenda of resistance transformed into the basis of the LNM’s 
negotiating strategy with the government in the early stages of the 
Lebanese Civil War. The LCP was the first political movement in Lebanon 
to establish an armed presence among the Shiʿa of South Lebanon, with the 
stated goal of defending the local community from Israeli offensives, while 
supporting the Palestinian resistance fighters that were also based there. As 
the ensuing analysis in the next chapters demonstrates, the nature and 
meaning of the resistance identity was subject to change and 
transformation. However, the making of the Shiʿi community’s resistance 
identity is historically grounded in the relationship between the communist 
Shiʿa and the LCP. 
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Chapter 4 ~ Between Communism 
and Communalism: The Shiʿa in 
the Lebanese Civil War 1975-1990 
During the Lebanese Civil War, the Shiʿi community’s resistance agenda 
became the focal point of a battle for the Shiʿa between the LCP, Amal and 
Hizbullah. The civil war was the arena in which the sectarianisation of the 
Shiʿi community’s political identities occurred. The breakdown of the state 
and the resultant security environment provided the conditions in which 
the saliency of primordial identities increased and communal political 
actors with sectarian agendas emerged. The LCP failed to deliver any of its 
political reform initiatives and security pledges to the Shiʿa. This produced 
widespread disaffection among the communist Shiʿa. The new Shiʿi players 
capitalised on the LCP’s decline during the war, targeting its infrastructure 
as well as its leadership with political assassinations. As the influence of 
the LCP fell away in their Shiʿi strongholds, the new Shiʿi political players 
moved in to secure territorial control over their communities. In this 
environment, secular identities among the Shiʿa were steadily superseded 
by sectarian identities in the form of two new Shiʿi political actors: Amal 
and Hizbullah.  
This chapter analyses the decline of the relationship between communism 
and the Shiʿa during the Lebanese Civil War. It argues that the rise of Amal 
and Hizbullah was directly predicated on three interlinked factors: the 
domestic political environment in Lebanon during the civil war, the decline  
and failures of the LCP, and the consolidation of sectarian identities in the 
war.  
The analysis begins by exploring the impact of the Lebanese Civil War on 
political life in Lebanon and among the Shiʿa. It argues for a critical 
reassessment of the rise of sectarian identities among the Shiʿa during the 
war. This situates these developments in Lebanon’s domestic political 
environment in Lebanon during the war rather than in external events such 
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as the Iranian Revolution. The discussion highlights three important 
domestic effects of the civil war: the breakdown of the state, the violent and 
unstable security environment and the sectarianisation of identities. The 
analysis then reviews the main chronology of the Lebanese Civil War to 
identify the key historical periods and events that are relevant to the 
decline of the relationship between communism and the Shiʿa. 
The analysis then moves on to explore the first stage of the LCP’s entry into 
the Lebanese Civil War between 1975-1978, highlighting their initial 
political and military successes before the setback caused by Syria’s 
military intervention. In the second stage between 1978 and 1982, the 
analysis examines the interaction between the LCP, Israel, Amal and the 
Palestinians, detailing Amal’s usage of the security environment to displace 
the LCP’s territorial presence in Shiʿi locales. The analysis then moves on to 
the period between 1982 and 1984, highlighting the failures of the LCP’s 
resistance against Israel contra Hizbullah. The final stage of the war 
between 1984 and 1990 highlights the devastating impact of the internal 
wars on the LCP, particularly in relation to the coordinated and targeted 
attacks on the LCP by Amal and Hizbullah. The analysis also assesses the 
political ramifications of the Taif Accord on the LCP in terms of its 
affirmation of the confessional political system in Lebanon. The analysis 
concludes that in the aftermath of the Lebanese Civil War, the LCP was in 
decline and the communist Shiʿa were in search of a new vehicle for the 
mobilisation of their resistance identity. 
The Lebanese Civil War 
This section begins with a brief critique of the existing historiography of the 
Shiʿa in the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990), which overstates the role 
played by external factors in the sectarianisation of Shiʿi political identities. 
The discussion then proposes a reassessment of the Shiʿa in the civil war 
that places a greater emphasis on the war’s internal dimensions. Three 
main features of the civil war are highlighted: the breakdown of the state, 
the security environment, and the sectarianisation of identities. The 
analysis then provides an overview of the civil war’s main chronology. 
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This also serves as a primer on the key events of the war. A new rendering 
of this chronology is then presented, in order to facilitate an analysis of the 
civil war’s impact on the relationship between the LCP and the Shiʿa. 
Reassessing the Shiʿa in the Lebanese Civil War 
The local dynamics of the Lebanese Civil War have been underplayed in 
analyses of the Shiʿa during this period. A brief critical overview of the 
current explanations for the rise of the communal Shiʿi players, Amal and 
Hizbullah, is presented here, justifying the need for a reassessment of how 
the civil war affected the Shiʿa. 
Four main events comprise the most overstated explanations for the 
sectarianisation of the Shiʿa during the Lebanese Civil War, and the 
subsequent rise of the Shiʿi militias, Amal and Hizbullah. The first event 
was the disappearance of Musa al-Sadr on a visit to Libya in 1978.402 Sadr’s 
disappearance is argued to have reinvigorated his political project for the 
Shiʿa, which had experienced a setback caused by the outbreak of the 
Lebanese Civil War.403 In chapter three, the analysis argued that one of 
Sadr’s primary aims was to combat the influence of communism among the 
Shiʿa through the establishment of a potent Shiʿi sectarian political identity. 
Although Sadr’s public position upon the outbreak of the civil war was one 
of political neutrality, an accident at a training camp in the Bekaa on 6th 
July 1975 revealed that Sadr had secretly been building a militia, Amal.404 
However, Sadr’s militia consisted of only around 800 members at the 
beginning of the war, the majority of whom were volunteers.405 In fact, there 
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were more Shiʿa carrying arms under the banner of communism than 
Sadr’s Amal movement in 1975. 406  In this environment, Sadr’s 
disappearance, and particularly the mystery surrounding the event, which 
remains unresolved to this day, became a symbolic manifestation of the 
Shiʿi tradition of the absent Imam (al-Imam al-Ghaʿib).407  
The second event that is frequently associated with the rise of Amal and 
Hizbullah in the civil war was the Iranian Revolution in 1979. 408  The 
establishment of a Shiʿi Islamic State in Iran provided a model of 
governance based on Ayatollah Khomeini’s Wilayat al-Faqih (Governance of 
the Jurisprudent). This was an event with transnational implications, that 
heightened the Shiʿi community’s identity as Shiʿa.409 The influence of the 
Iranian Revolution is particularly associated with Hizbullah’s rise in 1982 
since its charter specifically referenced Ayatollah Khomeini as a source of 
emulation, while the Iranian Revolutionary Guards were also closely 
associated with the training of Hizbullah’s fighting forces in Lebanon.410  
The third and fourth events that are frequently associated with the 
mobilisation and radicalisation of the Shiʿa in the civil war, were the Israeli 
invasions of 1978 and 1982. On both occasions, the Shiʿi communities in 
South Lebanon suffered greatly in terms of loss of life and physical 
devastation of their homes and livelihoods.411 The first invasion in 1978 is 
also considered a turning point in relations between the Shiʿa and the 
Palestinian fighters based in South Lebanon - a breakdown that Amal was 
able to capitalise upon with significant success. The Israeli invasion in 1982, 
which extended beyond just South Lebanon to Beirut, is directly correlated 
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with the emergence of Hizbullah, whose primary objective at this time was 
to militarily force Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanese territory.412  
The disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr in 1978, the Iranian Revolution in 
1979 and the Israeli invasions of 1978 and 1982, were all significant 
historical moments for Amal and Hizbullah. However, as external factors, 
the emphasis on these events obfuscates the internal dynamics of the 
Lebanese Civil War that were equally conducive to the radicalisation, 
mobilisation and sectarianisation of the Lebanese Shiʿa throughout this 
period. Furthermore, the association of the Israeli invasions with the rise of 
Amal and Hizbullah alone, overlooks the equally significant impact these 
events had on the LCP and its relationship with the Shiʿa. In this sense, 
rather than considering the external dynamics of the civil war in isolation, 
and assuming the exclusivity of their import to Amal and Hizbullah, this 
analysis argues for a more inclusive approach. This posits that the external 
and internal dimensions of the Lebanese Civil War had a mutually 
reinforcing impact on the Shiʿi community’s political identities, which 
manifested in the different political fortunes of the LCP, Amal and 
Hizbullah. The analysis now moves on to analyse the internal dimensions 
of the Lebanese Civil War. 
The Breakdown of the State 
The event that triggered the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War occurred 
on April 13 1975, following an attempted assassination of the Maronite 
Christian President, and leader of the Phalangist (al-Kataʿib) Party, Pierre 
Jumayyil. Believing the assassins to be Palestinian, Phalangist militiamen 
retaliated later that day, attacking a bus carrying Palestinian passengers 
through a Christian neighbourhood in Ain al-Rummaneh, and killing 
twenty-seven civilians. 413  The next day, violent clashes broke out at 
demonstrations across Beirut and Sidon. Militiamen arose from all sides in 
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the capital and surrounding cities, including Zahle, Tripoli, Zghorta and 
Damur.414 All entrances to the Palestinian refugee camps became violent 
battlegrounds.  While the conflict was initially characterised by ‘small 
wars’ between local gangs settling old scores with rivals, or seeking to 
enlarge their areas of control, the violence quickly acquired a sectarian 
character.415  
The main dichotomy that underlay the conflict was between the 
conservatives and progressives. On the progressive side were those who 
rejected the political and socioeconomic reality of the old Lebanese order. 
This camp, led by the Druze leader of the PSP, Kamal Jumblatt, was 
formulated under the banner of the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), a 
conglomeration of parties which included the Arab nationalists, Baʿthists 
and Murabitun. These parties also sought to develop a strong commitment 
to the Palestinian resistance based in Lebanon, and its right to launch 
attacks against Israel from Lebanese territory (South Lebanon, in 
particular). They were joined by the various rejectionist elements of the 
Palestinian revolutionary movement, including the PFLP, Arab Liberation 
Front and left-wing of Fatah. This camp also drew support from elements 
of the Sunni Muslim elite, including Rashid Karameh and Saeb Salam, who 
were opposed to the National Pact’s apportioning of executive powers to 
the Christians and Maronite Christians in particular.416 Although Muslims 
constituted the majority of the progressive camp’s membership, it also 
drew the support of the secular political parties, including the LCP and 
SSNP. The progressives were therefore a diverse camp, comprising leftist, 
Muslim and Palestinian elements. 
The conservative camp sought the preservation of the political and 
socioeconomic status quo in Lebanon. It was also opposed to the presence 
of Palestinian fighters in Lebanon, and their right to launch attacks against 
Israel from inside Lebanese territory.  This camp was almost exclusively a 
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Christian coalition formed around the Presidency, led by the Phalangists 
and its parties and supporters, including the former President Kemal 
Sham’un’s National Liberal Party (NLP).417 This coalition formed its own 
militia, the Lebanese Forces (LF) during the war.  
From the earliest stages of the war, where the domestic and external stakes 
were still unclear, violence acquired a sectarian character. Attackers made 
combatants and civilians of other communities their target, constructing an 
easily identifiable enemy. As stated by Picard, in Beirut, where the 
population was heterogeneous and closely intermingled, particularly at the 
workplace, ‘militiamen arrested, kidnapped and murdered members of 
other communities, or Palestinian refugees,’ after simply looking at their 
identity cards and identifying their sectarian affiliation.418 Thus the initial 
division between progressive and conservative merged with the categories 
of Muslim and Christian, a division set to splinter still further as violence 
increased. While events on the ground developed their own sectarian logic, 
they were also a microcosm of sectarian disintegration and political 
disagreement at the state level. 
The failure of the Lebanese state to present a unified national position, 
arbitrate disputes, or contain the violence was a key contributing factor to 
the civil war’s sectarian violence. Sulayman Franjiyya’s acquisition of the 
Presidency in 1970 signalled a resurgence of zuʿamaʾ styled politics at the 
state level. Although the Kataʿib Party had been an advocate for the 
strengthening of the state, the zuʿamaʾ viewed public service with 
indifference, systematically undermining the state.419  The President and 
Prime Minister failed to reach agreement over any issue during this period. 
Following the resignation of the Prime Minister, Rashid al-Sulh, the 
President attempted to create a Cabinet tasked with restoring peace, 
comprised of mostly Sunni Muslim ‘moderate’ military personnel only. 
This was a first in Lebanese history. However, the attempt galvanised the 
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Muslim political elite and religious leadership, including representatives 
from the Sunni, Shiʿi and Druze communities, in unanimous opposition, 
leading to the collapse of the new cabinet in just two days.420 Thereafter, 
politics continued to be mired in factional disagreements between the 
President, Prime Minister and Cabinet.   
The lack of political consensus at state level was reflected in the 
disintegration of political power - away from the President, Prime Minister  
and the rest of the political administration - to the warlords fighting each 
other on the ground. The factionalism of the political leadership also 
transferred directly to the creation and political sponsorship of the various 
militia groups involved in the fighting; violence came to reflect and mimic 
the political disagreements. Thus the Kata’ib Party, NLP and Marada 
Brigade all established their own militias whose membership was drawn 
from the   Jumayyil, Sham’un and Franjiyya zuʿamaʾ. The political 
opposition embodied by the LNM also established its own militias; the 
alliance with the Palestinian fighters formed the bulk of the LNM’s fighting 
force in the civil war. As stated by Picard, ‘communal strategies and 
individual ambitions had swept away the compromises of the National 
Pact.’421  
The factionalism of the political elite, which enabled and sponsored the 
violence committed by the warlords, also facilitated the involvement of 
external actors in the civil war. Internal divisions over the Palestinian 
presence inside Lebanon became a significant precipitator for the 
interventions of Syria and Israel, whose involvement frequently occurred at 
the invitation of their shifting alliances inside Lebanon. By the end of 1975, 
political factionalism, the involvement of external interests and militia 
violence eroded the power and authority of the Lebanese state. Events 
inside Lebanon also became increasingly subject to changes in the regional 
                                                
420 Farid el Khazen, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, 1967-1976, London:I.B Tauris, 2000, 
294-295. 
421 Picard, Lebanon: A Shattered Country, 107. 
  193 
balance of power, further eliminating the possibility for internal stability.422 
The growing presence of foreign armies in Lebanon, and the fact that after 
1976, every Lebanese President owed his election to a foreign power, as 
well as the presence of semi-autonomous armed forces across Lebanon, 
signalled the breakdown of the Lebanese state. 
In this environment, the Lebanese Army collapsed. In January 1976, the 
army was sent to liberate Damur from the Palestinian and Druze factions 
controlling it. At this point, the army divided along partisan lines. Some 
elements formed the Lebanese Arab Army (LAA), based in the Bekaa. 
Major General Saad Haddad established the Free Lebanese Army (FLA). 
Other brigades aligned with the Lebanese President, while still others 
aligned with the rival political factions, the LF and the LNM. 423  The 
splintering of the Lebanese Army signalled the complete collapse of the 
Lebanese state, which ceased to function as a guarantor of security, political 
legitimacy or public services. These functions increasingly fell under the 
purview of the militiamen and warlords. This produced a paradox, as the 
militias became both the purveyors of violence, and the guarantors of 
security. 
The Security Environment 
Following the collapse of the Lebanese state, the general population 
became motivated by the basic human need to survive, defend and protect 
itself against random acts of violence.424 Militias became a core means of 
survival. They established a local-level order in the absence of any national-
level order that the state could provide.425  As the violence of the war 
increased, the security needs of society also expanded. This facilitated what 
Norton has described as ‘the democratisation of the instruments of 
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violence.’ 426  After 1975, the supply of firearms to the militia groups 
dramatically increased. At the beginning of the war the largest group of 
militiamen belonged to al-Kata’ib (8,000), followed by the LCP (5,000) and 
SSNP (5,000). The LNM coalition had a total of 18,700 militiamen, while the 
Christian-based parties totalled 12,000. The numerical superiority of the 
LNM was facilitated by its alliance with the Palestinian factions, who 
contributed the largest numbers of fighting forces.427 By 1984, there were up 
to 186 different warring factions and splinter groups in Lebanon, each with 
different backgrounds, ideologies, patrons, grievances, visions and 
justifications for why they had resorted to armed struggle.428  
In the absence of the state, the militia groups organised community 
defences on a territorial basis. These newly demarcated territorial borders 
became extremely effective security cantons. Their cohesion was based on 
the effectiveness of communitarian-based militia loyalty, and the way in 
which militias communicated with other groups on the basis of threats and 
negotiations. A territory could only be entered via checkpoints that were 
guarded by militiamen with machine guns, who performed searches and 
interrogations on all who tried to enter. The militias also enforced the 
cohesion of the communities residing in their territory by making it 
extremely difficult for people to leave.429  
The dominance of the militias over the new security environment elevated 
their status above that of the political and economic leaders who had 
dominated Lebanon before the war. The militia men came to comprise both 
volunteer and salaried members - the latter were thus a more long-term 
presence. Although the militiamen remained a minority, they displayed 
their dominance via the wearing of paramilitary uniform and the 
deployment of armed vehicles to accompany their movements. In each of 
their areas of control, the militias established quasi-governmental 
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structures, organising their own judicial systems to display their hegemony 
and intimidate the local community subject to their control.430 
The militia established strong financial networks to facilitate their control 
over the security environment in the absence of any state-led framework. 
They militarily took over the Lebanese economy, targeting the banking 
industry in Beirut, the customs area of the port and airport, and many other 
areas of Lebanon’s financial infrastructure. The militias also took partook in 
drug trafficking, guaranteeing themselves large financial incomes.431 This 
wealth enabled the militias to pay their members extremely well, further 
securing the loyalty and commitment of their members.  
The security environment in Lebanon throughout the civil war was 
characterised by three inter-linked issues: the absence of any state 
orchestrated order, the violence that engulfed all of Lebanese society 
throughout the war, and the militia’s acquisition of control over security 
provision across the country.  These conditions, and the territorial nature of 
militia-led security provision, led to the widespread sectarianisation of 
identities.  
Sectarianisation of Identities 
Another effect of the state’s absence, particularly from the arena of security 
provision, was that society now increasingly sought security from within 
the family unit. The violence contributed to the resurgence of primordial 
identities, which linked the survival of the individual to their group of 
origin. Mobilisation of fighting forces occurred for more immediate 
purposes - the defence of close relatives, or fellow villagers from attacks by 
community outsiders. These battles became more urgent than class 
struggles or ideological motives. In areas that were relatively homogenous, 
patrons were transformed into warlords, exploiting community unity for 
compliance with their leadership.432 Thus, in the Shuf Mountains, where the 
                                                
430 Picard, ‘The Lebanese Shiʿa and Political Violence’, 33. 
431 Picard, ‘The Lebanese Shiʿa and Political Violence’, 33. 
432 Picard, Lebanon: A Shattered Country, 109. 
  196 
majority of the population was Druze, the area became a stronghold for 
Kemal Jumblatt’s PSP, and therefore rallied to the LNM. In the central areas 
of Lebanon, Kisrawan, East Beirut and its suburbs, where the Maronite 
Christians formed the majority, these areas were strongholds of the Kataʿib 
and NLP, excluding both the leftists and the Muslims.433  
The methods employed by the militias in order to secure their territories 
also contributed to the communalisation of identities. By not allowing 
residents to leave their areas of control, and severely limiting the entry of 
outsiders, the militias also contributed to the homogenisation of their 
communities. These changes sharpened the territoriality of communal 
identities. The boundaries between communities therefore became more 
pronounced. The community, locality, neighbourhood or quarter was no 
longer just a space to seek shelter in or reside. It now became an ideology 
and a perspective in which groups interacted and perceived those outside 
the group.434 Thus, the group transformed into a form of communalism. The 
emergence of insular communities and the retribalisation of identities that 
it produced, provided temporary relief from the horrors of the war. But this 
survival technique also made these communities prone to intra-group 
conflict, too.435  
Having distanced themselves from the ‘other’, these communities now had 
to face each other. In fact, the Lebanese Civil War represents an acute 
example of how inter-communal rivalries descended into intra-communal 
violence. As Khalaf states, ‘The ecology of violence, reinforced by 
demonisation of the ‘other’, provided the sources for heightened vengeance 
and entrapment into relentless cycles of retributive in-fighting’.436 Thus the 
labels conventionally applied to the Lebanese conflict, left vs right, 
Christian vs Muslim, fail to take account of the intra-communal violence 
that was borne of factional territorial disputes. 
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The breakdown of the state, the security environment and the 
communalisation of identities (as well as the propensity for intra-
communal conflict) are all interrelated aspects of the domestic environment 
caused by the Lebanese Civil War. In the ensuing analysis of this chapter, 
these factors form the underlying domestic conditions in which the political 
identities of the Shiʿi community transformed. From the outset it is 
apparent that the breakdown of the state and the resultant security 
environment during the civil war established a precedent for the 
resurgence of primordial identities. Thus, a partial explanation for the 
transition from communism to communalism among the Shiʿa is already 
evident. The analysis now moves on to establish the chronological context 
in which that transition occurred, by revisiting the war’s main events. 
Chronologies of the Civil War 
The first stage of the Lebanese Civil War, known as the two years war, 
includes the period from the initial outbreak of violence in April 1975 to 
November 1976. This period was characterised by sporadic episodes of 
violence, and government attempts at negotiation and peace building 
through dialogue. The failure to stop the violence and reach agreement 
gave way to the second stage of the conflict: November 1976 to June 1982. 
During this period, Syria entered Lebanon upon the invitation of the 
conservative camp, the internal wars continued, and Israel conducted its 
first invasion of Lebanon, Operation Litani in 1978. The third stage of the 
conflict, 1982-1984 involved the second Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, 
followed by the deployment of a multi-national force in Lebanon led by the 
US, and the expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon. The fourth stage of the 
conflict, 1984-1988 was marked by the intra-communal battles, including 
the War of the Camps, which pitted the new Shiʿi militias, Amal and 
Hizbullah against each other, as well as the Palestinians and their allies in 
the LNM. Intra-Christian battles also characterised the violence of this 
period. The period between 1988-1990 constituted the closing stages of the 
war. In 1989 the Taif Accord was signed under Arab tutelage in Saudi 
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Arabia. The ratification of the agreement by the Lebanese National 
Assembly (parliament) in August 1990 officially ended the civil war.437  
It is interesting to note that most chronologies of the Lebanese Civil War 
refer to the key events as those involving the interference of external 
players - Syria, Israel, the Arab and other multi-national forces. This 
emphasis is also replicated by some of the historiography of the Lebanese 
Civil War, which emphasises the role of exogenous factors in both causing 
and perpetuating the conflict. This study places itself in the opposing 
camp, which recognises the role of external actors, but views them in 
conjunction with endogenous issues, events and actors in Lebanon. The 
remit of this review is also narrower than a consideration of the domestic 
factors of the Lebanese Civil War would normally be, because the focus is 
on the war-time relationship between the LCP and the Shiʿa in particular.  
The analysis now moves on to explain the impact of the Lebanese Civil War 
on the LCP and its relationship with the Shiʿa. For this purpose, the 
aforementioned chronology of the war is reformulated as follows. The first 
period, 1975-1978 examines the LCP’s entry into the war as part of the 
LNM, and the initial faltering of the LCP in that context. The second period 
between 1978 and 1982 is analysed in relation to the LCP, Israel, the 
Palestinians and Amal. This stage is marked by the conflagration of 
internal and external events, to the detriment of the LCP’s influence among 
the Shiʿa of South Lebanon. The third period between 1982 and 1988 
involves a comparative assessment of the the resistance activities of the 
LCP and Hizbullah in the war with Israel. At this point the LCP and its 
allies failed to halt Israel’s expansive invasion of Lebanon in 1982, while 
Hizbullah emerged as a more formidable proponent of the resistance. In 
addition, the expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon took with it a significant 
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component of the LCP’s (and LNM’s) military capability in Lebanon. The 
fourth stage between 1988 and 1990 involves an analysis of the internal 
wars as well as the implications of Taif. During this period, the LCP 
becomes a target in the intra-communal battles involving Amal and 
Hizbullah, lacking the military capacity to defend itself. Additionally, the 
signing of the Taif Accord re-legitimised Lebanon’s confessional political 
structure, with severe implications for the LCP’s political survival in 
Lebanon as a non-sectarian political actor. 
Bringing the LCP and the Shiʿa into the Lebanese Civil War 
The analysis in this section demonstrates that the decline of the LCP and its 
relationship with the Shiʿa during the civil war was directly implicated in 
the rise of the new Shiʿi sectarian actors, Amal and Hizbullah. The 
argument is illustrated by documenting the failures of the LCP in the war, 
as well as the party’s interaction with the Shiʿi communal actors in the 
context of those failures. In this sense, the decline of communism among 
the Lebanese Shiʿa, and the consequent rise of Shiʿi sectaranism is situated 
first and foremost within the domestic framework of Lebanon. External 
themes and trends, such as the global decline of communism and the rise of 
political Islam, while relevant, are not prioritised by this analysis. This is 
because their influence was peripheral, and can only be inferred rather than 
demonstrated. 
The LCP in the Civil War 1975–1978 
The LCP was a prominent member of the political opposition in Lebanon 
under the framework of the LNM. The party was involved in the 
deliberations with the Lebanese government at the beginning of the war, 
which sought to halt the violence and negotiate for political reforms. The 
failure of these deliberations precipitated the breakdown of the state and 
the rise of sectarian violence, and the LCP became embroiled in these 
battles. The analysis in this section contrasts the stated objectives of the 
LCP in the war with the party’s actual conduct. It argues that the failure of 
the LCP to adhere to its political principles, as well as successive strategic 
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errors and miscalculations by the party leadership, contributed to the initial 
faltering of the LCP in the war. 
Following the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War, the LNM announced its 
transitional reform programme for Lebanon in August 1975. Its main 
emphasis was on the abolition of political sectarianism in Lebanon. The 
reform program also called for an end to the system of political and 
administrative quotas, a voluntary civil code for personal status rights, a 
new electoral law based on proportional representation, administrative 
decentralisation and the formation of a constituent assembly on a non-
sectarian basis.438 According to the LCP, this agenda was to be pursued via 
cross-platform negotiations and co-operation as the best means of averting 
further violence.439 The following month, a twenty-member Committee for 
National Dialogue (CND) with the Lebanese government convened to 
discuss the reforms proposed by the LNM. 
The CND’s deliberations marked the first and last attempt during the war 
to address the political and socioeconomic disagreements that lay at the 
heart of the Lebanese conflict. The discussion was formulated around the 
reforms proposed by the LNM. The issue of secularism was debated, while 
the committee unanimously voted to abolish sectarian quotas in 
parliamentary representation and administration.440 In addition, the PLO 
delegation pledged to respect Lebanese sovereignty and reject any 
alternative homeland for the Palestinians. Despite the unanimous 
agreement over sectarian quotas, the reforms were not implemented by the 
President. Thereafter, the violence resumed, with the LNM, who viewed 
themselves as progressive nationalists, pitted against the status quo i.e the 
Phalange and their allies in the LF. 
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The failure of the peaceful negotiations, however, gave way to what 
Fawwaz Traboulsi has described as a period of ‘reform by arms.’441 The 
LNM’s parliamentary members used their veto powers to prevent the 
Lebanese government from deploying the army for domestic order issues. 
This resulted in an escalation of hostilities between the progressive and 
conservative camps. In November 1975, the LNM launched an offensive in 
West Beirut known as the ‘Battle of the Hotels’ in an effort to remove the 
Phalangist forces from a mixed quarter of West Beirut. This was a direct 
response to an earlier Phalangist assault on East Beirut, where 200 Muslims 
were killed.442  Following a Phalangist attack on a Palestinian Christian 
refugee camp in Matn on the Lebanese coast, in which all of the refugees 
were expelled, the LNM’s Joint Forces mobilised again. They laid siege to 
Damur, a Maronite Christian town on the coast of the Shuf mountains. 
After Phalangist forces captured Karantina in January of 1976, the Joint 
Forces invaded Damur, Sa’idiyat and Jiyeh, pillaging the Christian villagers 
and forcing thousands to escape by sea.443 These events constitute the first of 
many examples of the LNM committing ‘sectarian excesses’ in the war.444 
These acts contravened the principles contained within the LNM’s 
domestic reform program - specifically those that opposed all aspects of 
sectarianism in Lebanon. For the LCP, the outcomes of some of its military 
misadventures in the war further reduced the credibility of its political 
programme.  
The LCP suffered immediate military setbacks between 1975 and 1976. The 
party provided the LNM with 1,000 fighters, and lost 200 of these in the 
first year of the war. More than 100 fighters died in combat throughout the 
Winter and Spring of 1976.445 The LNM lost most of its fighters in and 
around the zone controlled by the LF and their allies in the North, as well 
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as Matn. By August 1976, the Muslim and Palestinian enclaves of northern 
Beirut, Nabaa (100,000 Shiʿis), Jisr al-Basha (6,000 Palestinians) and Tel al-
Zat’ar (50,000 Palestinians and southern Lebanese) were decimated.446 In 
Bikfaya, LCP fighters were given ultimatums - either they renounced their 
communist affiliations or they faced expulsion from the town. Many of the 
party’s Christian members heeded these warnings. In fact, such was the 
extent of the exodus of Christians from the LCP that the party came to be 
perceived as wholly identifiable with the Muslim camp. Although the 
LCP’s leadership continued to be dominated by its Christian members, the 
party was now openly accused of advocating Shiʿi communal interests.447 
While the public association between the LCP and the Shiʿa was not a new 
accusation, the LCP’s activities in the war were increasingly delegitimising 
its anti-sectarian political agenda in this regard. 
The second military setback experienced by the LCP occurred following 
Syria’s intervention in 1976. Despite the heavy losses inflicted upon the 
LNM in the first year of the war, the Phalangists and LF still perceived their 
alliance with the Palestinian fighters to be a substantial political and 
military threat. Fear of their potential success led the Lebanese President, 
Sulayman Franjiyya, to call for Syrian military intervention.448 The entry of 
Syria on behalf of the LF in 1976 placed the LNM in a dilemma - they had 
expected support from Syria. Despite Syria’s entry on behalf of the LF, the 
LNM were reluctant in their military engagement with Syrian forces. This 
led to heavy casualties among the Joint Forces. The greatest damage 
exerted on the Syrian Army came from the LNM’s Palestinian allies 
stationed outside Sawfar and Sidon. However, the LNM was ultimately 
subdued in the second half of 1976.   
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Among the LCP’s Shiʿi communist cadres, disbelief was expressed at how 
quickly the LNM stood down from its engagement with the Syrian Army.449  
However, the more extensive damage to the LCP’s reputation was caused 
by the party’s disingenuous portrayal of its military drawdown - and 
defeat - as victory. While the LCP declared victory in this battle, the 
cessation of hostilities was a negotiated agreement in the face of the 
obvious military superiority of the Syrian army, as well as the reluctance of 
the LNM to engage in battle with Syria from the outset.450 Among the LCP’s 
Shiʿi cadres, who comprised the bulk of the party’s fighting forces in this 
battle, this declaration of victory was an insult. Ibrahim al-Amin, who 
participated in those battles expressed this frustration: 
All of the sudden we receive an order to leave our posts and gather at 
the Palace. We are told to go in a single file to headquarters, the 
Syrians wanted the Palace. They served us a speech about our victory. 
How we had won the battle for democratic change and so on. It was 
so ironic.451 
Later in the war, the LCP and Syria would be fighting side by side as allies 
in a different battle. This illustrates the extent to which the LCP became 
embroiled in the myriad contradictions of the conflict, which underscored 
the loss of the party’s political agenda and foresight.  For the communist 
Shiʿa, the beginning of the war represented the first instance in which they 
developed doubts about their role in the LCP, and in particular the role 
envisioned for them by the LCP’s leadership. 
The strategic failings of the LNM in the war have since been acknowledged 
by the leadership of its composite organisations. For example, George 
Hawi, then Secretary-General of the LCP, acknowledged the party’s failure 
to adhere to the reform initiative at the beginning of the war: 
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…we did so [abandoned our reform program] under pressure, when 
the unfavourable balance of forces after the first two years of civil war 
forced as to make a tactical retreat. But this had disastrous 
repercussions on the internal Lebanese conflict. It allowed the 
demands of the Muslim communities - legitimate demands for 
equality - to appear as the sole positions of the anti-fascist camp. Our 
camp thus lost its secular and democratic nature. Muslim demands 
for equality should have been subsumed within the vast and 
democratic and secular program of the National Movement, a 
program whose secular reforms would eliminate all religious 
oppression. Instead the National Movement seemed to be dominated 
by the Muslim movement, as if it were just part of one of the two 
camps in the ‘traditional’ Lebanese conflict…452 
Hawi highlights how the LCP’s early political and military failings in the 
war contributed to the delegitimisation of the party’s anti-confessional 
political agenda. The failure to maintain a secular political agenda also 
rendered the LCP’s communist Shiʿa more exposed to the tendencies 
toward communalisation exerted by the breakdown of the state and the 
resultant security environment in the civil war. The LCP appeared from the 
beginning of the civil war as a party with a suspect sectarian agenda and 
limited military capacity. As the analysis now moves on to the next stage of 
the civil war, the security environment and process of sectarianisation 
become the second precipitant of the LCP’s declining relationship with the 
Shiʿa. 
The LCP, Israel, the Palestinians and Amal 1978–1982 
Events during this period illustrate how external actors exerted influence 
over the internal dynamics of the Lebanese Civil War. The analysis in this 
section further demonstrates the LCP’s declining influence among the 
Shiʿa, both as an advocate for the Palestinian resistance (a joint interest that 
had previously been shared with the South Lebanese Shiʿa), but also as a 
guarantor of Shiʿi security in South Lebanon.  
Until the events of 1978, relations between the Shiʿa and the Palestinians in 
South Lebanon were strong. Their ties dated to the 1930s and revolved 
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around trade relations, as well as a shared sense of dispossession between 
the Lebanese Shiʿa and the Palestinian refugees who arrived in South 
Lebanon in the aftermath of 1948. In chapter three, the analysis showed 
how, after 1967, the LCP capitalised on the strong ties between the 
Lebanese Shiʿa and the Palestinians, deploying the LCP’s Popular Guard in 
South Lebanon in support of the Palestinian struggle against Israel. The 
LCP’s presence in South Lebanon was therefore initially welcomed by the 
local Shiʿi population, some of whom joined the LCP on the basis of its 
support for the Palestinian resistance, as well as the party’s pledge to 
defend South Lebanon from Israeli attacks. However, by 1978 the 
expansion of the Palestinian presence in South Lebanon, and the ferocity 
with which Israel retaliated against the South Lebanese villagers, strained 
relations between the local Shiʿi community and the Palestinians.  
Initially, Shiʿi frustration with the Palestinian fighters stationed in South 
Lebanon grew out of the increasing levels of arbitrary controls imposed on  
the Shiʿi villagers by the Palestinian militants. Checkpoints were manned 
by young Palestinians who conducted random searches of vehicles and 
persons wishing to pass, and some individuals sometimes behaved 
disrespectfully toward those they stopped. Shiʿi village elders began to 
take offence to the behaviour of the Palestinians in their villages. Shortly 
before his disappearance in Libya, Musa al-Sadr warned the PLO against 
establishing a long term presence in South Lebanon, describing the PLO as 
a ‘factor of anarchy in the South.’453 Sadr’s comments reflected the growing 
disenchantment of the local Shiʿi villagers with the Palestinian militants in 
their midst.  
The Israeli invasion in 1978 further radicalised Shiʿi opinion with regard to 
the Palestinian presence in South Lebanon. Heavy Israeli bombardment of 
the area, including artillery fire and airstrikes caused extensive 
infrastructural damage to the Shiʿi villagers. Civilian casualties were also 
extremely high, with over two thousand killed. The Israeli bombardment 
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forced more than 100,000 civilians to flee South Lebanon.454 Most of these 
refugees came to settle in West Beirut. While the PLO’s forces withdrew 
from the North to avoid Israeli forces, the local Shiʿa community therefore 
bore the brunt of Israel’s assault. It was under these conditions that 
relations between the Shiʿa and the Palestinians transformed, with 
implications for the LCP’s presence, too. 
Amal’s strategy at this time, commensurate with the militia strategies 
outlined earlier in this chapter, was to acquire, expand and communally 
homogenise the territory it controlled in Lebanon. Thus the provision of 
communal security constituted the organisation’s main agenda, and the 
growth in membership of Amal in the late 1970s was indeed predicated on 
its security pledges toward the Shiʿa. Amal’s initial strongholds developed 
in the suburbs of Beirut, particularly in Ghobeire. Amal’s influence here 
was directly facilitated by the relative territorial contiguity of the location. 
In South Lebanon, Amal’s strategic position was different. Although a Shiʿi 
region, this was a much vaster territorial area. In addition, military capacity 
overwhelmingly determined influence in this area, which Amal did not yet 
possess.455 In South Lebanon it was the LNM’s Joint Forces, among them the 
LCP but, importantly, the PLO, which had a powerful and pervasive armed 
presence.  
Although Amal lacked the military capacity to challenge the LNM’s 
military presence in South Lebanon, the movement was able to capitalise 
on the breakdown in relations between the Shiʿa and the Palestinians 
caused by the Israeli operation. Amal deployed a rhetorical strategy that 
related the presence of the Palestinians and, importantly, their allies in the 
LNM, with the insecurity of the Shiʿa in South Lebanon. Many Shiʿa, 
motivated by the basic need to protect their families, homes and villages, 
left the LCP, PLO and other component entities of the LNM, and instead 
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began to join the ranks of Amal, or offer their support to the movement.456 
One Shiʿi villager, expressing his anger at the conduct of the Palestinians in 
South Lebanon said, ‘We gave the Palestinians everything and they gave us 
back insults, corpses and a lesson in corruption.’457 Some Shiʿa were so 
frustrated with the PLO that they also provided assistance to Israel’s ally in 
South Lebanon, General Haddad’s South Lebanon Army (SLA).458  Shiʿi 
frustration with the PLO also extended to other areas of Lebanon, including 
West Beirut. From 1980 onwards, frequent armed clashes took place 
between Amal, the PLO and their allies in the LNM. These battles occurred 
in both West Beirut and South Lebanon; Amal began to accrue significant 
success where the Shiʿa expressed their frustration with both the left and 
the PLO in these areas. 
Following Israel’s withdrawal from South Lebanon, Amal sought to 
prevent the return of PLO forces to South Lebanon, in an effort to 
consolidate its territorial control over the Shiʿa. The provision of security 
for the Shiʿi community became a battleground between Amal, the LCP 
and its allies in the LNM, particularly the Palestinian factions. The 
advancement of Amal’s security strategy in the south was directly 
predicated on the decline of the LNM’s. Thereafter the LCP also suffered a 
loss in local Shiʿi confidence due to its association with the LNM. This was 
an outcome for which the LCP also bore responsibility. The LCP and its 
allies in the LNM have since acknowledged their failures in the arena of 
security provision in the south.  
George Hawi acknowledges that the LCP displayed indifference to the 
welfare of the populations that lived in the regions under their control. 
While the LCP was frequently critical of the government’s failures in this 
regard, the party took no independent initiative to provide for the security 
needs of the southern Shiʿa. The local population frequently complained of 
                                                
456 Norton, ‘Shiʿism and Social Protest’, 169. 
457 Norton, ‘Shiʿism and Social Protest ’, 60. 
458 Cobban, ‘The Growth of Shiʿi Power in Lebanon’, 146. 
  208 
the coercion and physical intimidation they experienced at the behest of the 
Joint Forces.459 These smaller issues could have been addressed through the 
imposition of some basic disciplinary coherence within the Joint Forces, or 
the establishment of an interim joint local authority to arbitrate disputes 
and provide a semblance of order. In the end, the LCP failed to deliver on 
its pledge of security to the southern Shiʿa; the Israeli invasion in 1978 
amplified that failure, while providing Amal with an opportunity to 
develop its communal legitimacy and authority among the Shiʿa. 
 The Israeli invasion of South Lebanon in 1978 contributed to the 
breakdown of relations between the Shiʿa and the Palestinians. This in turn 
transformed relations between the Shiʿa and the LCP due to the latter’s 
political and military support for the Palestinian resistance against Israel. 
The new Shiʿi militia, Amal, capitalised on local Shiʿi frustration with the 
Palestinian presence in South Lebanon, positioning itself with the Shiʿa 
against the Palestinians and their allies, the LCP. In this way Amal began to 
promote itself as a more capable provider of communal security for the 
Shiʿa, as a ‘Shiʿi' militia. In this sense, an external event (the Israeli 
invasion) dovetailed with the internal security environment and the 
resultant sectarianisation of identities.  
The Resistance: LCP vs Amal vs Hizbullah 1982–1984 
The third stage of the conflict was marked by Israel’s second invasion of 
Lebanon in 1982. This initially presented the LCP with an opportunity to 
re-establish its reputation among the Shiʿa as a leading force in the 
resistance against Israel, particularly due to the absence of of an effective 
mobilisation by Amal in the first two years of the war.460 The analysis in this 
section examines the LCP’s mobilisation against Israel in 1982, arguing 
that, ultimately, the LCP, and its allies in the LNM failed to mount an 
effective resistance. By 1984, Amal re-grouped and began to participate in 
the resistance against Israel. However, the real turning point in the war 
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with Israel came after the emergence of Hizbullah, which mounted a 
resistance effort that was superior to both Amal’s and the LCP’s. By the end 
of this period, the LCP had failed to reverse its fortunes vis a vis its 
resistance agenda among the Shiʿa. The exodus of the PLO from Lebanon 
also removed from the LNM a significant component of its fighting force, 
reducing the military capacity of the alliance further. Additionally, the LCP 
now faced two new powerful sectarian rivals for the Shiʿi community in 
the form of Amal and Hizbullah.  
The Israeli invasion led to an immediate mobilisation of the LNM’s forces 
in Lebanon, supported by Syria. The LCP’s General-Secretary, George 
Hawi called on all Lebanese ‘to unite regardless of ideological, religious 
and other differences in order to give a determined rebuff to the Israeli 
aggression.’461 The LCP further issued an appeal with OCAL and the Arab 
Socialist Action Party, calling for the formation of the Lebanese Patriotic 
Resistance Front (LPRF). This group also later joined forces with the Front 
for National Salvation, which comprised the PSP, the PLO, Syria, and 
Amal.462  
It’s worth noting that the Israeli invasion in 1982 continued to galvanise the 
LCP’s Shiʿi members, while producing new adherents. In the Lebanese 
documentary film, Shiyuʿiyyin Kunna, all of the respondents interviewed 
described the Israeli invasion of 1982 as the most important motivating 
factor behind their decision to either join the LCP or volunteer to fight the 
Israelis. For several Shiʿi communists, the LCP’s involvement in the fight 
against Israel consolidated their relationship with the party:  
My real awareness emerged in 1982, with the Israeli invasion, when 
the Communist Party decided to engage itself directly in the mission 
of fighting Israel. At that moment, I felt my relationship with the 
party was natural…Because when it came to the subject of resisting 
Israel, whether the general secretary of the party had sent you or not, 
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it was your duty to do it. This helped. It was the instance where my 
relationship with the party consolidated and became very real.463  
The 1978 and 1982 Israeli invasions elicited different reactions from the 
Shiʿi community, resulting in commensurately contrasting reconfigurations 
of the community’s political alliances. In 1978, the Israeli invasion sparked 
a breakdown in relations between the southern Shiʿa and the Palestinians. 
The Shiʿa blamed the Palestinian militants, and their allies in the LCP and 
LNM for the Israeli incursions, which disproportionately impacted the Shiʿi 
residents of south Lebanon.  This provided Amal with the opportunity to 
make inroads into the LCP’s traditional Shiʿi support base in south 
Lebanon, resulting in the loss of some territorial control by the LCP and its 
allies. However, the 1982 Israeli invasion, and the speed in which the Israeli 
army passed through Lebanese territory to reach Beirut, was a source of 
great alarm to the residents of south Lebanon.  
The Israeli invasion appeared to have the unintended effect of reunifying 
the fragmented Lebanese opposition, while also aiding the LCP’s 
recruitment among the Shiʿa, and strengthening the resolve and 
commitment of its existing members. In addition, it was during the 1982 
war the the LCP’s resistance strategy vis a vis Israel adopted a more radical 
strategy: the deployment of martyrdom operations. Conventionally, the use 
of such tactics is associated with Islamist organisations, and in the case of 
the Lebanese Shiʿa, Hizbullah. However, this analysis shows that 
martyrdom operations were originally conceived under a secular 
conceptual framework. Indeed the majority of suicide missions carried out 
against Israel in the 1982 were the work of the LCP, SSNP, Baʿth and 
Nasserist Parties based in Lebanon.464  
The secular political parties, among them the LCP, justified the use of 
suicide bombings against Israeli forces in nationalistic terms. In this sense, 
suicide bombing served to uphold the honour and dignity of the nation, 
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and to liberate a land from occupation.465 The notions of dignity and honour 
had wide application; they referred to all aspects of the occupation, 
including the destruction of villages, the loss of jobs and access to basic 
human resources.466 While the term, ‘martyr’ is nominally used to describe 
individuals who suffer persecution and death for a religious cause, in 
Lebanon almost anyone who dies an unnatural death is called a martyr.467 
As stated by Mroue,  
Images of these dead men and women populate the walls of Lebanese 
cities and towns…staring back at the living who more often than not 
behave as though they are oblivious to their ghostly presence. Posters 
of martyrs can be encountered in almost any neighbourhood of Beirut, 
regardless of the sectarian or political identity of the location [emphasis 
added].468 
Another often unremarked feature of the secular party’s use of martyrs, is 
that both women and men partook in such activities. The LCP’s most 
celebrated female martyr is Lola Abboud. Described as ‘the flower of the 
Bekaa’, Lola hailed from a middle-class Christian family. Aged 19, she blew 
herself up among Israeli soldiers attacking her village on 20th April 1985.469 
The explanations for why female suicide bombers carried out their actions 
were the same as those for the men, revolving around nationalistic intent 
and the upholding of the nation’s honour and dignity. Lola’s father 
explained that she was ‘fighting for the liberation of her homeland.’ In his 
view, Lola’s sacrifice, as a woman, was even greater than that of the LCP’s 
male martyrs: ‘Loula Abboud’s actions exceeded all expectations not only 
for women in war, but for men as well.’470 Too, Lola’s Christian identity 
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could also be invoked, since she died the day after Easter, thus her death 
served as a resurrection to her people.471 
Elias Atallah, a senior LCP official stated that the Politburo voiced no 
objections to the party’s use of suicide-bombings in the 1982 war. However, 
he acknowledged that the party did engage with the paradox represented 
by the practice of martyrdom, long associated with religious notions of 
sacrifice, being deployed in the service of a secular Marxist project. Atallah 
believes the LCP’s use of this strategy remained necessarily ambiguous, but 
that this rendered the tactic prone to cooptation by the Islamic resistance 
(Hizbullah). He contrasts the LCP’s use of suicide bombing, which,  
as a secular, left-wing act…was open to interpretation, challenge and 
debate…[whereas for the Islamists]…there is clarity in the 
motivations behind such missions, and little room for debate.472 
Hizbullah’s use of martyrdom operations deployed the same reasoning as 
its secular purveyors, however. Thus, honour and dignity also featured in 
Hizbullah’s justification:  
‘when duty calls and when there are dignities that are going to be 
downtrodden, when the pride and honour of the umma is going to be 
downtrodden by the Jews, then we we will not lay idle…473 
In Hizbullah’s reading, the nation simply becomes the ummah. But the 
connotations are the same, only the  martyrs offer different kinds of 
symbolic capital, only. As stated by Khosrokhavar,  
For the Shiites it is God’s encounter that is realised by combatting an 
infidel enemy. For the nationalists and the communists, immortality is 
achieved by identification with the ‘collectivite nationale’ or by 
identification with all the poor [deprived] in the world.474 
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The Lebanese Shiʿi historian, Munthir Jaber argues that there is no 
overwhelming difference between the LCP’s and Hizbullah’s justifications 
for martyrdom acts. In Jaber’s view, the secular and Islamic resistance 
should be viewed as two overlapping political formations: 
Hezbollah is continuing the same old Leftist approach. We saw 
countless faceless and nameless martyrs in the images of the fedayeen 
[resistance fighters] produced by Palestinian resistance [in the 1960s 
and 1970s]. Even at the higher ideological level nothing really has 
changed…Hezbollah is repeating the same basic message.475 
It is interesting, and important, to note that martyrdom operations in the 
war with Israel were originally conceived under the various secular 
political frameworks extant in Lebanon, before Hizbullah. However, in the 
end, the LCP and its secular allies were far less successful on the battlefield 
than Hizbullah in 1982. The analysis now returns to the LCP’s military role 
in the 1982 LNM-led resistance against Israel, contra the new Shiʿi 
formations, Amal and Hizbullah. 
What began as an Israeli invasion of South Lebanon became, in just six 
days, a full-scale occupation of Lebanon. Israel entered Beirut, which lay 
besieged for three months. It also invaded and occupied the Shuf 
mountains for one year, until September 1983, and the Western Bekaa and 
South Lebanon for three years until June 1985.476 From the first day of 
Israel’s invasion, the PLO’s combatants were poorly prepared and fled 
their posts across South Lebanon. In West Beirut they came under fierce 
artillery bombardment from Israel for one month, before capitulating to an 
American sponsored evacuation plan. This dispersed 15,000 PLO fighters 
from Lebanon, and the PLO’s leadership relocated to Tunisia. During the 
siege, Beirut’s residents were left without electricity and water, while 
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facing daily shelling from Israel. In the northern Bekaa, the Syrian Army 
also fled after sustained heavy losses.477  
Despite the reality of the LPRF’s failures in the war with Israel, the LCP 
circulated propaganda extolling the bravery of its cadres and claiming 
victory.478 The propensity for the LCP to exaggerate its military successes 
was a continual source of frustration among its Shiʿi cadres throughout the 
Lebanese Civil War. This led to a feeling among the communist Shiʿa that 
they were exploited by the LCP, and used as ‘cannon-fodder’ for the 
party’s various battles in the war.479 In the aftermath of the 1982 war George 
Hawi acknowledged the limited achievements of the coalition, noting the 
lack of foresight and unpreparedness for Israel’s advance from the South to 
Beirut, and in to the Mountain.480 
While the LCP and its allies in the LNM continued to mount attacks against 
the Israelis, including suicide bombings, by the mid-1980s the resistance 
was increasingly becoming dominated by different Shiʿi groups. Amal’s 
resistance was initially slow to emerge. This led to internal dissent within 
Amal, with one of its Command Council members, Husayn Musawi, 
accusing the group of collaborating with Israel, and deserting its Islamic 
principles.481 Musawi then established Islamic Amal in mid-1982, which 
organised resistance activities against the invading Israeli army.482  By 1984, 
guerrilla attacks against Israeli forces were increasing, but the assailants 
were now mostly from among the Shiʿi community in Jabal ʿAmil rather 
than from the Palestinians. The Mayor of Sidon summarised opinion 
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among the southern Shiʿa at this time: ‘They invaded us to hunt 
Palestinians and have stayed to occupy our land?’483 
The emergent Shiʿi resistance carried out daring and deadly attacks against 
the Israelis and Multi-National Forces in Lebanon. In November 1982 in 
Tyre, Shaikh Ahmad Qasir drove a bomb-rigged vehicle into an Israeli 
base, killing 75 officials and soldiers. So unexpected was the attack that 
Israel insisted for many years that the explosion had been the result of a gas 
leak.484 In October 1983, a truck-bomb targeted a US marine base in Beirut, 
killing 241 soldiers. A simultaneous attack on the base of the Multi-
National Forces killed another 57 French troops. While responsibility for 
this attack was claimed by a group calling itself Islamic Jihad, it is widely 
believed to have been carried out by the factions that eventually formed the 
new Shiʿi militia, Hizbullah485. The official founding of Hizbullah occurred 
in February 1985, when the movement released its ‘Open Letter to 
Downtrodden in Lebanon and the World.’486 
Hizbullah’s rise in Lebanon signalled the emergence of a resistance 
movement against Israel whose funding, organisation and weapons were 
far superior to that of the LCP’s and Amal’s combined. Founded by a 
group of Shiʿi clerics in the Bekaa, Hizbullah was a radical Shiʿi Islamist 
militia; it sought to emulate Iran’s Revolution through the establishment of 
an Islamic State in Lebanon. Hizbullah also received military assistance and 
training from Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. The group deployed a 
sophisticated strategy against Israeli forces in South Lebanon in particular, 
targeting its local ally, the SLA, first before moving against Israeli army 
outposts. While Hizbullah also deployed suicide attacks, it is noteworthy 
that the bulk of suicide attacks carried out against Israel during this period 
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came from the LNM’s secular allies. Thus nationalist and patriotic motives 
superseded religious inspirations in the resistance against Israel.487  
The rising toll of casualties inflicted on Israel by the emergent Shiʿi-led 
resistance forced Israel’s withdrawal from most of South Lebanon in 1984. 
Israel was also unable to rely on the SLA to cover the territory it retreated 
from, testament to the success of Hizbullah’s resistance strategy.488 
The 1982 Israeli invasion triggered the expansion of the Shiʿi community’s 
mobilisation in the civil war. The LCP’s resistance activities were simply 
outclassed by the combined efforts of the new Shiʿi actors, particularly 
Amal and Hizbullah. Although the LCP can be credited with the founding 
of South Lebanon’s resistance movement, the party struggled to retain 
ownership over its nature and direction in the civil war, while the 
effectiveness of its resistance also paled in comparison to the new Shiʿi 
players. Thus, decline also came to characterise the LCP’s relationship with 
the Shiʿa in terms of the resistance directed at Israel. As the analysis now 
moves on to the final stages of the civil war, the attention of the new Shiʿi 
players shifts away from Israel toward the internal wars, with the 
consolidation of their presence among the Shiʿi community now the 
priority.  
The Internal Wars & Implications of Taif 1984–1990 
The analysis in this section details the last two events of the Lebanese Civil 
War that cemented the decline of the LCP’s relationship with the Shiʿa. The 
first issue pertains to the impact of the internal wars, during which time the 
LCP found itself targeted by the new Shiʿi players that were seeking to 
consolidate their dominance over the Shiʿi community. Numerous senior 
LCP officials, many of whom were Shiʿi members, were assassinated by 
what the LCP referred to as ‘Islamic alignments’.489 However, Amal and 
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Hizbullah also coordinated a campaign against the LCP in the latter’s Shiʿi 
stronghold areas across Beirut and South Lebanon, before eventually 
turning on each other in the War of the Camps in 1988. The combination of 
the LCP’s losses in the wider battles of the civil war and the targeted 
campaign against them towards the end of the war, decimated the party’s 
infrastructure. 
The second issue during this period constituted the final blow to the LCP’s 
political standing in Lebanon, and among its Shiʿi constituency. This was 
the Taif Accord, signed in 1989 and officially ratified by the Lebanese 
parliament in 1990. This agreement reestablished Lebanon’s confessional 
political system, according it a legitimacy that it had not received in 
Lebanon or the region in the pre-war environment. As a non-sectarian 
actor, the LCP was one of the least placed parties in Lebanon to benefit 
politically from this system. The Taif Accord effectively consolidated 
confessional identity in the Lebanese political system. This assured the 
continued ascendence of the new Shiʿi communal players, Amal and 
Hizbullah in Lebanon’s post-war political environment, to the detriment of 
the LCP’s continuing influence among the Shiʿa. 
Before the LCP came under attack by the new Shiʿi players in Lebanon, the 
party had already signalled its ambivalence toward the rise of Hizbullah in 
particular. An article written in 1985 by the Deputy Secretary-General of 
the LCP, Husayn Muruwa, outlined the ideological and political currents 
that the party should continue to resist. One of these was identified as a 
Islamic political movements.’490 Muruwa argued that in their interpretation 
of the national question, political Islamists transcended even the 
boundaries of the the Arab world, not just its individual countries. 
Muruwa claimed that in the view of Islamists, neither national nor pan-
Arab problems had any meaning unless viewed as an integral part of a 
more comprehensive entity - that is Islam, and Muslim unity. For Muruwa, 
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this reduced the concept of ‘nation ’ and ‘people’ to the (narrow) 
framework of a ‘Muslim Community.’491 
The rise of Hizbullah represented a threat to the LCP’s secular democratic 
vision for Lebanon. The LCP was wary of Hizbullah’s pursuit of an Islamic 
styled political system in Lebanon, arguing that: 
Islamic hegemony...would be a new form of exploitation and 
domination making the Islamic bourgeoisie the strongest partner, 
even though it would certainly cede part of that power to the 
Christian bourgeoise.492  
The LCP’s Central Committee’s draft report to its Fifth Congress in 1987 
further revealed the party’s anxiety that the ‘doctrinal ideology of Islamic 
hegemonists will submerge the “national” ideology of Amal.’493 In this sense 
the LCP viewed Hizbullah as an even greater threat to its interests in 
Lebanon than Amal. However, the LCP’s public pronouncements against 
Islamic political movements may have precipitated the targeted 
assassinations initiated against the LCP by radical Shiʿi Islamist militants 
towards the end of the civil war. 
In February 1987, two years after Husayn Muruwa's earlier comments were 
published, he was assassinated in his home. Muruwa had also been a 
writer and editor of the newspaper al-Tariq as well as a professor of 
Philosophy at the Lebanese University.494 He was aged 78 when he was 
killed. Another top LCP Shiʿi figure, Mahdi ʿAmil, one of the the most well-
regarded Marxist thinkers in the Arab world was also assassinated on 18th 
May 1987.495 These were some of the high-profile assassinations of ʿAmil 
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communists during the war. The LCP received numerous written threats 
signed by various ‘Islamist’ groups in South Lebanon:  
In the name of Allah, the Most Merciful the Most Kind 
You must leave the south, otherwise you will be killed for numerous 
reasons: because you are atheists, traitors, unbelievers, and because 
you are hypocrites. And because you are abusing both Islam and the 
believers. And this has dire consequences.    
 The Organisation of Imam Husayn, January 1986 
In the name of Allah, The Communist Party, under the guise of the 
socialist movement: your activities are exposed and all your 
movements known. Stop all your activity otherwise you are exposing 
yourself to danger.       
 The Security of the South April 1986496 
In 1984 fifty-two LCP members were kidnapped and murdered.497 Several 
more party officials were killed between 1986 and 1988 including Khalil 
Na’us, a senior party official based in West Beirut and Suhayl Tawilah, 
editor-in-chief of the LCP daily, al-Tariq.498 
In addition to the attacks against the LCP by radical Islamists, Amal also 
bore responsibility for LCP losses at this time. In January 1986 another LCP 
official, Michel Wahid was killed after being held captive by Amal for more 
than two months.499 One hundred LCP members were arrested by Amal in 
South Lebanon in February 1986, supposedly to prevent ‘unauthorised 
military activities’ against Israel.500  Clashes between the LCP and Amal 
subsequently broke out in West Beirut, resulting in the arrest of further 
LCP officials in Beirut and the south. The clashes with Amal inflicted heavy 
casualties on the LCP. A former Shiʿi member of the LCP remarked that the 
party viewed these episodes with Amal as an existential battle:  
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A week or ten days prior there was a lot of talking that Amal and the 
Syrians planned to eradicate the Communist Party and expel it 
forever from Beirut…I was in charge of mobilising people to fight. If 
Amal was going to attack the Arab University and take control of the 
Communist Party headquarters, we would be exiled from the area. 
There was something personal about it.501 
While Hizbullah advocated an Islamist ideology and opposed secularism in 
principle, this is not a sufficient explanation for why the LCP in particular, 
came to be targeted by the movement at the end of the war. The LCP was 
not the only advocate of a secular political agenda in Lebanon, nor was it 
ever the most powerful secular political party in Lebanon. Thus the LCP 
did not constitute a significant threat to Hizbullah’s agenda. In this sense, 
secular-Islamist dichotomies arguably played a limited role in these events. 
The written threats received by the LCP in South Lebanon were therefore 
more likely to have come from other radical armed Shiʿi elements at this 
time. Hizbullah’s motivation, like Amal’s, is more convincingly explained 
by the efforts of these organisations to consolidate their presence among 
the Shiʿa community. Since the LCPs relationship with the Shiʿa was well 
known,    this explains why the LCP was indeed viewed as a rival by the 
new Shiʿi players. Thus, both Hizbullah and Amal found common cause, 
for a short time, in eliminating a shared competitor among the Shiʿa. 
Indeed, some of the most devastating attacks on the LCP occurred when 
Hizbullah and Amal coordinated their attacks. 
In February of 1988 Hizbullah and Amal forces jointly attacked the LCP’s 
headquarters in West Beirut. This offensive targeted the offices of the LCP’s 
al-Nida publication too. One report indicated that thirty-two LCP members 
were killed in these attacks while a further seventeen were kidnapped. 
Other sources put the toll at one hundred and eighty dead and three 
hundred and eighty wounded. The LCP was unable to prevent this 
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continued assault; the attacks only ceased after the LCP requested 
assistance from its allies in the LNM.502  
The LCP suffered greatly from the unity of newly emergent Shiʿi forces in 
the civil war. The campaign was organised, well planned and targeted 
some of the LCP’s most prominent and important intellectual voices; 
among them were the party’s only senior Shiʿi officials. By the end of the 
war, the LCP had suffered significant political, military and infrastructural 
losses. This was partially a result of the LCP’s own strategic errors in the 
war, but also the result of the rise of powerful competitors from the Shiʿi 
community in the form of Amal and Hizbullah. The LCP’s relationship 
with the Shiʿa was not able to withstand the sectarianisation effect of the 
civil war. These identities eventually coalesced around territory, igniting 
fierce internal battles for the consolidation of sectarian fiefdoms. The 
clashes between the LCP and Amal in West Beirut resulted in the departure 
of several communist Shiʿi members from the party.503 The feeling within 
the LCP was that these battles definitively indicated the LCP’s loss of 
purpose in the war: 
From 1982 onwards, after the Israeli invasion, there were the battles in 
Dahiyeh [Southern suburbs of Beirut], then in the mountains, then the 
battles in the north, then battles between Amal movement and us, 
then with Hizbullah. Battles over territorial demarcation. Each battle 
spilled into the next one. And we reached a point, where sectarian 
affiliations against one another were consolidated. When I think back now, 
I feel we were being manipulated in many ways by sects…In my 
opinion, the Communist Party was itself being used in these battles by one 
sect against the other. [Emphasis added].504 
The event which ultimately sealed the LCP’s political fate in Lebanon at the 
end of the civil war was the Taif Agreement. The Accord effectively re-
legitimised the system of confessional politics in Lebanon, albeit on a more 
equitable basis between the two main religious communities, Christian and 
Muslim. The agreement enhanced the position of the Prime Minister (a 
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Sunni Muslim post), as well as that of the Speaker (a Shiʿi post), thereby 
reducing some of the powers of the Presidency, and introducing a greater 
consultative role for the Council of Ministers and National Assembly505 The 
Speaker’s tenure in office was extended from one to four years. This 
strengthened the role of the Shiʿa in Lebanese politics, no longer subjecting 
this position to the restrictions imposed by just a one-year term.506 However, 
for the LCP, the maintenance, indeed strengthening, of confessional 
representation in the new constitution was a blow to the party’s long 
fought opposition to the sectarian system. Although the Accord stated that 
the abolition of political sectarianism was a national goal, it did not set a 
deadline or schedule for this process.507  
Although the LCP was on the right side of the conflict at the end of the civil 
war - meaning that it was an ally of Syria and supporter of the 1985 
Tripartite Agreement, the LCP was not rewarded any Cabinet posts or 
representation in government.508  The LCP also failed to make any gains in 
the first post-war elections in 1992, or thereafter. Politics in post-war 
Lebanon no longer revolved around a stark division between a right-wing 
government elite and the ideological parties of the left. Politics was now the 
main purview of the President, the Cabinet, the loyal political parties and 
the opposition directed against what would become Syria’s long-term 
presence in Lebanon.509  
Amal took advantage of the political gains accrued to the Shiʿa by the Taif 
Accord, dominating both the Speakership and the Council of the South, the 
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two main Shiʿi political institutions. As the Lebanese state and its 
institutions reformed after the war, the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ’ also re-emerged in 
the political sphere. 510  Hizbullah was the only anti-system party that 
remained among the Shiʿa in the immediate aftermath of the war, though it 
too transformed into a fully participatory political party in the 1992 
legislative elections. 
In the post-war sectarian political environment, the LCP’s anti-system 
agenda no longer had any purchase.511 The new political environment also 
constrained the labour movement, one of the LCP’s traditional sources of 
strength and mobility in Lebanon. 512  Disagreement among the party 
leadership, and intolerance toward any form of internal party dissent 
further mired the LCP’s activities in the aftermath of the civil war. The 
party’s centralised organisational structure meant that the leadership could 
always dominate decision-making, despite disagreement within the 
membership. This lead to further dissent, and the departure of many 
members, evidenced by the decreasing number of attendees at the party 
conferences. 513  A Shiʿi communist, ‘Commander Abed’ described his 
departure from the party in this environment:  
The resistance was at a very low point…The party’s infrastructure, 
because of the war, had not been renewed institutionally, nor was the 
methodology, I witnessed corruption become rampant with 
individuals…I left. I moved away and lived by the sea, never again 
mixed with the communists or non-communists…In 1995, I left 
behind anything that had to do with the party…I wanted to live like 
an everyday citizen.514 
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Conclusion	  
This chapter argued that the Lebanese Civil War was the main arena in 
which the relationship between the LCP and the communist Shiʿa 
transformed, and sectarian identities emerged in earnest among the Shiʿa. 
Rather than linking the latter development primarily to events that were 
external to Lebanon - such as the disappearance of Musa al-Sadr and the 
Iranian Revolution - the analysis argued that the rise of the new Shiʿi 
sectarian players should also be associated with the domestic political 
environment in Lebanon during the civil war. The chapter proceeded to 
analyse the effects of the Lebanese Civil War on political life in Lebanon, 
focussing on the impact of the breakdown of the state, the resultant 
security environment and the sectarianisation of identities. The analysis 
then provided a chronology of the main events of the civil war, before 
revisiting its key stages with a view to establishing the factors that led to 
the decline of the LCP, and its relationship with the communist Shiʿa. In the 
end, the LCP suffered a crisis of legitimacy in the war as a result of its 
participation in the sectarian violence and its poorly calculated political 
and military decision making. Instead of delivering on its political and 
security pledges to the Shiʿa, the LCP came to be perceived as exploitative 
of both its Shiʿi members and the Shiʿi residents who resided in its 
strongholds during the war. Amal capitalised on the growing disaffection 
among the Shiʿa with the LCP and its allies, and promoted itself as a more 
effective provider of communal security. Amal forcibly removed the LCP 
from its territorial strongholds in South Lebanon. In addition, Hizbullah 
emerged with a superior military capability to the LCP, and mounted an 
effective resistance effort against Israel in 1982. Towards the end of the war, 
Amal and Hizbullah launched a coordinated campaign of assassination 
against the LCP, targeting its top personnel and offices across Lebanon in 
what was arguably a battle for the Shiʿa between the three most powerful 
political actors among the community.  
The fall of the LCP in the civil war was compounded by the political 
ramifications of the Taif Accord in its aftermath. The sectarian political 
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system received renewed legitimacy from the domestic, regional and 
international support that underlay the agreement. After suffering multiple 
political and military strategic defeats in the war, the LCP was in decline 
and the new Shiʿi political players were poised to reap the benefits of the 
loss of their main rival for the mobilisation of the Shiʿi community. The 
arguments in this chapter demonstrate that the rise of sectarian identities 
among the Shiʿa occurred in the Lebanese Civil War - and not before. 
Furthermore, it has been shown that the rise of the new secular political 
actors among the Shiʿa was directly predicated on the decline of the LCP’s 
influence over the Shiʿa in the domestic political environment of the 
Lebanese Civil War. 
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Chapter 5 ~ Dilemmas of Identity 
among the Communist Shiʿa 
The decline of the LCP in the aftermath of the Lebanese Civil War initiated 
identity dilemmas among the former communist Shiʿa as they sought a 
new vehicle for the mobilisation of their resistance identity. The different 
conceptualisations of the resistance identity offered by the LCP and 
Hizbullah was the main source of these dilemmas. While the LCP’s 
resistance was decidedly secular, encompassing a political reformist, anti-
sectarian agenda for Lebanon, Hizbullah’s resistance was sectarian and 
only singularly orientated toward the armed struggle against Israel. In this 
sense, Hizbullah’s resistance identity did not contain an agenda for 
political reform in Lebanon that was comparable to the LCP’s pre-1975 
vision. A comparative assessment of the ideologies, political programmes 
and social composition of Amal and Hizbullah reveals that across these 
criteria, Hizbullah emerged as the preferred alternative among the former 
communist Shiʿa. This is based on Hizbullah’s adoption, reformulation and 
monopolisation of the Shiʿi community’s resistance identity.  
This chapter argues that in the aftermath of the collapse of communism and 
the LCP in Lebanon, the political trajectory of the former communist Shiʿa 
shifted toward Hizbullah and its reformulated conceptualisation of the 
resistance identity.  
This chapter begins by exploring the nature of the identity dilemmas 
experienced by the former communist Shiʿi. The alternative options 
represented by the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ and the new sectarian actors, Amal and 
Hizbullah, are assessed from the perspective of the former communists. 
The analysis then moves on to explain why Hizbullah, contra Amal, 
became the preference for the former communists. The chapter concludes 
with an overview of the legacy of communism among the Shiʿa in terms of 
the continued relevance of the resistance identity to the political 
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mobilisation of the Shiʿi, as well as the enduring relationship between the 
LCP and the Shiʿi in present day Lebanon. 
Identity Dilemmas 
The decline of the LCP and the emergence of Shiʿi sectarian alternatives 
presented the communist Shiʿa with difficult dilemmas over their political 
identities and future avenues for political mobilisation. Interviews from the 
documentary film, Shiyuʿiyyin Kunna offer interesting insights into these 
issues, and in particular the reluctance of the former communists to 
embrace the reality of political sectarianism in Lebanon. In this sense, 
despite there being powerful alternatives for the Shiʿi communists after the 
civil war, it was precisely because these alternatives were distinctly ‘Shiʿi’ 
options, that they were viewed with apprehension - ‘the problem is you go 
back to your Shiʿi sect, you go back to Hizbullah.’ 515  This further 
underscores how important the LCP’s anti-system, anti-confessional, 
political agenda had been to the party’s successful recruitment of Shiʿi 
members in Lebanon’s post-independence period. Ibrahim al-Amin’s 
comments suggest that membership of the LCP allowed the Shiʿi to leave 
their sectarian identity at the door:  
Basically when we entered party headquarters, it was if there was a 
safety deposit box into which we unburdened from our sect…and 
placed them in safe keeping. Then we melted inside the party.516  
Although sectarian identity did not determine or indeed prevent 
membership of the LCP, it is important to recall that the party still 
deployed recruitment strategies vis a vis the Shiʿa that invoked precisely 
their Shiʿi identity. Thus, even for the communist Shiʿa, their sectarian 
identity remained an active element on their identity repertoires. The 
difference therefore, between a Shiʿi member of the LCP and a Shiʿi 
member of Hizbullah, is the position of the individual’s sectarian identity 
                                                
515 Quoted in, Maher Abi Samra, Shiyuʿiyyin Kunna, documentary film, 2010. 
516 Maher Abi Samra, Shiyuʿiyyin Kunna, documentary film, 2010. 
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on that repertoire - more prominent for the Hizbullah member than for the 
communist.  The relative and changeable positioning of different identities 
is not a unique feature of identity, however. The analysis in chapter one 
showed how all individuals possess a variety of identities, and that the 
dominance of one identity over another is determined by environmental 
factors. Thus, in the case of the communist Shiʿa who left the LCP, the 
world outside communism, which in post-war Lebanon was decidedly 
sectarian, triggered a re-ordering of political identities. Thus al-Amin 
metaphorically describes the process of reluctantly becoming Shiʿi (or 
sectarian) again:  
When the party collapsed and we left, each one of us collected their 
deposits and went back home. Each person went back a communist 
but also a Shiʿite, or Shiʿite communist or Christian communist or 
Druze communist, back to being influenced by the same calculations.517 
To be clear, this transition from communism to sectarianism was not a 
unilinear process. As the case of Commander Abed demonstrated, some 
communist Shiʿa retired from an active political life altogether. For others,  
financial or familial priorities also contributed to a personal shift away 
from politics, and a grudging acceptance of the new sectarian reality. Ali 
Abed, describes how his acquisition of employment in the post-war 
political environment was determined by sectarian quotas and communal 
attachments:  
I heard there were openings for positions in the public sector…After I 
applied, it took almost a year and a half before I was appointed. The 
delay was due to changes in government. It is a place like any other, 
in government…It has to obey the logic of sectarian quota… Nine of 
us were appointed, practically and effectively, the nine of us were 
affiliated to someone.518 
For the communist Shiʿa who sought to remain politically active, the main 
alternatives to the LCP were either Amal or Hizbullah. The zuʿamaʾ also 
experienced a reawakening in the aftermath of the civil war. The analysis 
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now moves on assess these and the other available options, and their 
relative appeal among the former communist Shiʿa. 
The Shiʿi Alternatives 
The consolidation of political sectarianism in Lebanon after Taif facilitated 
a return to political life for the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ, who had been rendered 
obsolete during the Lebanese Civil War. The analysis in this section begins 
by analysing the political status of the zuʿamaʾ during and after the war. 
While the zuʿamaʾ remerged after Taif, they did not represent a viable 
option for the former communist Shiʿa. They were still objected to for the 
same reasons they did not meet the criteria for mobilising a resistance 
identity in the post-1943 political environment. The new Shiʿi options, 
Amal and Hizbullah were the main recipients of the former communists. 
The analysis compares and contrasts Amal and Hizbullah as as political 
alternatives to the LCP in Lebanon’s post-war environment. The 
comparison is made across four main areas, including: political identity 
and ideology, territorial basis, social composition and political programme. 
The analysis demonstrates that both Amal and Hizbullah replicated and 
reformulated aspects of the LCP’s pre-war political agenda, which had 
previously been essential to the party’s successful recruitment of the 
communist Shiʿa. 
The Fall and Rise of the Shiʿi Zuʿamaʾ 
In chapter two the analysis demonstrated that the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ were their 
most effective in the formal political sphere, where they developed a strong 
ability to contest and win elections. However, the breakdown of the state in 
the context of the Lebanese Civil War disrupted the traditional sources of 
zuʿamaʾ political power as Lebanon’s political institutions ceased to 
function. As the intensity of militia violence increased throughout the 
conflict, an additional challenge to the Shiʿi political families arose in the 
arena of military capability. These two factors combined to severely erode 
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the capabilities of the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ, rendering them the weaker of the 
myriad Shiʿi political actors in the war. 
The traditional intermediary function of the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ could not be 
deployed in the absence of the government’s political institutions. This role 
was adopted by the political parties, and subsequently the militias. Thus 
the zuʿamaʾ suffered a significant loss of influence and legitimacy among 
their clients. The status of the Shiʿi political families was further influenced 
by the Syrian presence in Lebanon. As Syria’s power-brokers became 
crucial political players in Lebanon, their relationship with the zuʿamaʾ 
became an additional determinant of the latter’s political status. Kemal al-
Asʿad’s decision to support the American sponsored peace attempt 
between Lebanon and Israel in 1983, which failed, lost him the support of 
both Syria and his Shiʿi constituency. This was a miscalculation that had a 
lasting impact on al-Asʿad’s political status thereafter - in 1983 he lost his 
position as Speaker of Parliament to Amal’s candidate, Husayn al-
Hussayni.519  
The zuʿamaʾ established their own armed strongmen during the war, and 
the larger entities, including the al-Asʿad and Khalil families both had their 
own militias. However, their military capacity was limited in comparison 
to their emergent Shiʿi rivals, Amal and Hizbullah who were better 
equipped and externally resourced by Syria and Iran respectively. The 
Palestinian fighters in South Lebanon also had superior military capability 
to the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ. In fact, the Palestinian resistance was a direct threat to 
the status of the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ in their traditional areas of influence during 
the war. While Kazem al-Khalil’s outspoken anti-Palestinian views won 
him political favour at the national political level, locally, his views led to 
clashes with the PLO. Al-Khalil was forced to flee his native Tyre in 1970, 
while the PLO took over the municipality, previously an important tool of 
this family’s political influence. Other notable political families experienced 
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similar circumstances. In Nabatiyya the al-Zayn family was uprooted by 
both the PLO and their leftist allies, as were the Beydouns in Bint Jbeil. The 
situation for the al-Asʿad family in Taybeh was worse; the family’s villa 
and traditional symbol of their dominance was taken over by the PLO and 
became their regional headquarters. While Adil ʿUsayran continued to live 
in his domain of Sidon, the neighbouring building was occupied by the 
commander of Palestinian forces in the city, demonstrating who really was 
in control of the area.520  
As formal politics in Lebanon disintegrated, the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ lost their 
most powerful tool of influence in their communities. As the security of 
their regions also deteriorated, they lost an additional source of power - 
their ability to protect their local communities. Control over South Lebanon 
fell under the purview of the various Palestinian and leftist militias. The 
political families lacked both the numbers and sophisticated weaponry to 
prevent this development. Indeed the weakness of the Shiʿi political 
families’ military capability contrasted with that of Lebanon’s other 
zuʿamaʾ. While the Jumblatt’s dominated the Druze community’s fighting 
capability, the Maronite Jumayill and Sham’un families also led powerful 
militias, the Phalanges and Numur. The latter also joined forces with other 
militias to form the Lebanese Front.  The Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ were also unable to 
deploy their traditional alliances with other Shiʿi political families since 
many were forced to flee their areas of territorial control. The continued 
mass migration of the Shiʿa to the cities (more than 141,000 between 1975-
1982) further eroded the social networks that had supplied the zuʿamaʾ 
with influence.521  
The collapse of the Lebanese state removed both authority and resources 
from the Shiʿi political families. These functions were seized by the militias 
and deployed with the aid of their superior fighting capability. However, 
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the political environment instituted at the end of the civil war facilitated 
the eventual return of the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ to political life. 
Although the Taif Accord stabilised the political balance of power between 
the Muslim and Christian communities of Lebanon, it consolidated 
Lebanon’s consociational political system and its underlying sectarian 
power sharing mechanisms. This, coupled with the removal of the 
Palestinian and leftist militias (including the LCP’s) from Shiʿi areas, 
enabled the Shiʿi political families to return from exile. However, unlike 
Lebanon’s other zuʿamaʾ, the Shiʿi political families had two new 
competitors in the form of Amal and Hizbullah. This has placed a check on 
the unbridled power of the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ, although they have benefited 
from Israeli efforts to shore up their power as a counterweight to Amal and 
Hizbullah.522 The strength of the zuʿamaʾ remains in the Bekaa, traditionally 
a more tribal and conservative Shiʿi community than the Shiʿa of Jabal 
‘Amil. Both Amal and Hizbullah have been forced to reluctantly engage 
with the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ in the Bekaa, particularly for the purposes of 
winning elections. Thus, Hizbullah has formed joint-lists with prominent 
zuʿamaʾ and Amal candidates in the Bekaa Valley. 
The return of the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ to the formal political sphere did not 
increase their chances of attracting the political loyalties of the former 
communist Shiʿa. Their perception of the political families as self-serving 
and corrupt was only heightened by their collaboration with Israel during 
and after the Lebanese Civil War. To the communist Shiʿa the zuʿamaʾ 
remained symbolic of the problems associated with political sectarianism in 
Lebanon. The LCP’s appeal, it should be recalled, lay not in its ability to 
win at the ballot box but in its rejection of the sectarian political system that 
facilitated the power of the zuʿamaʾ among others. The Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ 
therefore remain furthest from the conceptualisation of the resistance 
identity that was formulated by the communist Shiʿa. Thus, in order to 
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follow the political trajectory of the communist Shiʿa after Taif, the analysis 
must turn to Amal and Hizbullah. 
Amal and Hizbullah: Political Identity and Ideology 
In terms of political identity, neither Amal nor Hizbullah represent anti-
system political parties. In this regard, they constitute a significant 
departure from the LCP’s conceptualisation of a resistance identity. 
Nevertheless, a contradiction persists in both cases with regard to their 
position on the confessional political system. While both charters of the 
parties advocate the abolishment of political sectarianism in Lebanon, as 
political actors who participate in elections and are represented in various 
state institutions, Amal and Hizbullah seek integration within the national 
Lebanese framework as Shiʿa’. Amal and Hizbullah therefore seek to gain 
access to the privileges accorded the Shiʿa by the Lebanese state.  
Although Hizbullah emerged as a virulently anti-system party in the civil 
war, its decision to participate in the Lebanese elections of 1992 saw the 
party gradually reduce its pursuit of an Islamic-styled political system in 
Lebanon. 523  This marked the beginning of Hizbullah’s integration into 
Lebanon’s national political framework. Thereafter the party successfully 
ran in elections, winning parliamentary seats and acquiring Cabinet-level 
appointments. 
Amal has a longer history of pursuing an integrationist agenda than 
Hizbullah. Indeed, Amal’s stance began with Musa al-Sadr in the Charter 
of the Movement of the Deprived, where Sadr expressed the demands of 
the Shiʿi community for a share in Beirut’s prosperity.  Amal’s 
preparedness to accept the constitutional document prepared by the 
Maronite President, Suleiman Franjiyyeh in 1976, also shows Amal’s 
willingness to accept proposals that would not have significantly altered 
Lebanon’s confessional dynamics at the political level. The leader of Amal 
since 1980, Nabih Berri, held various government posts, including Minister 
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of Justice and a post created exclusively for him, Minister of South 
Lebanon, between 1984 and 1988.524  In 1992 he became the Speaker of 
Parliament, a post he still holds today.  The reforms heralded by the Taif 
Accord in 1989 further consolidated Amal’s position in the political system, 
considered by the party’s elite who benefitted from these changes, as 
victory for ‘consociational democracy.’525 Since Amal benefits greatly from 
the confessional political system, it is unlikely that the party would ever 
pursue its charter’s pledge to abolish political sectarianism, since this 
would erode a signifiant component of Amal’s political power.  
Ideologically, Amal is a Shiʿi party with a secular nationalist political 
ideology. Although Amal’s charter calls for a separation between religion 
and sectarianism, it also contains references to Imam Ali, the highly 
revered Shiʿi Imam as well as Musa al-Sadr’s religious political ideas. Amal 
does therefore have a religious identity, which it has conserved for 
legitimacy purposes in order to be able to compete with the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ, 
as well as  Hizbullah.526  
By contrast to Amal’s relegated religious identity, Hizbullah is a Shiʿi party 
with an Islamic nationalist political ideology. It emerged ostensibly as an 
Islamic resistance movement against American hegemony and Israeli 
occupation. Hizbullah’s first manifesto, which was published on February 
16, 1985 expounded a doctrinal ideology that sought to emulate Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s Wilayat al-Faqih, or Guardianship of the Jurisprudent.527 This 
was the primary justification for the party’s pursuit of an Islamic state in 
Lebanon. Hizbullah’s second manifesto illustrated a shift in this political 
objective - since Hizbullah by this time had become an active political 
player in Lebanon, and no longer identified the pursuit of an Islamic state 
in Lebanon as a key objective. However, the party maintained that this did 
not mean it had abandoned wilayat al-faqih, only that this did not prevent 
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Islamists from integrating with Lebanon’s political system. 528   This is 
indicative of Hizbullah’s ability to adapt its ideological and political 
objectives while claiming to still adhere to its doctrinal foundations. The 
political identities and ideologies of Amal and Hizbullah are therefore also 
markedly different from the LCP’s communism and civic-national, non-
confessional political ambitions for Lebanon. 
Amal and Hizbullah: Strongholds & Social Composition 
Moving on to territorial strongholds, it is worth recalling the battles over 
territorial demarcation that occurred between the LCP, Amal and 
Hizbullah during the Lebanese Civil War. The LCP lost much of its 
territorial dominance over the Shiʿa in Jabal ʿAmil, the Bekaa and suburbs 
of Beirut, first to Amal, and later to Hizbullah. Hizbullah’s advances in 
Lebanon between 1985 and 1989 occurred at the expense of Amal’s 
territorial gains over the LCP. Thus, Hizbullah first established bases in 
Baalbek, before expanding to the southern suburbs of Beirut (al-Dahiya), 
which remains a stronghold today. 529  Hizbullah and Amal have both 
retained significant followings in different areas of the Bekaa and Jabal 
‘Amil. Amal tends to draw more of a following than Hizbullah in Tyre, 
along the coast. 
Conventionally, Amal’s following is associated with the Shiʿi middle-class 
bourgeoise in Beirut and wealthy expatriate Shiʿi communities, particularly 
those in West Africa.530 This is contrasted with Hizbullah’s poor, working 
class and clerical following. 531  The characterisation of Amal is mostly 
accurate. It was founded by university-educated Shiʿa who had 
experienced some upward mobility in Beirut in the 1950s. The vast majority 
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of its early members were lawyers, who formed most of Amal’s politburo, 
including its Secretary-General since 1982, Nabih Berri. Amal also drew a 
small number of clerical figures. Despite the movement’s association with 
Musa al-Sadr, clerics were always the minority in Amal. Many of its 
adherents were also described as ‘secular clerics’, i.e those influenced by 
Musa al-Sadr’s political project of achieving greater Shiʿi representation in 
accordance with the sectarian logic of the Lebanese political system.532  
The conventional association of Hizbullah with the clerics and the poor, 
however, is more problematic. Although the movement’s leadership was 
and remains almost exclusively dominated by high-ranking clerical figures, 
the social composition of Hizbullah is far broader than this image implies. 
Hizbullah emerged with a large following among the Shiʿi poor, which 
remained the case for the first decade of the party’s existence. However, 
thereafter, the party’s social basis began to expand, attracting a significant 
component of middle-classes, professionals and intellectuals. Lebanese 
migrants from West Africa, traditionally associated with Amal, also became 
a significant component of Hizbullah’s support, in terms of members and 
finance.  
The religiosity of Hizbullah’s membership tends to be assumed rather than 
demonstrated. Harik’s study of Hizbullah’s base showed its members to be 
less religious than is assumed, with religiosity only modestly linked to Shiʿi 
political preferences more generally. In addition Hizbullah’s appeal was 
found to be broad-based and mixed-class, incorporating many 
professionals, lawyers, engineers and teachers. Hizbullah’s membership 
was not overwhelmingly associated with followers of a particularly low 
socio-economic status.533 In this sense, Hizbullah’s Shiʿi following contained 
a similar mix of classes and social groups to the LCP’s. 
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Amal and Hizbullah: Political Programmes 
One of the explanations for Hizbullah’s broader social base can be found in 
its political and socioeconomic programme. In the aftermath of the 
Lebanese Civil War, Hizbullah sought to consolidate its long-term position 
within the Shiʿi community. The destruction wrought by the war produced 
a levelling effect among the Shiʿi population. To this end Hizbullah 
implemented an extensive range of social, educational, medical and relief 
projects. The party used tanker trucks to regularly deliver drinking water 
to almost all of the southern suburbs half a million residents. This was a 
vital service due to the city’s damaged water-distribution system. 534 
Hizbullah’s agricultural engineers provided services to Shiʿi farmers in the 
Bekaa, as well as landowners and tenant farmers. Thus, Hizbullah did not 
discriminate in terms of class in its service provision among the Shiʿa.535 In 
this sense, too, Hizbullah was delivering much needed services and 
development to the Shiʿa, particularly in the agricultural sector. These were 
services and reforms long promised to the Shiʿa by the LCP, but never 
delivered upon. 
In addition to Hizbullah’s service provision, the party’s consistent support 
for the Palestinians inside Lebanon, and successful military mobilisations 
against Israel were a further source of the party’s broad-based Shiʿi 
following. Hizbullah came to the defence of Beirut’s Palestinians when they 
came under attack by Amal in the War of the Camps. Hizbullah’s 
contribution of military aid and medical relief also drew the party support 
from among the peasantry and Shiʿi migrants in Beirut.  
As Hizbullah became engaged in economic projects, the party increasingly 
drew additional support from the Shiʿi emigrants to West Africa. This 
support increasingly came in the form of significant monetary donations 
from wealthy Shiʿi businessmen. In this sense, the conventional argument 
made about Hizbullah being beholden to Iran for military and financial aid 
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is inaccurate. Financially, Hizbullah is believed to accrue the majority of its 
income from the wealthy Shiʿi diaspora of West Africa, and elsewhere in 
the world, as well as the party’s own fundraising initiatives in Lebanon and 
abroad.536 
Hizbullah’s more cohesive organisation, service provision and resistance 
agenda has rendered the party far more popular among the communist 
Shiʿa than Amal. Whereas Hizbullah’s network has reached a much wider 
swathe of the Shiʿi community, Amal has struggled to convince the 
communist Shiʿa that they will benefit from political and economic 
opportunities provided by the government. Amal’s pursuit of political 
appointments accrued the party control over the government’s largest Shiʿi 
institution, the Council of the South. This receives millions of dollars in 
government expenditure, which is politically controlled by Amal, whose 
leaders are frequently the first to benefit. Although Amal continues to be a 
powerful political player in the Shiʿi community, there is a popular 
perception among many that views Amal as incompetent, corrupt and 
arrogant in its political dealings. 537  Furthermore, while Amal’s charter 
decries Zionism and Israeli repression, the memory of Amal’s siege of the 
Palestinian camps in Beirut, as well as its delayed mobilisation against the 
invading Israeli forces in the 1980s, further delegitimised the party in the 
view of many former communists. 
The analysis in this section has compared and contrasted the political 
alternatives available to the communist Shiʿa in the aftermath of the 
Lebanese Civil War. This included the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ, Amal and Hizbullah. 
The suitability of the zuʿamaʾ was immediately dismissed, though the 
                                                
536 Harik, ‘Between Islam and the System’, 63; Douglas Farah, ‘Hezbollah’s External Support 
Network in West Africa and Latin America’, International Assessment and Strategy Centre, 
4th August 2006; Ana Maria Luca, ‘Hezbollah’s Wallet’, 15th December 
2011<https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/reportsfeatures/hezbollahs_wallet_>; Carl Wege, 
‘Hizballah in Africa’, Perspectives on Terrorism, 6:3, 2012. 
537  Elizabeth Picard, ‘The Lebanese Shiʿa’, 44; Wikileaks documents also highlight a 
collection of quotes and sources referring  to Amal’s corruption in Lebanon. See for 
example, ‘What’s Wrong with Amal?’ Wikileaks Cable, 30 November 2004,– 
<https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04BEIRUT4941_a.html> (1 January 2015) 
  240 
reemergence of their political power in Lebanon was noted. Amal and 
Hizbullah were compared and contrasted in terms of their relative appeal 
to the communist Shiʿa. A number of the points developed here need to be 
taken forward to help explain why Hizbullah became the preferred choice 
of the communist Shiʿa. These are firstly, Hizbullah’s more nuanced and 
strategic integration with the Lebanese political system, contra Amal’s 
entreating approach toward the Lebanese state. Secondly, Hizbullah’s 
expansive programme of social service provision. Thirdly, Hizbullah’s 
consistent support for the Palestinians, and more sophisticated resistance 
strategy. Fourthly - and most importantly for the remaining analysis - 
Hizbullah’s broad-based social basis of support among the Shiʿa, which 
also encompasses members with lower levels of religiosity, or non-
practicing Muslims. These factors are important preliminary indicators for 
why the shift from the LCP’s communism to Hizbullah’s Islamism was 
possible. 
Toward Hizbullah 
The analysis in this section offers some preliminary insights into why 
Hizbullah became the preferred alternative to the LCP among many of the 
communist Shiʿa. Interviews and conversations in the field, as well as 
additional evidence from the documentary film, Shiyuʿiyyin Kunna, 
produced a number of references to either the presence of communists in 
Hizbullah, or sympathies toward Hizbullah’s political agenda. The 
discussion in this section offers some preliminary explanations for why this 
happened. Three lines of inquiry are proffered. The first explanation relates 
to a historical precedence. The analysis posits that the interest of the Shiʿi 
clerics in communism in the 1960s, inverted in the 1980s, and the Shiʿi 
communists became intrigued by Islamic thought once more. The second 
explanation pertains to the evolution of Hizbullah’s political agenda in 
Lebanon, which coopted many of the features of the LCP’s pre-1975 
political agenda that had appealed to the Shiʿa. The third and related 
explanation pertains to Hizbullah’s resistance identity, and how this 
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particular issue consolidated communist sympathy for the party. These 
three issues are examined concurrently below. 
The decline of communism in Lebanon occurred in line with a regional 
ideological shift away from secular ideas. This occurred in the aftermath of 
the great Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel, and the subsequent crisis 
of legitimacy suffered by Arab nationalist thought. Thereafter, political 
ideology in the Middle East became more involved with Islamist critiques. 
The Iranian Revolution constitutes the symbolic ascendence of political 
Islam in the Middle East, although Arab intellectuals had also begun to 
engage with Islamic nationalist ideas before 1979.538  The collapse of the 
Soviet Union in the late 1980s was the second symbolic indicator of 
communism’s decline; the loss of an important source of ideological, 
moreover, financial support also prefigured in the multiple problems the 
LCP was experiencing by this time. However, the emergent political 
Islamists engaged with Islamic tradition in almost an identical fashion to 
that of their communist predecessors. 
Multiple Shiʿi clerics, from Iraq’s Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, to Lebanon’s 
Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli, Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah and Ayatollah 
Muhammad Fadlallah, have engaged in the same dialectical discourse 
between Islamic and secular ideas that they previously criticised the 
communists for. Leftist political slogans appear in their discourse too, 
including references to the ‘toiling masses’, ‘shameless class-based order’539, 
as well as the mahrumin (deprived), ‘downtrodden’, mustakbirun 
(oppressors) and mustad’afun (oppressed).540 Fadlallah’s usage of harakiyya 
al-waqi (perpetual transformation of reality) through jihad against an unjust 
power is a discussion inspired by Marxist thought on the role of the 
proletariat in the ‘negation of social reality’. In Fadlallah’s reading, reality 
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can be transformed spiritually rather than materially.541 In this sense the 
juxtaposition of communism with Islamism is not as stark as it is 
conventionally imagined. The Islamists engaged in a dualistic re-
appropriation of key elements of Marxist and Islamic thought and 
symbolism, and in the regional ideological environment described above, 
many leftists followed suit. The fluidity of relations between the Shiʿi 
clerics and Marxism are illustrated by the remarks of one of the sons of the 
prominent ‘Red Cleric’, Sayyid Muhsin al-Amin: ’Muslim clerics drove me 
to the path of Marxism and those who brought me back to religion and 
Islam were the communists themselves.’542  
The affinity between the Shiʿa and communism, as well as their shared 
disposition toward Islamic political thought, partly explains why the 
transition from communism to Islamism among the Lebanese Shiʿa was a 
definite possibility. Ibrahim al-Amin, once a Shiʿi communist and now the 
editor of the Lebanese daily al-Akhbar considered to be a mouthpiece for 
Hizbullah communications, expresses how his attraction to Hizbullah 
occurred on the basis of the latter’s appeal to his Shiʿi religious identity: 
It was the first time someone called me ‘Sayyid’. It was no longer 
comrade or Ibrahim or the son of so and so or any of that, ‘Sayyid’. 
What about this ‘Sayyid’ thing? I know the implications of ‘Sayyid’ 
but how is it significant to me? I gave myself some space, a grace 
period, or margin, away from the rest of the communists being a 
‘Sayyid’. Immediately I remembered a discussion with Sayyid 
Mohammad Fadlallah about martyrs or the difference between the 
greatest hero for communists and Islamists. Theirs went to heaven, 
but the communist martyrs went nowhere.543 
Al-Amin’s transition toward Hizbullah’s Islamism exemplifies the fluidity 
of the interaction between religion and secularism among the Shiʿa. In this 
sense, ‘being Shiʿi’ did not preclude involvement with communist or 
Islamic political movements. On the contrary, ‘being Shiʿi’ was sometimes 
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the marker that determined one’s involvement in either movement. The 
analysis in this study has therefore demarcated the environmental 
conditions in Lebanon under which each of these identities surged and 
reverted among the Shiʿa.  
The second factor that explains the transition from communism to 
communalism is the appeal of Hizbullah’s political agenda to the 
communists. As the analysis in the previous section demonstrated, 
Hizbullah’s appeal within the Shiʿi community superseded Amal’s across 
several indicators. These included the party’s broad social base among the 
Shiʿa, which transcended both class and territory. Additionally, the 
evolution of Hizbullah’s sophisticated social service provision throughout 
the 1990s began to fulfil a long-held Shiʿi demand and need for 
socioeconomic welfare and development initiatives. Further still, 
Hizbullah’s consistent support for the Palestinian resistance, and the 
refugees residing in Lebanon, as well as the party’s military superiority 
(relative to the other elements of the Lebanese resistance) in the wars with 
Israel, was and remains a significant source of Hizbullah’s legitimacy 
among the Shiʿi community. Finally, although Hizbullah is no longer 
technically an anti-system party in Lebanon, its rapprochement with the 
Lebanese state has been more strategically pursued than Amal’s. 
Importantly, these four measures dovetail directly with the initial basis 
upon which the LCP developed its appeal among the Shiʿa between 1943 
and 1975.  
To recall, among the communist Shiʿa, the LCP formulated a resistance 
identity based on opposition to the confessional political system, political 
and military support for the Palestinian resistance inside Lebanon against 
Israel, and socioeconomic reform for Jabal ‘Amil. In addition, the social 
basis of the LCP’s support among the Shiʿa also cut across the traditional 
class lines usually associated with communist movements. The LCP 
enjoyed support among the middle-class Shiʿa first, before expanding its 
following among the peasantry, rural and urban workers, intellectual elites 
and, as has been shown, some Shiʿi clerics.  
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However, as the analysis in chapter four demonstrated, the LCP failed to 
uphold the principle of anti-confessionalism in the civil war, while also 
failing in its resistance activities against Israel. Further still, all the 
socioeconomic reforms and welfare programmes for the southern Shiʿa 
promised by the LCP failed to materialise either during or after the war. In 
fact, the indifference displayed by the LCP and its allies in the LNM toward 
the welfare of the Shiʿi populations in Jabal ‘Amil was a significant factor in 
the deterioration of relations between the LCP and the Shiʿa. In this sense, 
Hizbullah has coopted the most successful aspects of the LCP’s political 
programme in Lebanon, it has also Islamised that agenda, and 
implemented it with a greater level of sophistication and success than the 
LCP. 
The Legacy of Communism 
Despite the decline of communism’s influence among the Shiʿa during the 
Lebanese Civil War, the relationship with the LCP imparted a lasting 
legacy over the Shiʿi community’s political identities in Lebanon. Elements 
of that legacy have already emerged in this chapter’s discussion, such as 
communism’s influence over the Shiʿi clerics as well as the aspects of the 
LCP’s agenda that became features of Hizbullah’s political programme for 
the Shiʿa during and after the war. However, the discussion in this section 
argues that the most enduring feature of communism’s influence was in its 
making of the resistance identity. 
The Resistance  
As’ad Abu Khalil draws a direct line of comparison between Hizbullah and 
Marxist political organisations.544 Though relatively dated now, this is one of 
few scholarly contributions that have explicitly documented the similarities 
between Hizbullah’s organisational structure, as a radical Islamist party, 
and those of the Marxist parties. Abu Khalil’s study is based on an analysis 
of Hizbullah’s Islamic ideology, and the terminological congruence 
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between its central tenets and that of Marxist-Leninism. For example, 
Lenin’s notion that ‘class consciousness can be brought to the workers only 
from without’, is in Hizbullah’s reading reformulated as, ‘the umma alone 
can bring about Islamic consciousness.’545 However, although Abu Khalil’s 
contribution is a valuable insight, the legacy of Marxist influence over 
Hizbullah extends far beyond ideological points of reference only. The 
ensuing analysis argues that a more interesting manifestation of 
communism’s legacy is in Hizbullah’s adoption of the resistance identity.  
The resistance remains the most unifying feature of the Shiʿi community’s 
political identity in Lebanon today. Any political actor or movement that 
seeks to mobilise the Shiʿa must display a conformity to the resistance 
agenda. Commenting in 2006, Khaled Hadedeh, the current Secretary-
General of the LCP, emphasised the centrality of the resistance to the Shiʿi 
community’s political identity when he stated ‘…in the average [Shiʿi] 
Lebanese family with seven children, four will be with Hezbollah, two will 
be with the Communists and one will be with Amal - all of them with the 
resistance [emphasis added].’ 546  The concept of resistance, however, has 
evolved since its original conceptualisation by the LCP in the 1960s.  
When the LCP originally formulated the resistance identity, it contained 
two dimensions. The first component of the LCP’s conceptualisation 
consisted of resistance to Lebanon’s confessional political structure, and 
advocacy of its overhaul and replacement with a secular democratic 
political system. The second component was armed resistance directed at 
Israel, in support of the Palestinian struggle for self-determination. 
However, following the LCP’s decline during the Lebanese Civil War, 
ownership of the resistance identity was transferred to Hizbullah by 
default, since this was the party which emerged from the civil war as the 
most powerful Shiʿi political actor in Lebanon. But Hizbullah, perhaps 
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having recognised the mobilising potential of the resistance identity in the 
LCP’s relationship with the Shiʿa, consciously adopted and reformulated 
the resistance identity. 
Hizbullah’s definition of the resistance is somewhat paradoxical, for it is 
both a reduction and expansion on the LCP’s conceptualisation. Unlike the 
LCP’s definition, Hizbullah’s resistance no longer contains an anti-system 
component that aims to reform or overhaul the confessional political 
structure in Lebanon. Indeed, Hizbullah has only adopted the part of the 
LCP’s definition that referred to the struggle against Israel. In this sense  
Hizbullah’s concept is narrower - and not all communists approved of this 
change, particularly because of the way Hizbullah’s resistance became 
imbued with Shiʿi religious symbolism, and Islamist notions of jihad. Thus, 
on the one hand, some communists acknowledge the superiority of 
Hizbullah’s resistance- ‘I can’t help noting how much the sons of its [the 
LCP’s] resistance resemble us, how much they improved what we had 
begun.’ On the other hand, the communists remained wary of the 
communal and religious components of Hizbullah’s resistance: ‘But 
Hezbollah remains captive...captive to its own sect.’ Indeed, one senior 
LCP official, Nadeem Abdul-Samad lambasts Hizbullah’s 
conceptualisation as devoid of a national component, and thus inferior to 
the LCP’s more inclusive definition:  
I see resistance as a national resistance...it includes the entire nation. 
What is there today is not a national resistance, it is sectarian. This is 
regression, simply. The strength of its vision is that it tries to impose 
its own perspective. The subject is seen from the blood of Hussein. I 
have no place in this...who can tell me where the gains of this 
liberation will go, if this will actually happen, this accomplishment 
achieved by the resistance. The critical question is who determines the 
gains yield will be distributed within the nation, or the scope of the 
nation will be considered rather than the scope of Islam or the Shiʿites 
and their role in the overall political scheme in a way that serves 
Iran’s interests? How can I endorse it? it is no longer about action, or 
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taking action against Israel. OK, I’m against Israel but I can no longer 
accept this in all simplicity and accept givens.547 
Of note, the Shiʿi communists have been far more willing to accept 
Hizbullah’s sectarian and political Shiʿi interpretation of the resistance, 
perhaps for the reasons presented earlier pertaining to the fluidity of 
relations between communism and religion. Thus, for Ibrahim al-Amin, 
since the LCP is no longer a viable contender, and a viable secular 
alternative does not exist, Hizbullah’s resistance does not present a 
problem for him:   
…secularism has become a prerequisite for any project. If the 
resistance is not secular, then the liberation it produces is not 
acceptable. If liberating Palestine is going to happen through 
Hezbollah, then it is rejected. But how is it going to happen? At the 
hands of a secular power? Who is this secular power? Where is it? 
What is it doing these days? Give me a resistance that suits my taste, 
and I won’t reject it.548 
Other Shiʿi communists present their willingness to accept Hizbullah’s 
resistance in ways unrelated to the question of communalism or religion. 
Ali Ayoub argues that it is simply a matter of making the best choice 
available under the present circumstances. He acknowledges that 
Hizbullah’s resistance lacks a progressive or reformist component, unlike 
the LCP’s definition. However, since the LCP was in decline, and no other 
progressive alternative existed, Hizbullah’s resistance represents an 
acceptable alternative, perhaps for the short-term: ‘If the resistance exists 
but the opportunity for change does not exist, you can be with the 
resistance until change becomes a possibility.’549  
Although Hizbullah’s resistance is viewed by some communists as 
reductive,  Hizbullah's conceptualisation is highly expansive in other ways. 
This is because Hizbullah utilises the resistance agenda vis a vis Israel to 
justify all its political activities and decision-making in Lebanon and the 
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region. For example, while most studies of Hizbullah argue that the shifts 
in the party’s attitude to the Lebanese political system were facilitated by 
ideological flexibility, this study posits that it was actually the party’s 
resistance agenda that determined this transformation.550 
The decision to participate in the Lebanese elections of 1992 was made on 
the basis of a calculation that greater parliamentary influence for Hizbullah 
would aid its resistance agenda:  
Ideology was never a reason for conflict; rather, it was the role and 
nature of resistance activity. Political reality calls for a concentrated effort 
in order to group resources for defiance of the occupiers [emphasis added].551  
Hizbullah’s election coalition was titled ‘Allegiance to the Resistance’, 
which also subsequently framed the party’s consideration of all 
parliamentary proposals.552 
Other areas of Hizbullah’s activities in Lebanon are also promulgated as 
being in the service of its resistance agenda. The party’s social service 
provision and development work is pursued for the purposes of building a 
‘society of resistance.’553 From waste collection, the delivery of water, the 
building of hospitals, schools and mosques, to the associations Hizbullah 
oversees that manage the welfare of its militants and civilians wounded in 
war, all of this work is conceptualised in terms of Hizbullah’s resistance 
identity: 
Such social work, which has evolved alongside resistance activity, 
served to relieve the Resistance of a considerable burden by assisting 
the populace in their endurance of Israeli aggression and of the 
remnants of occupation. It also fostered a humane and social 
environment of joint responsibility, thus shielding the Resistance from 
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social catastrophes - those from which the government simply 
alienated itself.554 
Thus, the resistance has become a central feature of Hizbullah’s political 
identity. In Lebanese public lexicon the terms ‘Hizbullah’ and ‘the 
resistance’ are frequently deployed interchangeably when referring to the 
party. Indeed, by way of emphasis, the website address for Hizbullah’s 
online presence is entitled al-Muqawama (the resistance) and not the actual 
name of the party. Although Hizbullah has monopolised the resistance 
agenda against Israel, the LCP continues to stake its own claims over the 
meaning of the resistance, rejecting Hizbullah’s conceptualisation in 
political Shiʿi terms, and instead  advocating for the revival of a national 
resistance. This is illustrated by the following case of the LCP’s 
involvement in the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War. 
The LCP in the 2006 Lebanon-Israel War 
Although the Lebanese Civil War marked the beginning of the end for 
communism in Lebanon, and the LCP’s declining influence in Lebanese 
politics, the party’s relationship with the Shiʿi community has continued to 
endure. This is evidenced most recently by the LCP’s mobilisation as part 
of the Hizbullah-led resistance in the 2006 Lebanon-Israel war.  
Whilst media and scholarly analysis of the 2006 war focusses exclusively on 
the battle between Hizbullah and the IDF, there were other fighting forces 
present on the Lebanese side, among them the LCP. The response from the 
Shiʿi community to Israel in 2006 was similar to that which occurred in the 
1982 war, a full military mobilisation that included Amal and the LCP. The 
LCP announced at the end of the war that it had lost 12 soldiers.555 The party 
published biographical information about 7 of these, 4 of whom were 
identifiably Shiʿa and all from the same southern Lebanese village of Srifa. 
Comrades Ahmad Salim Najdi and Mohammad Ali Najdi both joined the 
LCP in 1984, a time when the LCP was fully mobilised against invading 
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Israeli forces.556 The other two Shiʿi communist martyrs from the 2006 war, 
Ali Husayn Najdi and Hassan Salameh Karim, were younger members of 
the party who joined in 1992 and 1998 respectively. Both were active 
members of the LCP’s youth wing in Srifa.  
Aside from illustrating the endurance of the LCP’s special relationship with 
the Shiʿa, the party’s involvement in the war of 2006 also marked the 
beginning of a rapprochement with Hizbullah. Only two years before the 
2006 war, relations between Hizbullah and the LCP were still hostile. A 
major prisoner swap with Israel resulted in the release of 400 prisoners to 
Hizbullah in 2004. Although the majority of the prisoners were LCP 
members, Hizbullah refused to allow the LCP to attend a welcoming 
reception for the released prisoners at Lebanon’s airport.557 However, two 
years later, at a mass funeral for the fallen fighters of the 2006 Lebanon-
Israel war, the LCP’s ‘martyrs’ were buried alongside Hizbullah's. Video 
footage of the funeral procession shows the flags of the LCP, Hizbullah and 
Lebanon flying in unison.558 
During the 2006 war, Hizbullah and the LCP coordinated the resistance 
efforts between their fighters in the South Lebanese town of Srifa. The 
practicalities of a war in which Lebanon was at a distinct military 
disadvantage to the IDF was undoubtedly a factor in Hizbullah’s openness 
to cooperation with willing participants. The LCP’s participation was an 
effort to expand the remit of the resistance effort beyond Hizbullah’s 
conceptualisation. In this sense, the LCP was calling for the nationalisation 
of the Lebanese resistance. While limited, the LCP’s role in the 2006 war is 
symbolic of a lasting special relationship between communism and the 
Shiʿa in South Lebanon. 
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Conclusion	  
Secular political identities ceased to be a viable basis for the Shiʿi 
community’s political mobilisation in the aftermath of the Lebanese Civil 
War. The events of the war and the nature of the political settlement that 
followed elevated the centrality of sectarian identities to the Lebanese 
political framework. The dilemmas of the former communist Shiʿa and 
their gravitation toward Hizbullah illustrate their reluctant acceptance of 
the sectarian realities of Lebanon’s post-war political system. The 
relationship between the Shiʿi and the LCP nevertheless imparted a legacy 
of political learning on the Shiʿi community’s political successors. This is 
visible in the political programmes and strategies of mobilisation utilised 
by both Amal and Hizbullah. The resistance identity remains the most 
lasting symbol of the Shiʿi community’s relationship with communism, and 
continues to be a unifying feature of the Shiʿi community’s contemporary 
political mobilisation. However, the meaning of the resistance identity has 
become subject to significant change and transformation since its original 
conceptualisation by the LCP. Although Amal and Hizbullah remain 
opposed to Lebanon’s sectarian regime in principle, their ascendence in 
Lebanon during the civil war was largely due to their acceptance of the 
sectarian rules of the political game in Lebanon. In the aftermath of the civil 
war, Amal and Hizbullah continued their skilful navigation of the political 
system as sectarian actors, and today are the two most powerful 
representatives of the Lebanese Shiʿa. The resistance, however, in its 
contemporary usage, no longer refers to a reformist agenda contra political 
sectarianism in Lebanon; rather it is primarily deployed as a legitimising 
tool in the ongoing war with Israel. 
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Thesis Conclusion 
This study explored the identities and political mobilisation of the 
Lebanese Shiʿa.The objective was to bring to the fore the previously 
sidelined role of secular identities in the early political mobilisation of the 
Shiʿa. This was achieved through a case study of the relationship between 
the communist Shiʿa and the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) from 
Lebanese independence in 1943 to the end of the Lebanese Civil War in 
1990. The analysis challenged conventional readings of Lebanese Shiʿi 
political mobilisation that place Amal and Hizbullah at the beginning of 
that process. Furthermore, the analysis showed that Shiʿi interaction with 
the secular political movement played a formative role in the construction 
of a resistance identity, which was subsequently adopted and transformed 
by Hizbullah.   
The conceptual framework developed for this study was based on a 
hybridised approach to the study of identity. This posits that both 
primordial and constructionist identities are present on the identity 
repertoires of individuals or groups. It was argued that the conditions 
under which primordial or constructionist identities ascend or descend the 
hierarchy of identities are determined by the particular context in which 
these identities arise. The process of studying these dynamics is a highly 
empirical endeavour, and varies from country to country. For the purposes 
of this study, secular and sectarian identities constituted the hybrid 
identities under consideration. For the Shiʿa, secularism was a resistance 
identity that challenged the sectarian political structure of the Lebanese 
state. The collapse of the LCP in the aftermath of the Lebanese Civil War, 
and the rise of the new Shiʿi political actors, Amal and Hizbullah, 
transformed that resistance identity from a secular to a sectarian political 
project. In this sense, this study has emphasised the dynamic interplay 
between secular and sectarian identities in the political mobilisation of the 
Shiʿa. However, the fundamental difference between secular and sectarian 
identities among the Shiʿa lay in their conceptualisation of resistance. For 
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the communist Shiʿa, their secularised resistance identity manifested in a 
political project that sought to overhaul and transcend the sectarian 
political structure in Lebanon. For Amal’s and Hizbullah’s Shiʿa, their 
sectarianised resistance identity sought to organise the expression of Shiʿi 
identities in within the existing framework of the (sectarian) political 
system in Lebanon. In short, whereas the communist Shiʿa sought to 
change the rules of the game in Lebanon, the sectarian Shiʿa sought to play 
the game.  Each deployed the resistance identity in a different way to 
achieve these aims. 
From the Ottoman Empire to the French Mandate and beyond Lebanon’s 
independence, the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ have consistently pursued their inclusion 
and incorporation into the Lebanese state in accordance with  the sectarian 
logic of the political system. As chapter three showed, Musa al-Sadr 
aspired to reform the political system so that the Shiʿa acquired a more 
equitable share in the state’s confessional distribution. In today’s Lebanon, 
Amal retains the Shiʿi community’s guaranteed post of Parliamentary 
Speaker, while also holding 13 parliamentary seats, and control over the 
Council of the South, the main governing body of South Lebanon. 
Although Hizbullah emerged as a rejectionist party, its militantly Shiʿi 
identity still conforms to the sectarian logic of Lebanese politics and 
society. Hizbullah also transformed into a fully participatory political party 
in Lebanon’s 1992 elections, and currently holds 12 parliamentary seats. 
Hizbullah is also regarded as one of the most powerful political 
movements in Lebanon today.  
If sectarian identities predominate over the Shiʿi community’s 
contemporary political mobilisation, what is important about their 
historical association with secular identities? Highlighting the historical 
significance of secular identities and their interaction with sectarian 
identities among the Shiʿa has important implications, not just for 
correcting our historical knowledge of the historical development of the 
Lebanese Shiʿa, but also for broadening our understanding of Lebanese 
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history. The battle for the Shiʿa that took place towards the end the civil 
war, which pitted the LCP against Amal and Hizbullah, represented a 
microcosm of a historic struggle that was also taking place at that time: the 
battle between secularism and sectarianism in Lebanon.  By the end of the 
war, the main advocates of secularisation - the Lebanese left -  had been 
defeated. Thereafter, the secular left in Lebanon was condemned to the 
margins of history. While the primary focus of this study has been to 
highlight and examine the significance of secular identities to the Lebanese 
Shiʿa, the findings also represent the recovery of a period of Lebanese 
history in which the idea of sectarianism was challenged by a powerful 
secular political movement. Removing the paradigm of sectarianism from 
our analytical focus reveals a secular history of Lebanon that is largely 
untouched. 
The history of secular identities in Lebanon is a heterodox subject. But this 
study has illustrated the important role secular identities played in the 
political mobilisation of the Lebanese Shiʿa, and their legacy over the 
sectarian identities that came after. Further still, as was shown in chapter 
five, the LCP still retains a small but loyal Shiʿi following in Lebanon today. 
But the communist Shiʿa are not the only participants in the continuing 
struggle for secularisation in Lebanon. Social movements such as Laïque 
Pride559 (Secular Pride) and Nahwa al-Muwatiniya (Towards Citizenship) are 
also part of the continuation of Lebanon’s historic struggle for 
secularisation.560 
This study’s findings highlight the need to recognise the role played by 
secular identities in the Lebanese Shiʿi community’s past, while also 
serving as a call to revisit the history of the Lebanese left in general. 
Additionally, the findings of this thesis are also pertinent to the 
contemporary Shiʿi political field in Lebanon. Various actors, including 
Shiʿi clerics, intellectuals, grassroots activists and descendants from the 
                                                
559 Rana Khoury, ’Secular Lebanon Marches for Citizenship’, al-Arabiya News, 8th May 2002, 
<http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/05/08/212864.html> (23 February 2015) 
560 Nahwa al-Muwatiniya <http://www.na-am.org/about-na-am.html> (23 February 2015) 
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traditional political families are seeking to formulate a ‘third-way’ for the 
Shiʿa that is independent of both Hizbullah and Amal. And many of these 
independent Shiʿi actors are advocating a secular political agenda. 
Critical voices directed at the Hizbullah and Amal monopoly are an 
emerging trend within the Lebanese Shiʿi community. Dissatisfaction with 
Hizbullah originates from the party’s unrivalled power, intolerance of 
dissenting voices and intimidation tactics.561 The influence of external states, 
namely Iran and Syria over Hizbullah's domestic and regional policy 
decisions is also a source of growing frustration within the Shiʿi 
community.562 While Amal is traditionally perceived as a more domestically 
integrated, secular counterweight to Hizbullah’s Islamism and regional 
alliances, it has developed an unfavourable reputation for corruption and 
political mismanagement.563  Although Amal and Hizbullah are political 
allies, Amal is widely perceived as the junior partner in this alliance. As 
Shanahan writes,  
The further that Amal moves from its founding ideals of probity, 
equality and political empowerment espoused by its founder Musa 
Sadr, the more peripheral it becomes to Shiʿa politics. Hizbullah acts 
as the senior partner on whom it relies for its electoral relevance.564 
Three key recent events have served as catalysts for internal dissent within 
the Shiʿi community to spillover into the public domain. The first event 
concerns the 2006 Lebanon-Israel war triggered by Hizbullah. In the war’s 
                                                
561 ‘Lebanon: Alternative Shiʿa Advocates Not United’, Wikileaks Cable 07BEIRUT1597, 11th 
October 2007 <https://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/10/07BEIRUT1597.html>; Laure 
Stephen, ‘Shiites in Lebanon Start Saying ‘No’ to Hezbollah’, Worldcrunch 12th September 
2012, <http://www.worldcrunch.com/world-affairs/shiites-in-lebanon-start-saying-039-
no-039-to-hezbollah/syria-shia-iran-hani-fahs/c1s9549/#.VbgAOXg6H8t> Accessed 29th 
July 2015. 
562  ‘Lebanon: new Think Tank Aimed at Linking Independent Shia’, Wikileaks Cable 
08BEIRUT570, <https://cablegatesearch.wikileaks.org/cable.php?id=08BEIRUT570> 
Accessed 29th July 2015 
563’What’s Wrong with Amal?’ Wikileaks Cable 04BEIRUT494,  
<https://cablegatesearch.wikileaks.org/cable.php?id=04BEIRUT4941> Accessed 29th July 
2015 
564 Rodger Shanahan ‘Lebanon: The Chimera of a Shiʿa ‘Third Way’, 30 July 2003, Lowy 
Institute for International Policy <http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/lebanon-
chimera-shia-third-way> Accessed 29th July 2015. 
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aftermath, voices from within the Shiʿi community began to question 
Hizbullah’s provocation in light of the resultant loss of human life, and 
extensive infrastructural damage to homes and property. 565  Secondly, 
Hizbullah’s takeover of west Beirut in a 2008 dispute with the Lebanese 
government also led to criticism of the organisation’s political tactics.566 In 
the process, the events reignited the debate over Hizbullah’s continued 
retention of its weapons. Hizbullah’s implication in a 2009 corruption 
scandal constituted the first blow to the party’s reputation for moral 
altruism, upon which the party has historically prided itself.567 The third and 
final precipitating event relates to Hizbullah’s decision to send its fighting 
forces to Syria, in defence of the Assad regime. Although it was known that 
the party was in Syria from 2011, the Secretary-General, Sayyid Hasan 
Nasrallah only publicly admitted Hizbullah’s presence in Syria in May 
2013.568 
The sources of Shiʿi dissent are therefore wide and varied. Contemporaries 
of the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ are prominent among the dissenting voices, and have 
established new political organisations to contest the Hizbullah-Amal 
monopoly. Chief among these figureheads is Ahmad al-As’ad, who 
established the Lebanese Option Party in 2007.569  
Several prominent Shiʿi intellectuals have also openly declared their 
opposition to Hizbullah. Professor Mona Fayed of the Lebanese University, 
                                                
565 Rola el-Husseini ‘Cracks in the Hezbollah Menopoly’, The Washington Post, 8th January 
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566 Robert F. Worth and Nada Bakri, ‘Hezbollah Seizes Swath of Beirut From US-Backed 
Lebanon Government’, The New York Times, 10th May 2008 
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567 Robert F. Worth, ‘Billion-Dollar Pyramid Scheme Rivets Lebanon’, The New York Times, 
15th September 2009–  
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Washington Post, 25th May 2013, 
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published a scathing article entitled ‘To be a Shiʿite now’ in Beirut’s An-
Nahar newspaper during the 2006 war.570 Professor Fayed, along with 50 
other Lebanese Shiʿi intellectuals and activists, signed another opinion 
piece in the same newspaper in August 2012, voicing their support for the 
Syrian people.571 This was a direct challenge to Hizbullah’s position on the 
conflict.  
Dissenting clerical voices are also prominent among the Shiʿi challenges to 
Hizbullah. Ali al-Amine, the late Hani Fahs, Sheikh Subhi Tufayli and 
Sheikh Muhammad al-Hajj were among the more influential critical clerics 
involved in the establishment of the Free Shiʿa Movement. 572  Sheikh 
Muhammad Ali al-Husseini, founder of the Islamic Arabic Council was 
also a critical clerical voice. However his organisation was effectively 
disbanded following his arrest in May 2011 on charges of spying for Israel.  
Shiʿi businessmen involved in grassroots, civil society activism have also 
been advocates for a Shiʿi ‘third way’. Chief among these are Raed 
Sharafeddine, Youssef al-Khalil and Mohammad Matar. The latter 
established a think-tank entitled Lebanese Analytica Matrix (LAM) with the 
aim of linking together the disparate independent Shiʿi groups.573 Although 
the founder of this group suffers from the reputational damage of being a 
well-known lawyer for Saad al-Hariri, his new organisation has a number 
of prominent Shiʿi members. These include, Mohammad Hussein 
Shameseddin (journalist), Ibrahim Shameseddin (the head of the Islamic 
Cultural Centre in Beirut,), Loukman Slim (independent activist), Youssef 
                                                
570  Mona Fayyad, ‘To Be a Shiite Now’, An-Nahar, Beirut, 8th August 2006 
<http://www.10452lccc.com/hizbollah/fayad10.8.06english.htm> Accessed 29th July 
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Khalil (Central Bank Director), Mona Fayed (Professor, Lebanese 
University), Yousef Zein (son of the founder of al-Irfan), Ahmad Baydoun 
(historian), Karim Mroueh (a former communist interviewed by this 
author), Jamil Mroueh (publisher of the Daily Star) and his brother Malek 
(close to March 14 leader Nassib Lahoud).574  
Clearly there are numerous internal voices of dissent currently emerging 
from the Shiʿi community. However, the obstacles to their success are also 
many. These range from Lebanon’s current electoral laws, which favour 
blocs over independent, single parties; the March 14 Hariri camp, which 
favours working with Amal and Hizbullah, (the emerging Shiʿa want to 
operate completely independently of these parties); Hizbullah’s 
insurmountable resource base coupled with the reluctance of the Shiʿi 
diaspora to openly declare support, by way of providing funding, for the 
Shiʿi independents; and finally the general absence of unity of action 
among the various elements of the Shiʿi independents. However, the 
majority of these figures hold a shared aspiration for a secular political 
vision for the Lebanese Shiʿi. This is a development that is particularly 
interesting in light of this study’s findings. 
The Lebanese University professor Mona Fayed is a secular Shiʿi 
intellectual.575 The founder of LAM, of which she is a member, has described 
the organisation’s approach as twofold. On the macro level, LAM 
highlights the main objectives of the Shiʿa, which are to secure an 
independent, sovereign, and secular Lebanon. On the micro level, LAM 
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intends to focus on grassroots issues and bring together the various Shiʿa 
independents.576   
Mohammad Obeid, who seeks to reform Amal from the inside, has spoken 
of his desire to ‘tap into the segment of the Shiʿa community that leans 
towards secularism…’577 The neo-zaiʿam, Ahmad al-As’ad also advocates a 
mostly secular political platform. However, he sees it as necessary for his 
new party to begin as a Shiʿi movement in order to act as a bulwark against 
Hizbullah and Amal. Thereafter, he envisions the party branching out to 
the cross-confessional. The feudal past of the Shiʿi zuʿamaʾ must, however, 
be taken into consideration when considering these proclamations. Overall, 
as summarised by US Ambassador to Lebanon, Jeffrey D. Feltman, a 
secular ethos is a significant presence among the burgeoning independent 
Shiʿa, but this movement faces many constraints: 
The Shia who are prone not to ally with Hizballah or Amal are largely 
secular and looking for a cross-confessional alternative movement, 
rather than a third Shia party…nevertheless the "state of fear" of 
sectarian conflict, Israeli aggression, and a history of respect for 
Hizballah's integrity and accomplishments keep many secular, well-
educated Shia with Hizballah.578  
Although Shiʿi ‘third way’ activists currently lack a unified political 
platform, which is one of several impediments to their success at the 
present moment, there are two things they all have in common - a secular 
political vision for the Shiʿa, and a desire to be completely independent 
from Amal and Hizballah. The findings in this thesis demonstrate that 
there is in fact a historical precedent for secular political identities to play a 
prominent role in the political mobilisation of the Lebanese Shiʿa. In the 
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final analysis, the rise of third way independents within the Shiʿa 
community is indicative of the resurgence of secular identities among the 
Lebanese Shiʿa today. 
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Transcript of quotations from the documentary film Shiyuʿiyyin Kunna (We Were 
Communists), Documentary Film. Director: Maher Abi Samra, Beirut, 2010. 
Huseein ali Ayoub, born in Aynata, south Lebanon, 1965. Shiʿite. Lives in 
Beirut, Arab University area. Working class family. Relationship with LCP 
began with my family, they were communists, father was one of the first 
martyrs of the LCP in its struggle against Israeli occupation. I was active in 
party meetings, distributed the party newspaper as well as other partisan 
activities. 
Bashar Nadim Adbel Samad, born in Moscow, 1964. Lives in Beirut in the 
Arab University area. Currently a student, belongs to middle class family. 
Came to know LCP through family, father is in the party leadership. 
Participated in party meetings, other partisan activities and military 
training. 
Ibrahim Mohammad Ali Al-Amin, born Ras Baalbek, 1965. Shiʿite. Lives in 
Sidon. From Middle Class family, came to know LCP through my family. 
Participated in party meetings, military training and other partisan 
activities. 
Maher Dib Abi Samra, born in Shiyyah in the Dahiyeh originally from 
Shebba, 1965, Sunni and works as electrician, from lower middle class 
family. Came to know the LCP through the neighborhood in Shiyyah, 
participated in party meetings and military training. Did not leave Beirut 
during the 1982 Israeli invasion. Maher was 17 years old when he joined 
the LCP 
Maher: “I thought my relationship with the communists had ended. But I 
found myself thinking about the chicken coop.” 
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Maher first took up arms against the Israelis in 1982 as part of the LCP’s 
resistance. 
Hussein: If there was a party that could secure at once liberation and 
change, or establish a correlation between liberation and change, between 
resistance and change, then I would take my hat off to it. It is what we 
want. But if this party does not exist, and there is one that proposes 
resistance and another that wants change, then you can endorse the part 
related to resistance and the part related to change. If the resistance exists 
but the opportunity for change does not exist, you can be with the 
resistance until change becomes a possibility. And if change is a possibility 
but there is no resistance, then one can work towards change until the 
resistance becomes a possibility. Today in this country there is no real party 
or force proposing change in a cogent or clear terms, on the one hand. On 
the other hand, this is not a question that can be isolated from the general 
context, whether you consider strictly the local context or the larger 
context....but I can no longer see the question of the Lebanese resistance as 
a purely Lebanese issue...I cannot isolate the resistance in Lebanon from the 
resistance in Palestine. And I cannot see the resistance in Palestine far from 
the context of the resistance in Iraq. They are all one issue that cannot be 
regarded separately. 
Ibrahim: What scares me is that we are actually living in a present moment 
where secularism has become a prerequisite for any project. If the 
resistance is not secular, then the liberation if produces is not acceptable. If 
liberating Palestine is going to happen through Hezbollah, then it is 
rejected. But how is it going to happen? At the hands of a secular power? 
Who is this secular power? Where is it? What is it doing these days? Give 
me a resistance ‘that suits my taste’, and I won’t reject it. 
Bashar: First we need to agree and define our position regarding the 
resistance. I see resistance as a national resistance...it includes the entire 
nation. What is there today is not a national resistance, it is sectarian. This 
is regression, simply. The strength of its vision is that it tries to impose its 
own perspective. The subject is seen from the blood of Hussein. I have no 
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place in this...who can tell me where the gains of this liberation will go, if 
this will actually happen, this accomplishment achieved by the resistance. 
The critical question is who determines the gains yield will be distributed 
within the nation, or the scope of the nation will be considered rather than 
the scope of Islam or the Shiites and their role in the overall political 
scheme in a way that serves Iran’s interests? How can I endorse it? it is no 
longer about action, or taking action against Israel. OK, I’m against Israel 
but I can no longer accept this in all simplicity and accept givens. 
On Joining the LCP 
Bashar: I think the moment I joined the party was the instant Israeli tanks 
rolled in. Joining had a lot to do with the encouragement my family 
insisted on. The kind of environment I grew up in made it all seem like a 
natural outcome. I grew up in this environment I’m from a Communist 
family. My father was in the leadership, it was expected. Or natural, based 
on my political convictions, that I would join the party. So i joined the party 
quite early but actually my membership was never really officialised! The 
real test of your loyalty to the party...the central mission that compelled us, 
and measured the extent of our loyalty to the party...the major mission I 
considered my duty was the struggle against the Israelis from the moment 
they invaded.  
Ibrahim: I found that after all that I heard at home, and all I stored from 
long discussion with my father, was that the ideas inspiring the party were 
good, the party was good but its leadership damned hopeless. My real 
awareness emerged in 1982, with the Israeli invasion, when the Communist 
Party decided to engage itself directly in the mission of fighting Israel. At 
that moment, I felt my relationship with the party was natural. The 
arguments and clashes about the party with my father at home decreased 
to the point of lapsing altogether. Because when it came to the subject of 
resisting Israel, whether the general secretary of the party had sent you or 
not, it was your duty to do it. This helped. It was the instance where my 
relationship with the party consolidated and became very real. 
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Hussein: If my father had died a natural death, and we had continued 
living in the village, I don’t know what our choice would have been, how 
we would have turned out. But my father was the first martyr in of the 
Communist Party’s resistance. This fact shut the door on any discussion. 
That’s it! You’re communists and you remain communists. We are taken in 
charge by the Communist Party....The real test for my personality, my 
behaviour, my loyalty and my commitment to these principles or concepts, 
was in 1982. Not after 1982, I mean specifically during the Israeli invasion. 
My experience began with the Israeli invasion and continued afterwards. 
Maher: There were obviously a thousand reasons, I fell in love with a 
girl...whose family and brothers were communists. It also had to do with 
my desire to escape my own family to find other people, I was in need of 
friends. There were a thousand reasons, but I can say now that one of the 
fundamental reasons was that being close to the party in that 
neighbourhood, was like being closer to the city, more so than being close 
to a particular ideological school...of course there’s the over-arching notion 
that with the communists, there is social justice issues like medical care for 
all...it’s not much what Marx said, rather there were fundamental or basic 
issues I thought the Communist Party espoused around the social justice 
between people. 
Bashar: The Communist Party is a party whose nature, composition, 
program and means were different from all the other political parties that 
existed in the country. During that difficult time when political struggles 
became so mobilised, the party was in retreat, we lived in a very 
challenging and turbulent arena. In this conflict and pressures, we 
perceived it as the last ditch before the total collapse of the country 
altogether. If a blow were directed at the Communist Party, If I left the 
faculty of arts, it would be a sign that everything was over, and darkness 
would overcome...in the faculty of arts, in Raousheh in Beirut and in 
Lebanon. The world would lapse in to darkness. [it depended on you?] Yes, 
as if we were the last barricade, the last bastion of the anti-sectarian, the 
secular and the plural. Therefore we had to be fierce. In a way we felt we 
were engaged into defensive battles, but in reality they were backwards. 
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This began to impact our core, it became obvious, each one of us was 
beginning to ask questions. 
Declining Relationship 
Hussein: The older we got, the deeper our experience, the more we allowed 
ourselves the right to question decisions and express opposition. There’s a 
story, you remember the party meeting in the Beqaa in 1989, I stood up at 
that meeting and said we should withdraw from internal warring, that it 
was an absurd war that it was not our war. Suddenly, someone took a 
stand against you and identified your position as treacherous, and accused 
you of being influenced by others, that this was a patriotic war, even 
though sects were involved, there were also national sects. All those 
catchprases circulating at that time. 
Maher: The perception of the resistance was fundamentally that of 
flawlessness. To be asked to join the resistance implied without question 
that I would join. It was an honour to join the resistance. I joined and 
stayed in the south until 1984, until I was detained. During that time, I felt 
no hesitation participating in battles, when I was in the resistance. That was 
not the case when I participated in the battle of the mountain, or the battles 
in Dahiyeh, the internal wars. 
Bashar: Yes, we considered our role in the resistance as part of imparting 
change in the country. The relationship between liberation and change is a 
key question. If you are a great person, but the person sitting next to you is 
drowning you with things that are practically insignificant, it’s a question 
of raising the levels of deviation and corruption of sectarianism and 
draining the country altogether. You’re somewhere and he’s somewhere 
else. OK, if you want to draw a conclusion, maybe we should have pulled 
out of the war. Maybe we should have. 
Maher: From 1982, onwards after the Israeli invasion there were the battles 
in Dahiyeh then in the mountains, then the battles in the north, then battles 
between Amal movement and us, then with Hezbollah. Battles over 
territorial demarcation. Each battle spilled into the next one. And we 
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reached a point, where sectarian affiliations against one another were 
consolidated. When I think back now, I feel we were being manipulated in 
many ways by sects. Like in the battle of the mountains, I remember I felt 
that people were there wondering who we were? What were we doing 
here? We were sent to fight anyway but it was really as though we were 
being used as individuals at the time. In my opinion, the Communist Party 
was itself being used in these battles by one sect against the other. 
During the Civil War: Battle with Amal and Decline of LCP. 
Narrator [Maher]: The civil war began in 1975, the party was involved in it 
up to its proverbial ears. We had great dreams but the resistance didn’t last 
long, it fell almost entirely in the hands of Hezbollah, and other sects, we 
are allied with them and that we described it as national, swallowed us. 
And the Red Bear, that was from us and of us, began to disintegrate and we 
left.  There was a specific battle that marked our departure from the war 
and the party. The one we called The Battle of the Arab University. It was 
the only one where the four of us fought together in Beirut’s streets and 
alleys, under the command of Abu Mushen, in 1987.  
Bashar: Before our battle with Amal began in 87, the situation escalated to a 
point where a fight was going to break out for sure. The party was at its 
worst state, it was a shadow of itself. We were fighting for our very 
survival. 
Hussein: A week or ten days prior there was a lot of talking that Amal and 
the Syrians planned to eradicate the Communist Party and expel it forever 
from Beirut. They posted me across from the Palace, in a building we 
referred to as the district center. The day the battle broke out I was there. 
Maher: In a few words, our intention was to wage a battle to purge Beirut 
of Amal, the Palestinians were our allies, and this alliance was against the 
Syrians. It was complicated and it was the only battle where all four of us 
participated. 
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Hussein: I was in charge of mobilising people to fight. If Amal was going to 
attack the Arab University and take control of the Communist Party 
headquarters, we would be exiled from the area. There was something 
personal about it. 
Bashar: One of them lunges for the centre and begins to fire and the 
fireworks erupted. The battle went on for about 6 days. I was in charge of 
protecting the roof, so I went up to the roof. 
Ibrahim: Of course at that moment I felt my back to the wall. During that 
battle, my biggest fear was to be killed. I believe in the end it was a 
collective feeling. 
Maher: There’s this feeling in the midst of this city, where you live, that 
you relate to, suddenly you stop seeing what’s around you, it’s as if you’re 
numbed, but at the same time your adrenalin levels are incredible. 
Ibrahim: In this battle we’re fighting with Walid Jumblatt, the Druze 
against the Shiʿites, with the Palestinians against the Syrians. At the same 
time in other areas, we were allied with other factions. Within the party it 
wasn’t easy to criticise your leadership. To be expelled from the party 
wasn’t an administrative matter. The party was your whole life, it implied 
a social and psychological exile. It was very difficult for people to leave.  
Abu Mushen: After 1976, there was a resurrection but it was the last one. 
Through these events, the Syrian Army’s direct involvement in Lebanon 
was restored and particularly in Beirut.  
Hussein: We followed the news, we had a small radio, and I hear the 
declaration by the Islamic Assembly calling on Hafez al-Assad to enter 
Beirut. The Syrians accepted the invitation. Suddenly, the battle ended. A 
cease-fire. The Syrians entered Beirut, I shaved my beard for the first time. I 
remember a Syrian officer arrived and introduced himself. He asked ‘Who 
is in command of the Communist Party here?’ We answered: Abu Rabih. 
Abu Rabih went with them by himself. And I went home. I enrolled back in 
university, and a new phase started there. 
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Ibrahim: All of the sudden we receive an order to leave our posts and 
gather at the Palace. We are told to go in a single file to headquarters, the 
Syrians wanted the Palace. They served us a speech about our victory. How 
we had won the battle for democratic change and so on. It was so ironic. In 
the evening, we were told our weapons will be returned to the Russians. 
The next morning we were told to go away or go home.  
Abu Mushen: For me, on some level, I was not able to understand what 
had happened. We walked in a single file carrying our weapons and 
ammunition, everything we had, walking away.  I handed over everything 
and went home.  
Hussein: One battle ended, another started immediately. Each battle ended 
the previous battle’s debate. I don’t know if I could have acted any other 
way at that time, I doubt it. Even if later I assessed critically what the 
battles did...at that time, I was seeing the world from a hole in the wall at 
the Arab University. 
After Communism 
Ibrahim: “When I try to figure out how I belong in this place I’m returning 
to, that is welcoming me back and treating me like I’m special, i return in a 
different way. I come back to the periphery, the edges of the sect, I hover 
around it. Like when I joined the Communist Party, I had to strip some 
things, leave them at the door. Now it’s ‘My dear to enter this place, you 
have to get rid of everything you carry from the Communist Party.’ It’s not 
a coincidence that the majority of communists don’t have a normal 
relationship with their social surroundings. Basically when we entered 
party headquarters, it was if there was a safety deposit box into which we 
unburdened from our sect, family and futures, and placed them in safe 
keeping. Then we melted inside the party. When the party collapsed and 
we left, each one of us collected their deposits and went back home. Each 
person went back a communist but also a Shiʿite, or Shiʿite communist or 
Christian communist or Druze communist, back to being influenced by the 
same calculations. 
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I always felt that if the Communist Party fell apart from here, if it failed to 
unite the sects then there was no other force in Lebanon who achieve that. 
For 40 to 50 years, it was a movement that appealed to every place, every 
sect...every area. It was so active, tens of thousands of people walked its 
path, poor workers, professors, engineers, union leaders, doctors, everyday 
people, even people involved in commerce. I mean if that was not enough 
to guard its mission that transcended sects and regions, then no other force 
could succeed. I was so depressed with the state of the local situation. The 
resistance was like a solace. 
Hussein: I left the party in 1992, or in the beginning of 1993, there was a 
general collapse in the world, a general collapse in the region, in the 
country, in the party and so on. One project was collapsing, and another 
was rising....In my case, I hung on to the cliche, to strengthen the self, 
rebuild myself. I mean, facing this overwhelming collapse all around me, 
the most important thing was to preserve myself, or in other words, to 
develop personal immunity to allow myself at any moment to take a stand 
without enabling anyone to sway my position. No one can impose where I 
work, or what I work on, or what I can write about. In the Kuwaiti 
newspaper al-Watan we weren’t allowed to criticise Hariri, but I never 
once wrote an article pro-Hariri. After 2004, I felt stronger I was no longer 
simply a monitor, I felt I could and ought to take a stand vis a vis the 
resistance. In 2006 after the July War, I felt an even stronger urge. Not only 
was I being asked to take a stand, but it was important for me to take a 
stand, to influence others. It was important to be involved in the internal 
battle in the country. The choices were clear, and questions were clear. 
There were this project or that project, and I had no hesitation.  My position 
and opinion were clear. This was the project with significance to me. 
After the War 
Bashar: Practically, unions stopped being a professional realm, a platform 
for discussions of general issues, instead it became a space of subjugation, 
resorting to coercion or need. Coercion because now, there are stakes tied 
to context. So it has the power to pressure and coopt politically and 
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financially from an economic position. They could inhibit you from stirring 
any debate within the syndicate, or an insurrection in the general opinions 
of engineers, or from showing where and how they were being threatened. 
After Hariri came to power, he re-shuffled the leadership of the union. It 
mirrored the political leadership of the country. It was reproduced here. 
Spaces became more constricted, more and more suffocating. We kept the 
fight for a long, long time until he died..[Maher: Could you do anything?] 
To some extent. In the end, we just became this vague body. What could 
they call us? Communists? We were also in a confrontation with the Party! 
Who are we? Were we from another planet?...At some point there was no 
space left, it kept shrinking, smaller and smaller until it lapsed, no one was 
left, we were finished. This group that once was, is finished done...[Maher: 
Where did they go?] At one meeting, one guy said “everyone go back to 
where they came from!” I stared at him and said “there is no place left for 
us to go back to!” The problem is that you go back to your Shiite sect, you 
go back to Hezbollah. But what about us? There is no place to go back to. 
You want us to leave this place? We’ll leave. We’re used to leaving! 
The lack of security I endured, economically and financially pushed me to 
seek stability, something consistent. I had to meet obligations. I was putting 
at risk people I brought into this world, who had nothing to do with this. I 
have kids now. What can I do? That was my logic. I heard there were 
openings for positions in the public sector, that I should apply. After I 
applied, it took almost a year and a half before I was appointed. The delay 
was due to changes in government. It is a place like any other, in 
government and work etc. It has to obey the logic of sectarian quota. Where 
access is predicated on the logic of ‘who belongs to whom.’ It could be 
political affiliation or which sect one belongs to. It could be something else, 
personal acquaintance works too. Generally that’s the way things operate. 
Nine of us were appointed, practically and effectively, the nine of us were 
affiliated to someone. Each one of us, in one way or other, accounted for 
someone. All of us were affiliated to the spiritual father of the ministry, 
Walid Jumblatt.” 
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Moving toward Hezbollah 
Narrator (Maher) : Hezbollah is a riddle. On the one hand, it enforced what 
was proper (halal) and what was not (haram) in the areas in controlled. At 
the same time, it was accused of assassinating intellectuals from the left. On 
the other hand, I can’t help noting how much the sons of its resistance 
resemble us, how much they improved what we had begun. But Hezbollah 
remains captive...captive to its own sect.  
Ibrahim: I meet people, individuals, of different kinds, from different sects, 
from different regions. There was a political debate between us but also an 
understanding, we are still communists, and thus reject some things. We 
experimented on our own, but I began to really falter when I made my first 
contact with Hezbollah. I went as a journalist to see someone from 
Hezbollah, I think it was Abu Hassan Ra’ad, investigating what was going 
on between them and Amal. That day, I felt the resistance existed but it was 
no longer with the communists. I remembered, when I used to see someone 
from Hezbollah, images came up immediately. They had begun to 
transform, but the images I carried were old, walking in slippers, shirts 
untucked, bearded, with some kind of grim look, holding worry beads, and 
showing them off speaking loudly as if to say ‘I’m here’, and the way they 
apprehended you as if you were a reject, a blasphemer, an apostate. I had 
only one friend affiliated to Hezbollah at the university, he was the only 
one I had a personal relationship with. So I recalled these old images, and I 
wondered what’s going on with me? What’s happening to me? Somehow 
there is something here appealing to me! What’s going on? It was the first 
time someone called me ‘Sayid’. It was no longer comrade or Ibrahim or 
the son of so and so or any of that, ‘Sayid’. What about this ‘Sayid’ thing? I 
know the implications of ‘Sayid’ but how is it significant to me? I gave 
myself some space, a grace period, or margin, away from the rest of the 
communists being a ‘Sayid’. Immediately I remembered a discussion with 
Sayid Mohammad Fadlallah about martrys or the difference between the 
greatest hero for communists and Islamists. Theirs went to heaven, but the 
communist martyrs went nowhere. His explanation was to ask if I thought 
communists could undertake their action without believing, there must be 
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somewhere in their hearts, the belief that there is something else, there 
must be something else. I was attracted to this place that had something to 
do with resistance, I felt comfortable with the ‘Sayid’ thing but I Was also 
frightened. I was frightened when I realised that I could not be like them.  
This is a new stage in my relationship with them, the resistance. Because it 
has become visible. By the way, it’s a bit startling when one realises that 
visibly you are one of them, but not really of the, you seem like an 
instrument in the eyes of the other, ‘a means’. Not an autonomous 
individual who have an understanding with them about this channel inside 
the party, the resistance. I know eventually I came to notice that my articles 
contained messages to the Israelis. Israelis began to treat my articles not as 
someone close to Hezbollah, and someone who knows. There are messages 
to the Israeli Army within this man’s articles. It’s true. This has come to be 
by tacit complicity, there is no necessity for Hezbollah to tell me that he’s 
passing on this information, for the Israeli, to see it in my article. Nor am I 
writing articles in a way to say look, I’m passing on your information. It 
just happened. I understood without being told, that part of this reciprocal 
game, was for me to communicate messages. The matter evolved to the 
point that complicity was no longer implicit but rather public and explicit. I 
accepted this role. I felt I had a role. I became a partner, small, but a partner 
nonetheless. A partner in debate and in the ways ideas are communicated. 
Somehow I felt I was back to being part of the resistance. 
Commander Abed: It was our choice to resist. It was no longer a choice, but 
rather became an option. What was an option? There was no longer 
consensus in the party. I sensed there was no longer consensus in the party. 
The resistance was at a very low point, in the higher levels of the 
leadership. The party’s infrastructure, because of the war, had not been 
renewed institutionally, nor was the methodology, I witnessed corruption 
become rampant with individuals. I witnessed narcissism. I still had ability. 
The energy was there, but the desire to put up with lying to myself as 
Abdel Karim, or to comrades who might die, whom I could convince, I 
knew I could convince them, or intimidate even if I fail to convince, they 
might be intimidated because they still believed me. I sent them and wait, I 
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don’t want to say 48 hours, 24 hours, on my nerves, waiting for their 
return. They might return or not. How am I going to tell their families? I 
became responsible then for informing the families for the burials, 
memorial services and so on. I felt defeat when people started talking 
behind closed doors and out in the open. It was stated publicly at the 
regional conference in the south that these people should be brought up 
before the party’s military tribunal. [talking about me] I felt defeated when 
the vice secretary general, or that peacock, a member in the political bureau 
stood up and said, ‘we in the political bureau had decided to stop all 
operations but Abdul Karim saw fit to continue himself.’ He was lying. 
That’s the moment I felt defeat, I left. I moved away and lived by the sea, 
never again mixed with the communists or non-communists. Honestly, in 
94 I lived at Golden Shores (beach managed by the party). In 95, I left 
behind anything that had to do with the party. In 94 I left and moved to the 
sea shore. I also rejected anything to do with civilian life. I wanted to live 
like an everyday citizen, an employee in a company and so on. But I wasn’t 
able to..I couldn’t live like an everyday citizen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
